THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERSONALITY IN STATE LEGISLATURES

BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the potential impacts of personality – as operationalized by the Big Five framework – on the preferences and behavior of state legislators. Within the study of American politics, scholars generally study the values, attitudes, and behaviors of the mass public or the characteristics and behaviors of political elites and the institutions in which they reside. Within both strains of research, we have developed an extraordinary understanding of how the political environment influences individual political thought and behavior.

In recent years, scholars of the mass public have undertaken renewed efforts to study the role biological and resulting psychological predispositions play in shaping political behavior. As the acceptance of the Big Five framework in psychology has increased, political science has seen a resurgence of work investigating the effects of personality on political values, attitudes, and behaviors. Scholars have generally studied these streams – the environment and more individually-based biological and psychological factors – separately. Furthermore, while researchers have recently undertaken a great deal of work on how biology and personality affect values, attitudes, and behaviors at the mass level, they have largely failed to undertake similar attempts in studies of elite political behavior.

In this dissertation, I develop a framework for placing the personality characteristics of state legislators into a broader institutional context. I argue personality traits serve as stable, biologically-based dispositions, and I demonstrate empirically personality does indeed influence the behavior of state legislators above and beyond existing institutional explanations. I argue personality plays an important role in shaping which activities legislators prefer to engage, the amount of time legislators dedicate to those particular activities, the number of introductions

and cosponsored measures to which legislators attach their names, the legislative success of legislators, and the pattern of campaign fundraising legislators undertake.

Rather than focusing solely on environmental explanations for engaging in activities such as introductions and cosponsorship or participating on committees, I argue for a more nuanced understanding of what motivates legislators to engage in legislative activities. Although factors such as constituency and party pressure certainly play significant roles in determining how legislators allocate their time in office, I believe individuals' personalities also affect whether and how often legislators put forth effort within the institution. In addition to bringing new insight regarding the antecedents of legislative politics, this dissertation helps to demonstrate the benefit of incorporating key concepts from political psychology in the study of elite political behavior.

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While in pursuit of both my undergraduate and graduate degrees, I have had the opportunity to meet and work with a plethora of wonderful individuals who, knowingly or unknowingly, have enriched my life both professionally and personally. As the dissertation project comes to a close and I move on to the next stage of my professional career, I simply have to express my gratitude to all those who nurtured me in my studies at both the undergraduate and graduate levels and in my personal life, as well. Without this support and advice, I would never have accomplished this endeavor.

Since my arrival in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, a number of people have significantly influenced my development as a scholar and a person. First and foremost, I must thank the individual who has served as my mentor and guide these last five years. I am incredibly grateful to Dr. Jeffery J. Mondak, my adviser and chair of this dissertation, for skillfully and (very) patiently guiding me throughout not only this project but my entire tenure in the Department of Political Science. During my first semester in the program, his political behavior seminar inspired what has grown into this dissertation. He has been nothing but supportive in my attempts to integrate sometimes opposing perspectives within the American politics subfield. Furthermore, his friendship and practical advice have helped me navigate the challenge of pursuing a doctorate.

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necessitating me to consider how my work fits within the broader study of politics and how to structure the project to facilitate later publications. Finally, Tracy, as the institutional counterbalance to Jeff's behavioral perspective, drove me to find answers to the question every researcher dreads: "So what?" Her invaluable critiques have propelled me in my efforts to consider how political psychology benefits the study of political institutions rather than simply adding new variables to old models.

During my time pursuing my undergraduate degree at Furman University, one professor played a profound role in my development as a student, scholar, and person. Dr. C. Danielle Vinson, my professor for a course on the American Congress, truly ignited my love for studying American politics. Seeing my burgeoning interest in political science, Dr. Vinson asked me to work as her summer research assistant. In a truly collaborative effort, she even had me write the first draft of the paper we eventually presented together at the 2007 American Political Science Association annual conference.

That research experience led to my interest in applying to graduate programs, and Dr. Vinson provided me with a great deal of guidance, support, and advice during that process. Furthermore, Danielle, as she's now become to me, has helped me through my years of graduate school. Undoubtedly, graduate school can be both incredibly rewarding and incredibly frustrating. Danielle has guided me through the ups and downs, celebrating my achievements and talking me off the ledge during the hard times. I cannot even begin to express the gratitude I feel toward this incredible educator and can only hope to approach being for my future students what she has been for me.

Undoubtedly, two other professors from my undergraduate years have continued to impact my development in graduate school. My academic journey in political science began at Furman University in Professor Michael Bressler's introduction to comparative politics class. While I found myself woefully underprepared for his class, Dr. Bressler planted the seeds of interest in my mind. As I progressed through my undergraduate and graduate education, Dr. Bressler continued to provide support and advice for which I am forever grateful. In addition, Dr. Judith Bainbridge, my freshman English professor, improved my writing and critical thinking skills by leaps and bounds. When I receive compliments on my writing skills, I simply tell them all the credit goes to Dr. Bainbridge.

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Chapter 1: A Theory of Personality and Elite Political Behavior

Introduction

Bruce Braley and David Loebsack represent the first and second congressional districts of Iowa, respectively. These two neighboring districts, situated in the eastern part of the state, have myriad similarities. Both districts are urban. Each contains a large city providing the home to a large industrial presence. The residents of these two districts are predominantly white, Protestant, and high-school educated. Finally, both districts are known as Democratic strongholds within the state.

In addition to the district similarities, Congressmen Braley and Loebsack also share a variety of characteristics themselves. The two men have similar backgrounds. Born and raised in Iowa, they are married with children and possess post-graduate degrees. Also, Congressmen Braley and Loebsack had little political experience before running for Congress. Both were elected to the House of Representatives in 2006, neither having served in an elected office nor having worked in any meaningful capacity for the local Democratic Party organization. Finally, both barely held onto their seats in the 2010 elections (Barone 2011).

Once in Congress, these two men have also behaved similarly. First, the two men have similar DW-NOMINATE scores. DW-NOMINATE scores provide a measure of ideological positioning within Congress by measuring with whom a member has voted during his time in office. Ranging from a possible score of -1 (liberal) to +1 (conservative), Braley has a DW-NOMINATE score of -0.360, while Loebsack has a score of -0.357. In addition, neither holds a seat on the more influential House committees nor do they hold any leadership positions within the party or the chamber. In addition, both men share an interest in military issues. However,

the two men do differ on one noteworthy aspect. In the three full Congresses in which these men have served (the 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses), Congressman Braley has sponsored 93 pieces of legislation while Congressman Loebsack has sponsored only 54 pieces. As the average member of Congress introduced 18 bills each two-year congressional cycle during the period of 2000-2008 (Tanger, Seals, Jr., and Laband 2011), Congressman Loebsack has behaved in a predictable manner, while Congressman Braley has sponsored nearly 100% more legislation than the average legislator did during the same number of years.

Current explanations for why individuals engage in particular legislative activities predict Braley and Loebsack should behave in similar manners. They have similar personal backgrounds. They have similar experiences with their party. Each has an interest in military affairs and serves on a committee involving the military (Veterans' Affairs and Armed Services). Their constituencies likely share similar preferences. However, Braley has sponsored almost twice the number of bills as Loebsack. If prior political experience, party, and constituency do not explain this difference, what does?

Political scientists, such as Hall (1996), have sought to understand why members of Congress participate in the creation and passage of legislation when they are under no obligation to do so. Hall identifies three reasons: the electoral connection, personal policy interest, and the furtherance of the president's agenda. Although participation rates in committees and subcommittees are low, the reasons behind a member's motivation influence where he or she puts forth effort. When the motivation is a policy interest, members spend more time in subcommittee and on bill markups; when the motivation is electoral, members put forth effort in more public arenas (63). Nonetheless, Hall stresses policies do not emanate

from the floor as a whole, the committee, or even subcommittees; rather, they arise from small groups of legislators inside these larger bodies.

Undoubtedly, external factors influence the activities of members of Congress. However, Congressmen Braley and Loebsack have similar electoral connections, likely possess similar personal policy interests, and support the president's agenda at similar levels. If careers, constituencies, and party affiliation do not account for the differences in Congressmen Braley and Loebsack, what does? By examining only the environmental factors influencing legislative behavior, I believe we have failed to provide sufficiently nuanced accounts of all the impulses leading to particular behaviors.

External factors undoubtedly prove consequential. Yet, in standard work on legislative behavior, we take a bird's-eye view on behavior but fail to consider important deviations from findings in the literature. Essentially, most current work on legislative behavior "…assumes members are continually looking *outward* for cues about how to legislate" (Burden 2007, 15). Certainly, partisanship and constituency preferences play roles in determining representatives' actions. However, by themselves, it also is clear they tell an incomplete story. What we miss with an exclusive focus on environmental variables is the possibility that legislators' core psychological dispositions also shape their behaviors. A full account of behavior must include three sets of variables: environmental factors, people's core biologically-influenced traits, and interactions between environmental factors and biologically-based factors (Mondak 2010, 182). While current legislative behavior research focuses almost exclusively on the environmental factors, this dissertation focuses on the latter two sets of variables.

By including personality as an explanatory variable, I believe we can understand behavior in light of the fact legislatures are composed of individuals who have different ways of thinking and interacting with the world. Outside forces assuredly influence the behavior of legislators. However, what forces the members perceive and how members channel their responses to these forces could also be shaped by rather basic and inherent factors.

Theory

I propose a theory of legislative behavior integrating measurements of personality alongside existing explanations. Rather than relying solely on factors external to the legislator (his constituency, his party, or the institution itself), I propose scholars also include measures of personality. In doing so, we gain a more nuanced and complete understanding of legislative behavior. Currently, work on legislative behavior paints legislators as strategic: they engage in particular behaviors because it benefits them electorally; provides them power within the institution; and, allows them to create public policy.

Undoubtedly, legislators do often act rationally and strategically, and external constraints affect how those legislators behavior (see Figure 1.1). However, personality may influence legislative behavior in two ways. First, personality could directly impact engagement in behaviors such as introductions and cosponsorship (see Figure 1.2). For example, why do members in safe seats continue to raise campaign funds? Perhaps they have strategically planned to build up a war chest for use in later elections. Or, the member could be extra-cautious or even paranoid about his reelection chances and raise money as self-reassurance.

However, personality might also impact how individuals perceive and interact with external constraints. In addition to both external constraints and personality directly influencing

behavior, personality and the environment likely interact (see Figure 1.3). By examining these interactions, we can understand the individual within a situation. In doing so, we gain greater knowledge of how internal and external factors interact to affect the final outcome – legislative behavior.

Rather than providing a competing explanation for legislators' behavior, I believe the use of personality offers a complement to extant approaches, allowing for a more complete understanding of the behaviors of interest to students of legislative politics. For instance, current literature suggests members (co)sponsor legislation because of directly observable reasons such as assisting the constituency, creating good public policy, building their reputations, and gaining electoral benefits and financial rewards. However, I believe the personalities of individuals also influence why, how, and to what extent members perceive and seek to achieve these goals.

The inclusion of personality in legislative behavior may seem like a challenge to rational actor approaches. As in the case of Congressmen Braley and Loebsack, rational-actor theories would dictate they behave similarly in Congress. But how do we account for two identical individuals forming different policy preferences or choosing different forms of legislative activity? These rational-actor perspectives essentially paint legislators as homogenous and do not allow for a rationality rooted in something other than costs and benefits and self-interest (Hibbing and Mondak 2012). The inclusion of personality allows for us to account for variance when external factors fail to predict differences in behavior. Thus, incorporating personality enriches the rational-actor approach. For example, after accounting for personality, we may see it is understandable why one actor is highly risk-averse and another is less so.

While I maintain the assumption of strategic action on the part of legislators – the consideration of party, constituency, and electoral environments – I also assume legislators possess individual differences driving their behaviors. When a legislator introduces or cosponsors a piece of legislation, he or she does so with the intention of furthering reelection goals, advancing constituency interest, and engaging in a psychologically satisfying activity by interacting with others in the institution. Members participate on committees to gather information, further party interests, gain perks for their constituencies, and to fulfill obligations. Intrinsic factors (here, personality) and external factors need not compete. Rather, intrinsic factors help determine how legislators respond to external pressures.

As demonstrated in the highly simplified Figure 1.4 and explained more fully in the remaining pages, the dimensions of personality begin at the genetic level. Genes, when combined with environmental factors and biological structures, lead to the possession of particular personality traits. Those personality traits then influence individuals' attitudes and beliefs, including those of a political nature. Those attitudes and beliefs then affect resulting behaviors.

Although literature at the level of the mass public studies politics at the genetic, trait dimension, attitudinal, and behavioral levels, extant literature on legislative behavior almost exclusively emphasizes studying such activity at the attitudinal and behavioral stages. Though the existing explanations for legislative behavior certainly explain a great deal, I believe we have skipped the first half of the causal chain. Although focusing on studying political behavior through genes proves problematic and controversial, studying elite political behavior at the

personality level allows for the inclusion of genetically-influenced predispositions without necessitating chromosomal-level analysis.[1]

Figure 1.4 alludes to the causal chain of the mass public. This dissertation proposes a slightly modified version for political elites (Figure 1.5). In the same manner as members of the mass public, genes influence the possession of personality traits. Personality traits, along with environmental influences, help determine the political values and attitudes an individual possesses. However, in addition to the external influences faced by everyday citizens, political elites must also contend with a variety of other external influences, including constituency desires, party preferences, and aspects of the institution such as professionalization. A legislator's personality, moderated by potential external influences, then affects resulting legislative behaviors such as the time allocated to particular legislative activities like fundraising, participation on committees, introductions and cosponsorship, and levels of legislative success.

Purpose and Significance of Study

I believe this investigation has importance for reasons both normative and practical. First, current institutional design rewards certain behaviors. If personality influences the levels of engagement in these various behaviors, then institutional design may favor certain personalities over others. On its face, this potential does not necessarily prove problematic.

[1] Indeed, work into the potential relationships between genes and politics continues to prove controversial (see, for example, Fowler and Dawes 2008 and Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2008). These studies still fail to account for the mechanism by which genetics influence political orientations and behaviors. Certainly, when a single gene rarely determines the occurrence of a disease (e.g. Huntington's Disease), one can understand skepticism about how a single gene or group of genes could determine something as complex as human behavior. However, employing personality as the independent variable allows us to account for the potential influence of genes on political behavior without requiring an individual to buy into the idea of discovering "the gene" for political behavior. Therefore, personality provides a potential missing mechanism, likely an important one at that.

However, it could lead to sub-optimal outcomes if the most valued traits are not those best serving the institution's interests. For instance, if rewards come to the gregarious over the hard-working, perhaps we reward the "wrong" people.

Second, extant explanations of legislative activity and entrepreneurship seem inherently unsatisfying. Scholars usually attribute legislative activities and entrepreneurship to constituency pressures, party pressures, reelection, or personal interest. All these factors assuredly influence the amount of time and resources a legislator commits to crafting and passing various pieces of legislation. Simultaneously, literature on congressional behavior discusses a difference between workhorses and show horses, individuals who work behind the scenes with little credit and individuals who attract attention but perform little of the everyday functions of legislators (see Payne 1980). Although in different areas, the exogenous forces above should lead all members of Congress to engage in entrepreneurship in some instances.

Why, then, do we see some legislators acting as workhorses in all areas of their careers, some legislators performing a mixture of workhorse and show horse behaviors, and some legislators acting as solely show horses (Hall 1987)? I believe personality helps explain these differences in behaviors. Employing a personality framework allows us to account for the psychological differences of these unique individuals. In doing so, we gain the potential to devise much richer and more comprehensive accounts of legislative behavior.

Third, political scientists often engage in the study of psychology at the mass level to the exclusion of elites. First, elites prove more difficult to access than members of the general public. Rather than directly approaching a legislator, one must often first make it through an initial gatekeeper in the form of staff. Second, should a staff member prove amenable, one

must then approach the legislator. Unfortunately, in an age of heightened media coverage and "gotcha" politics, legislators often express hesitancy at participating in studies. As a result, political psychologists have been unable to determine the extent to which psychological concepts travel. Applying a psychological framework allows scholars to ascertain how much personality influences perception and behavior in an environment where exogenous factors play such an important role. In other words, at what point do the exogenous factors determining legislative entrepreneurship overwhelm more endogenous explanations?

By focusing on a particular population who already exhibit less variance on other dimensions such as age, gender, educational backgrounds, and income, legislators also likely exhibit less variance in personality than found in the mass public as a whole. For instance, running for office requires a certain willingness to engage with others. As a result, legislators likely score higher on an extraversion dimension than would members of the general public. However, legislators are still individuals, individuals with unique personality characteristics likely influencing behavior beyond choosing to run for office.

Finally, as a result of an inability to study personality, scholars have made anecdotal claims about the inherent differences between elites and the mass public. Although we recognize the likelihood of personality's influence on behavior, we have avoided including personality in the study of elite political behavior. As a result, we as political scientists cannot make many definitive claims about the potential psychological differences between these two groups. However, including personality variables in studies of elite behavior provides a way to examine the potential similarities and differences between the mass public and its representatives.

In an effort to synthesize techniques and findings from the fields of psychology and mass political behavior, this dissertation presents four distinct analytical chapters concerning the potential effects of personality on legislative behavior. Guided by findings in the mass behavior literature, I will demonstrate three things in chapter two. First, I will verify elites will indeed answer personality-related survey questions. Second, I will illustrate variance in personality amongst elites does exist. Third, I will investigate how that variance in personality at the elite level follows patterns concerning ideology and partisanship found at the mass level. In the third chapter, I will move beyond establishing the groundwork and replicating previous findings to show how personality dimensions and institutional constraints help determine the amount of time legislators report engaging in particular activities, including meeting with constituents, writing and studying legislation, participating in committees and caucuses, and fundraising.

In chapter four, I will more thoroughly investigate personality's impact on three aspects of legislative behavior: introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative success. Rather than relying on roll-call behavior, which constitutes an activity in which all legislators participate, I have chosen to study introductions and cosponsorship because they afford the opportunity to study behaviors in which legislators choose their levels of participation and make unique contributions. In chapter five, I will discuss the implications for personality and gender. Rather than attributing behavioral differences in male and female legislators to gender itself, I argue the personalities of the men and women who serve in political office differ, and those personality differences drive variations in behavior. Finally, in chapter six, I will discuss the representational, policy, and real-world implications of individuals' personalities in a legislative

setting. As a prelude to these analyses, the remainder of this chapter steps back to develop a foundation for the study of personality in this area.

Personality and Political Science

For years, political scientists have recognized the potential importance of personality when discussing the behavior of both the mass public and elites (Fenno 1978; Campbell 1982; Lamb 1988). However, we have often failed to include personality as an explanatory variable in our research because of a difficulty in operationalization. Such a lack of implementation comes as no surprise because the guiding field for personality, psychology, has also had difficulty operationalizing personality as a construct. Indeed, for decades, psychologists struggled to simply define personality or its dimensions and put forth dozens of different scales measuring different facets of personality (McCrae and John 1992, 175). Unfortunately, these scales largely failed in mapping onto one another, creating confusion over which scale to use when measuring a particular aspect of personality. Additionally, scholars had myriad personality scales from which to choose but little overall guidance in choosing an appropriate scale.

However, in the last twenty-five years, perspectives within psychology have crystallized around a single framework, today known as the Big Five structure or Five Factor Model. Rather than replacing all the earlier works on personality, the Big Five framework has served as a unifying mechanism, helping to stitch together a more comprehensive view of personality based on previous efforts. The sheer number of different terminologies employed in previous works demonstrates the diversity in thinking about personality. Nevertheless, these multiple conceptualizations do display a good deal of overlap and convergence, and the Big Five seem to encompass these overlapping areas.

Origins of the Big Five Framework

Psychologists needed some kind of generalized framework or taxonomy before undertaking the task of understanding and measuring personality. Rather than focusing on the more microlevel facets of personality such as aggression or tolerance, this framework needed to create broader dimensions by which researchers could study specified areas of personality (John and Srivastava 1999). In creating this framework, early researchers began at a logical starting point – human language used to describe all the various ways individuals differ from one another. The lexical hypothesis, originating with Galton in 1884, predicts "…most of the socially relevant and salient personality characteristics have become encoded in the natural language" (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 117). Based on this hypothesis, scholars could use dictionaries to find a wide-ranging but finite number of adjectives from which to create clusters of similar or interrelated attributes.

Using *Webster's New International Dictionary*, Allport and Odbert (1936) created a comprehensive list of almost 18,000 words used to describe individuals and how they interact with one another. Although the authors began with over 550,000 words in the dictionary, a list of 18,000 words still proved unwieldy. In an effort to further refine their list, Allport and Odbert separated the words into four categories: personality traits, temporary states, evaluative judgments, and physical characteristics. By focusing on the words placed in the first classification, the authors narrowed their list to 4,504 words. Although Allport and Odbert provided the foundation for the study of lexical descriptions of personality, their list of descriptors certainly overlapped, and the 4,504 words still proved onerous to put into any practical use.

In the hopes of creating a more manageable list from which to work, Raymond Cattell (1943) took on the task of further refining Allport and Odbert's list of personality traits. Cattell set about categorizing the 4,500 words previously identified into groupings of synonyms headed by a key term. Then, Cattell added an antonym to the key term, creating a number of bipolar traits. After paring down the expanded list semantically, Cattell then empirically clustered the list based on correlations, leading him to 35 variables. Using an early form of factor analysis, Cattell identified 12 separate factors of personality, which later became part of his *Sixteen Personality Factors Questionnaire* (16PF). Although Cattell claimed similar findings across multiple sources of measurement (e.g. self-reports, observer ratings, and tests), later scholars had difficulties replicating his results. Indeed, Digman and Takemoto-Chock (1981) went so far as to state Cattell's findings could not have been correct (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 118).

Despite the controversy surrounding Cattell's findings, his work did spur other researchers to attempt to create more parsimonious lists of personality traits (see Fiske 1949 as an example). In a small-scale meta-analysis, Tupes and Christal (1961) reanalyzed the correlation matrices from eight different samples. In doing so, the authors found "…five relatively strong and recurrent factors and nothing more of any consequence" (14). The authors labeled these five factors as surgency, agreeableness, dependability, emotional stability, and culture. Others (e.g. Norman 1963, Borgatta 1964, and Digman and Takemoto-Chock 1981) used Cattell's original 35 variables and parsed them down to these same five factors. Lewis Goldberg (1981) later labeled these five factors as the Big Five, not because the five factors

constituted the end-all-be-all of personality but rather because the five factors contained such broad characteristics (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 119).

Others have described frameworks similar, but not identical, to the Big Five. For instance, Hans Eysenck described two personality dimensions – Neuroticism and Introversion/Extraversion – in his book *Dimensions of Personality* (1947); he later added a third dimension called Psychoticism (1970). These three dimensions greatly correspond with the dimensions within the Big Five. In addition to works such as these, others have tried to expound upon the use of traits. For instance, McCrae and Costa (1995) make clear personality traits do not serve as summaries of behavior; rather, individuals can infer traits based on observation and use those inferences to make predictions on future behaviors. Additionally, traits do not constitute the entirety of personality to those advocating the factors within the Big Five (McCrae and John 1992, 177). Instead, traits "…interact with the environment to produce culturally conditioned and meaning-laden characteristic adaptations" (McCrae and Costa 1995, 248).

Because of the origins of the Big Five, several competing theoretical perspectives have developed. These perspectives range from the purely descriptive to the purely biological. For instance, some individuals (see works by Goldberg) focus solely on the lexical component of personality rather than personality itself. As a result, they make no claims concerning causation (Saucier and Goldberg 1996). Although dissatisfying to those interested in personality as a concept, those advocating a lexical approach do highlight the phenotypic (observable) nature of personality. Others view the phenotypic aspects of personality as arising from particular genotypes meant to represent individuals' survival needs (see Buss 1996). McCrae and Costa

also support this more genetically-based approach, wherein personality traits act as central tendencies of behavior influenced by environment and changes in the brain and body (e.g. structural or hormonal).

This lack of agreement on a theoretical perspective both helps and hampers the Big Five as a construct. Many psychologists find the lack of theory troublesome in that the framework lacks grounding or testable causation. However, those advocating particular theoretical perspectives appreciate the Big Five's flexibility in allowing them to use it while not compromising their underlying views. Nevertheless, the Big Five trait dimensions have provided research into personality with a common ground and common vocabulary alongside a variety of well-validated instruments suitable to a variety of testing circumstances.

The Big Five Trait Dimensions and Their Effects on General Human Behavior

As previously discussed, the five-factor model provides a hierarchical organization of personality traits based on five broad dimensions: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. Remember, each of these broadly-based dimensions contains a plethora of facets. For example, overall measures of conscientiousness often contain more specific measures concerning industriousness, self-discipline, and orderliness (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 126). Additionally, one must remember no ideal personality exists. Scores on each of the trait dimensions can lead to a variety of positive and negative behaviors. Having a high or low score does not normatively reflect upon an individual. Rather, the score on a trait dimension provides a general sense of how an individual reacts to various environments.

Because of the variety of conceptualizations of the Big Five, some of the factors appear with different names in different works. Some researchers continue to use the names given to the Five Factors by Norman (1963): I – extraversion or surgency; II – agreeableness; III – conscientiousness; IV – emotional stability; and, V – culture. Others simply employ the Roman numerals and forgo using terms. In addition, some scholars employ Costa and McCrae's names for the traits: extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. Obviously, the Roman numerals remove the ambiguity created by the multiple names for the same dimensions. However, they prove more difficult to remember (McCrae and John 1992, 177-80). For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to employ Costa and McCrae's names for four of the trait dimensions. However, I employ emotional stability rather than neuroticism because the linguistic term neuroticism often has a negative connotation associated with it.

I - Extraversion

Extraversion relates to an individual's level of activity outside himself and with the world. Individuals scoring high on extraversion tend to seek out the company of others and engage in social activities. They enjoy talking and display a certain level of assertiveness. Individuals scoring low in extraversion (introverts) lack the exuberance of their counterparts. Often described as quiet or shy, introverts tend to need less stimulation from the outside world. However, introversion does not imply laziness. Introverts may possess a great deal of energy; they simply choose not to use that energy in the social world.

Studies have elucidated relationships between extraversion and a number of arenas of life. Extraversion appears to have a particularly strong influence in the workplace, leading to

greater success in sales positions (Barrick and Mount 1991) and being a workaholic (Burke, Matthiesen, and Pallesen 2006). In addition, extraversion relates to health behaviors, including risk-taking (Markey, Markey, Ericksen, and Tinsley 2006) and smoking (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, and Schutte 2006).

II – Agreeableness

Similar to extraversion in that it relates to individuals' level of interaction with others, agreeableness corresponds with a general concern for social harmony. Agreeable individuals value getting along with others and not making waves. As a result, others often describe these people as friendly, compassionate, helpful, altruistic, and willing to compromise. On the other hand, disagreeable individuals tend to place their own self-interest over concern for others. These individuals are often described as unfriendly or suspicious.

As agreeableness relates to how individuals get along with others, studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between this dimension and success in the classroom (Chowdhury and Amin 2006). Additionally, agreeableness has several interesting effects in the workplace, including overall level success in the workplace (Matthews and Oddy 1993) and levels of income from work (Judge, Livingston, and Hurst 2011). Also, agreeableness has relationships with adult health outcomes (Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt, and Dubanoski 2007) and engagement in smoking (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, and Schutte 2006) and other risky behaviors (Markey, et al. 2006).

III – Conscientiousness

Conscientiousness concerns an individual's ability to regulate internal impulses. As a trait dimension, conscientiousness, first and foremost, relates to responsibility. Described as

careful, thorough, and deliberate, conscientious individuals generally work hard and exhibit reliability. Individuals scoring low in conscientiousness may be characterized as irresponsible and unable to internally motivate themselves to finish a task.

Scholars have demonstrated a number of ways in which conscientiousness affects everyday behaviors. The conscientious display higher levels of honesty (Horn, Nelson, and Brannick 2004); better eating habits (Goldberg and Strycker 2002); and, even have better driving records than the average individual (Arthur and Graziano 1996). In addition, conscientious people have greater success in the classroom (Chowdhury and Amin 2006) and higher scores on job performance criteria (Barrick and Mount 1991). On the negative side, those scoring high in conscientiousness tend to have high levels of workaholism (Burke, Matthiesen, and Pallesen 2006). Conversely, those scoring low in conscientiousness have a higher predilection to engage in procrastination (Dewitt and Schouwenburg 2002).

IV – Emotional Stability

Emotional stability relates to a person's tendency to experience negative emotions. Those scoring low on emotional stability are emotionally reactive and vulnerable to stress. At the other end of the scale, individuals high in emotional stability exhibit calmness and an even temper. However, one must remember the emotionally stable do not necessarily experience an abundance of positive emotions; those positive emotions instead relate to extraversion. Rather, they simply do not react strongly to stress (Costa and McCrae 1980).

Unlike the other dimensions in the Big Five, most of the research into the effects of emotional stability comes in the field of medical implications. Because of emotional stability's relationship to stress and anxiety, scholars have tested the correlations between emotional

stability and overall levels of happiness (Hills and Argyle 2001), marital problems (O'Leary and Smith 1991), and hypochondria (Bolger and Schilling 1991). In the workplace, emotional stability positively correlates with job success and performance (Judge and Bono 2001).

V – Openness to Experience

The newest and most controversial of the Big Five dimensions (McCrae 1990), scholars characterize openness to experience through the pursuit of intellectual interests, general curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, and unconventional values. Although related to intellect, openness to experience does not measure intelligence. Individuals scoring high in openness to experience value art, adventure, and the imagination. Conversely, individuals scoring low in openness to experience tend to prefer the routine over new experiences and the straightforward over the complex.

Individuals with high levels of openness to experience tend to have more positive adult health outcomes (Hampson, Goldberg, Vogt, and Dubanoski 2007), possibly because they eat more fiber (Goldberg and Strycker 2006). Conversely, those high in openness to experience also tend to engage in other high-risk health behaviors (Booth-Kewley and Vickers 1994). In terms of the more thought-based aspects of this dimension, scholars have demonstrated relationships between openness and divergent thinking (McCrae 1987). In addition, highly open individuals tend to express less ethnocentrism and right-wing authoritarianism (Butler 2000).

The Big Five's Effects on Political Behavior

Clearly, each of the trait dimensions of the Big Five has effects on how everyday individuals behave and interact with the world. Certainly, personality affects how individuals work and live. But in what other ways does personality impact individuals' lives? Only relatively

recently have scholars begun investigating how the Big Five affect more politically-oriented attitudes and behaviors.

Political scientists have focused a great deal of attention on ideology over the years (see Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960 and Converse 1964 as the seminal examples). Indeed, recognizing the possible link between personality and political ideology, scholars as far back as the 1950s have investigated personality's effect on the core beliefs and values held by individuals (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Stouffer 1955; Lane 1962; and, St. Angelo and Dyson 1968). However, these earlier works lack the coherent framework provided by the Big Five.

In more current research, political ideology significantly and consistently correlates with two of the five trait dimensions. First, liberals tend to express higher levels of openness to experience while conservatives exhibit lower levels of the same. Second, conservatives possess higher levels of conscientiousness than do liberals (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha 2010).

In addition, some studies have demonstrated positive relationships between conservatism and emotional stability and agreeableness with liberalism (Mondak 2010). In addition, personality also matters in terms of more concrete political affiliation, with researchers demonstrating positive relationships between extraversion and conscientiousness and support for center-right parties and agreeableness and openness to experience with support for center-left parties (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 1999; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, and Zimbardo 2003; Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, and Fraley 2007;

Schoen and Schumann 2007). Additionally, scores on personality dimensions, particularly openness and extraversion, also correlate with particular policy positions (Mondak 2010, 138).

Again, earlier scholars expressed an interest in identifying links between personality variables and more concrete political behaviors (see Mussen and Wyszynski 1952), yet these studies also lacked a cohesive framework. But not all traits matter for all forms of political behaviors. For instance, openness to experience positively correlates with turning out to vote, and emotional stability negatively correlates with the same. However, conscientiousness, the most logical factor to equate with voting, demonstrates no relationship at all (Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, and Anderson 2010). Indeed, the conscientious, known for their respect of order and stability, avoid political protesting and casting votes (Mondak et al. 2010).

Personality also has a relationship with political efficacy, both internal and external. Agreeable individuals have higher levels of internal efficacy, or confidence in their ability to understand and influence politics (Mondak and Halperin 2008). Additionally, openness to experience demonstrates a strongly positive correlation with internal efficacy, likely because openness to experience relates to feelings of self-confidence (Mondak 2010, 124). Finally, Vecchione and Caprara (2009) demonstrate a similar relationship between internal efficacy and openness to experience and extraversion.

Not surprisingly, extraverts enjoy participating in the more social of political activities, such as attending and speaking at political meetings, contacting elected officials, and signing petitions (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, Raso, and Ha 2011). Need to evaluate (NE), or the "…proclivity to create and hold attitudes" (996) and an aspect of openness to experience, positively correlates with the number of

evaluative beliefs an individual holds about a candidate, the likelihood of voting, the likelihood of using party identification when voting (Bizer, Krosnick, Holbrook, Wheeler, Rucker, and Petty 2004), and the probability of working for a campaign (Mondak, Canache, Seligson, and Hibbing 2011). Additionally, openness to experience plays an important role in whether an individual tries to convince others to vote for or against a candidate, even when controlling for political knowledge and internal efficacy (Mondak et al. 2010).

Finally, personality impacts whether and how much individuals engage in political discussion and seek out political information (Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011). First, openness to experience strongly and positively correlates with the number of discussion partners in a respondent's political network; the number of days a week a respondent discusses politics; and, an individual's amount of political knowledge (Mondak 2010, 100-102). Because individuals high in openness look for information, they logically include more individuals within their social networks in an effort to seek out a variety of different opinions. And, by seeking out all this information, those open to experience possess a much greater amount of political knowledge than those less willing to seek out information (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2011).

Second, conscientiousness again plays the spoiler: rather than increasing political knowledge, conscientiousness negatively corresponds with levels of political knowledge (Mondak 2010, 102). This surprising finding likely occurs because those measuring high in conscientiousness value other things in their lives over politics – their families, jobs, hobbies, etc. In other words, the conscientious will only engage in politics at higher levels when they view political engagement as important. If they prioritize other activities over politics, then the

highly conscientious are no more likely to politically participate at higher levels than their less-conscientious counterparts (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Bloeser, McCurley, and Mondak 2012).

Personality and Elite Political Attitudes and Behaviors

Although few scholars have investigated the impact of personality on the behaviors of political elites recently, researchers have published reports sporadically for the last century. Because scholars can study personality in myriad ways, many of the earlier investigations of personality and political elites centered on small-N case studies (e.g., Lasswell 1930; George and George 1964; Kearns 1976; Latcham 1982; Barber 1992; Sigelman 2002). While these efforts prove useful in understanding the psyches of single individuals, they fail to provide any way to generalize a pattern to political elites as a whole.

Nonetheless, some scholars have undertaken more systematic studies of personality and political elites, even before the advent of the Big Five framework. These studies tend to fall along two lines of research: determining the differences between elites and the public and providing categorizations of elites. In the first vein, McConaughy (1950) administered personality batteries to members of the South Carolina state legislature and two control groups and found differences between the legislators and the control groups; the legislators displayed higher levels of emotional stability and extraversion than did those in the control samples. In addition, Hennessy (1959) did not detect many differences between "politicals" and "apoliticals" but did find a difference in what he termed "power drive".

Additionally, Barber (1965), Costantini and Craik (1980) and Stone and Baril (1979) all sought to investigate the personality differences between political elites. These authors,

however, began to go beyond describing the personality differences and also investigated how these differences affect behaviors. For instance, in studying Maine legislators, Costantini and Craik demonstrated how various combinations of personality attributes affect legislative effectiveness and perceptions of success. All of these studies attest to the usefulness of describing and categorizing legislators based on personalities and lead one to consider how personality likely affects other legislative behaviors. The above works demonstrate political elites will indeed answer personality questions. However, these works are all over three decades old (exceptions have more recently occurred in comparative literature, including Feldman 1996 and Best 2011)[2].

In more recent research involving political elites and the Big Five factors, other scholars have also investigated the personalities of followers and their political leaders. Not surprisingly, voters evaluate the personalities of candidates largely along the lines of extraversion and agreeableness (Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 2002). In other words, voters prefer sociable and cooperative candidates. Additionally, elites appear to differentiate ideologically along the same lines as the mass public (Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Remmel, and Turner 2012) with two notable exceptions: center-left elites tend to score higher in extraversion than center-left voters, and center-right elites tend to score higher in agreeableness than center-right voters (Caprara et al. 2003). However, these two exceptions make sense when considered inside the political realm of campaigns and policymaking. Nevertheless, while these studies incorporate the Big Five in their models, the focus of these studies largely remains with

[2] Additionally, Rubenzauer, Faschingbauer, and Ones (2000) used Costa and McCrae's NEO-PI-R to evaluate and characterize the personality of 41 American presidents. However, instead of using ratings provided by the individuals in question, a truly impossible task, the authors had experts on each president complete the surveys. In a content analysis of presidential speeches, Thoemmes and Conway (2007) further analyze the Rubenzauer et al. data.

studying the mass public and its personality perceptions of elites rather than a thorough investigation of personality and its consequences for political elites themselves.

Heritability of Personality

It appears as though personality plays a significant role in determining political beliefs, values, and behaviors at the both the mass and elite levels. However, from where does personality come? A number of scholars have undertaken studies concerning the biological origins of personality. As with much research on genetics and human behavior, the bulk of this research has centered on the use of twin studies. In these studies, scientists exploit the genetic similarities and differences between monozygotic and dizygotic twins. Monozygotic twins (MZ), often referred to as identical twins, have identical genes. Therefore, researchers can attribute any differences observed in behavior between MZ twins to environmental factors. Dizygotic twins (DZ), known more commonly as fraternal twins, share approximately 50% of their genes. Giving DZ twins the same heritability level as non-twin siblings means any differences in behavior could be genetic or environmental in origin. By comparing the differences between MZ twins and DZ twins, scientists can more accurately estimate the effects of genetic and environmental factors. Twin studies further break down environmental factors into shared and unshared environments. For instance, a shared environment could entail the home in which both twins lived, while an unshared environment could designate the various classroom environments each twin experienced independent of the other.

Undoubtedly, twin studies are not perfect. For instance, families treat their pairs of MZ twins differently. Some families choose to emphasize the similarities while other families try to raise the children independently. In addition, one cannot assume parents raise MZ twins and DZ

twins in identical environments, which allows for the attribution of all differences to genetics. Also, we can easily distinguish the difference between genetics and shared environmental influences. However, the unshared environmental category often serves as the catch-all for variance not attributable to genetics or the shared environment. Yet, we cannot rule out how much variance within the unshared environment researchers could attribute to gene-environment interactions and measurement error. While keeping these issues in mind, however, one can get a general sense of the influence of genetics on behavior.

Heritability is the proportion of phenotypic (observable) variation in a population due to genotypic (genetic) variation between individuals. These scores range from zero to one, with higher scores indicating a greater genetic influence. More importantly, these scores describe the influence of genetics across populations, not within the individuals. Therefore, a hypothetical heritability score of 0.70 for handedness indicates genes account for 70% of the variance across the population and *not* a 70% genetic influence on my being left-handed.

Studies have repeatedly demonstrated the heritability of the Big Five. These heritability scores typically range from 0.25 to 0.50 (see Tellegen, Lykken, Bouchard, Wilcox, Segal, and Rich 1988; Bouchard, Jr. and McGue 2003; Bouchard, Jr. 2004). These same studies attribute virtually no influence to the shared environment, leaving the remainder to the unshared environment as providing the rest of the variance in personality. With such scores, it would seem as though we have left a great deal unexplained.

However, we have several reasons to argue against such an idea. First, few scholars investigating genetics would claim genes can account for all the variance in a particular trait or behavior. Indeed, 0.80 appears to mark the apex of heritability (for height; see Xu 2006).

Therefore, scores of 0.25 to 0.50 appear impressive. Additionally, McCrae and Costa (2003) and McCrae, Jang, Livesley, Riemann, and Angleitner (2001) argue measurement error inflates the impact of the unshared environment.

Therefore, rather than representing the maximum in genetic variation, heritability scores likely represent the *minimum* influence of genetics on variance in a trait or behavior. The studies arguing measurement errors inflates the impact of the unshared environment correct for reliance on self-reporting by comparing those reports with observer ratings and by accounting for implicit personality theory, which claims individuals make assumptions about trait covariance (e.g. assuming all introverts must also exhibit low openness to experience). For instance, Riemann, Angleitner, and Strelau (1997) produced heritability estimates based on self-reported data, peer-reported data, and a combination of self-reported and peer-reported data. When investigating self-reported data, the authors produced heritability estimates ranging from a low of 0.42 (agreeableness) to a high of 0.56 (extraversion). However, when the authors employed both self-reported and peer-reported data, the heritability estimates jumped; the heritability estimate for agreeableness increased to 0.66, and the heritability estimate for extraversion increased to 0.68. However, other trait dimensions moved even higher. For example, self-reported data led to a heritability estimate of 0.54 for openness to experience; that same estimate increased to 0.79 when accounting for both self- and peer-reported data, a level almost identical to the heritability estimates for height.

The strong levels of heritability for the Big Five speak directly to causality. If genes acted as the sole factors leading to variation in personality traits, and personality traits lead to variation in thoughts and behaviors, then genes indirectly influence thoughts and behaviors

through personality traits. Such findings would allow us to concretely say the directionality of causation for personality and politics begins at genes, goes through personality traits, and ends with predispositions, attitudes, and behaviors. Assuredly, environment and context play roles in that chain. However, environment and context come after genetics in the causal model. If the heritability of personality were low, there would be a greater possibility that the non-heritable content of personality traits is what matters for various facets of human behavior, including legislative behavior. However, with heritability instead being relatively high—even approaching the 0.80 mark associated with human height, widely regarded as among the most heritable of attributes—we can feel relatively confident any impact of personality on behavior signals an antecedent role for biology.

Stability of Personality over Time

If genes do influence personality, it stands to reason personality should remain largely stable over time. Indeed, the usefulness of personality as a predictor of behavior depends greatly on personality's stability over time. If personality changes drastically depending upon the situation in which the individual finds himself, then personality does not provide us with any leverage in predicting future behavior. In addition, any cross-sectional studies involving personality as an independent variable would appear highly suspect because those studies measure personality at only a single point in time.

A major assumption behind the earlier work concerning personality traits rested on their stability over time. If personality is stable, life grows more predictable. Indeed, McCrae and Costa (1994) point out that within the political realm, "They [individuals] can vote on the basis of candidates' records, with some assurance that future policies will resemble past ones"

(175). However, if expressions of personality vary over time, then personality does not provide much in the way of predictive power.

It seems a debate concerning the stability of personality over time has existed for as long as scholars have studied personality. Even before the emergence of the Big Five trait dimensions, scholars such as Thorndike (1903) argued "…there are no broad, general traits of personality, no general and consistent forms of conduct which, if they existed, would make for consistency of behaviour and stability of personality, but only independent and specific stimulus-response bonds or habits" (29). As the study and inclusion of personality increased over later decades, scholars believed they had discredited such criticism by repeatedly demonstrating the same trait structure.

Nonetheless, a resurgence of debate concerning the stability of personality occurred after the first round of research into the Big Five. The most prominent early critic, Walter Mischel, argued individual differences measured in personality inventories had little relationship to subsequent behavior (1968). Such an argument undermined the predictive importance and value of personality traits. Rather than personality affecting how individuals behaved in a situation, the environment and contextual cues played the major roles and affected an individual's personality. Mischel's criticism essentially paralyzed the field of trait psychology for years (Goldberg 1995).

Although many scholars expressed frustration with Mischel's criticisms, they likely took his argument to its extreme. Scholars conducted a flurry of studies in response, claiming an individual's personality was largely concrete by the age of thirty (Costa and McCrae 1988; McCrae and Costa 1994; McCrae and Costa 1986; Terracciano, Costa, and McCrae 2005; see

Hampson and Goldberg 2006 and Ardelt 2000 as counterexamples). These studies testify to the overall stability of personality traits over time.

However, while Mischel expressed concern over the low correlations between traits and behaviors, he did not dismiss them outright. As much of Mischel's apprehension grew from concerns over observer ratings, later research has successfully defused much of the tension (see Eysenck and Eysenck 1990 as an example). However, inclusion of Mischel's argument has led many scholars to believe less deterministically in traits, which has led to an increase in the study of trait-situation interactions.

Indeed, Fleeson (2004) goes so far as to say both sides were right: an individual's behavior over the short term proves highly variable and necessitates a more process-oriented approach, while an individual's long-term behavior proves highly stable and can be explained by interpersonal differences. Essentially, while intrapersonal stability may vary greatly, interpersonal stability seems relatively constant. One must think of personality traits as central tendencies rather than as deterministic forces. Those scoring low on agreeableness do not yell at everyone with whom they come into contact. For instance, a disagreeable individual may feel comfortable arguing with just about anyone but his wife. However, on the whole, one can feel comfortable believing such individuals will engage in arguments and have less sensitivity to others' feelings. Personality traits do not act as the sole determinant of behavior. However, they do provide researchers with a reasonable way to predict individuals' future behaviors and reactions.

Reliability and Validity of the Big Five

In addition to demonstrating personality's stability over time, scholars have undertaken numerous studies testing the reliability and validity of different methods of measuring the Big Five (McCrae and Costa 1987; Costa and McCrae 1986; Borkenau 1992; John, Naumann, and Soto 2008). These works demonstrated the ratings of other individuals highly correlated with self-reported personality measures (McCrae 1982; McCrae and Costa 1983; Funder, Kolar, and Blackman 1995; Watson, Hubbard, and Wiese 2000). Certainly, agreement between the individual and another person tends to increase as the two know each more intimately and for longer periods of time.

However, it appears individuals generally know their personalities and provide realistic descriptions of themselves to investigators rather than responding to some kind of social desirability bias (Graziano and Tobin 2002; McCrae and Costa 1983). Additionally, scholars have created measures to correct for extreme differences between individuals and others, likely allowing for a more precise measurement of personality traits (McCrae 1993; McCrae 1994; McCrae, Stone, Fagan, and Costa 1998). Furthermore, because of the high correlation between individuals and others' ratings of them, scholars have grown more comfortable in using others' ratings of an individual's personality, particularly when that individual cannot be reached or studied.

In addition, it does not appear as though the way individuals use vocabulary in everyday life has affected how the terms apply to individuals. For instance, Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda, and Hughes (1998) demonstrate small group differences in personality based on race, gender, age, and educational level (though see Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae 2004 for a cautionary

note).[3] With such results, it appears as though the five dimensions found over time did not arise as merely some lexical fluke. Indeed, Digman (1990) goes so far as to say, "At a minimum, research on the five-factor model has given us a useful set of very broad dimensions that characterize individual differences. These dimensions can be measured with high reliability and impressive validity" (436).

The various instruments used have included ratings by others and a variety of different questionnaires. These questionnaires tend to rely on Goldberg's Big Five framework or Costa and McCrae's Five-Factor Model. Both systems posit that five trait dimensions compose a substantial amount of individual's personalities. However, the systems differ somewhat in terminology, theoretical grounding, positions on causation, and type of questionnaire items.

First, Goldberg titles his five factors as surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and intellect, while Costa and McCrae term their five dimensions extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. Second, Goldberg arrived at his five factors through a reexamination of the lexical hypothesis (1990) whereas Costa and McCrae took a more contextual approach wherein traits (of a genetic origin) interacted with environmental contexts.

Third, Goldberg largely sidesteps the issue of causation and discusses only the resulting behaviors and qualities of traits, while Costa and McCrae posit a combination of genetics and environment as the cause and expression of those dimensions. Finally, due to the different methods by which they arrived at their factors, the two camps differ in how their

[3] Allik and McCrae (2005) undertook a study on the geographic distribution of personality based on the five-factor model. While typical measures of geography, such as distance from the equator and mean temperature, did not prove significant, geographically-proximate cultures had more similar personality profiles, with a clear demarcation between American/European cultures and Asian and African cultures. However, the authors attribute this difference more to acculturation rather than genetics.

questionnaires measure the five dimensions. Goldberg uses single words and adjectival phrases, and Costa and McCrae use complete sentences. As a result, while Costa and McCrae's Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) inventory has proven the best validated measure because the sentences tend to negate potentially ambiguous adjectives, scholars tend to employ Goldberg's Trait Descriptive Adjectives (TDA) more frequently because of its brevity (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 131).

The Big Five across Multiple Cultures and Languages

The results presented so far suggest the Big Five provides a replicable structure of personality traits. However, scholars conducted all these studies in English, based on lexical clustering of adjectives found in English dictionaries, and in the United States of America. However, generalizability across cultures and languages provides another important criterion for a successful personality taxonomy. According to Buss (1996), evolution has made the same tasks universally important to the survival of humans. It stands to reason, then, that the differences between individuals and the ways people describe those differences should also occur universally. Therefore, not only do cross-cultural studies involving personality help further our understanding of differences and similarities between societies (McCrae 2000), studies of cross-cultural generalizability prove vitally necessary to support the idea of a five-factor structure (Katigbak, Church, and Akamine 1996).

Scholars conducted the first non-English studies in Dutch and German, both Germanic languages linguistically very similar to English. Not surprisingly, these studies found only five factors of personality dimensions across different adjectives and samples, though the openness to experience factor in Dutch emphasized "…[u]nconventionality and [r]ebelliousness rather

than [i]ntellect and [imagination]" as in English (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008, 121). However, the difference between the facets of the openness to experience factors of English and Dutch likely involves differences in how the authors included different types of descriptive words.

Others have undertaken studies in non-Germanic languages, including Italian (Caprara and Perugini 1994), Chinese (Yang and Bond 1990), Croatian (Mlacic and Goldberg 2007); Filipino (Katigbak, Church, and Akamine 1996); Greek (Saucier, Georgiades, Tsouasis, and Goldberg 2005); and, Turkish (Somer and Goldberg 1999). This strain of literature demonstrates factors similar to the Big Five occurring in other languages. While this evidence proves strongest in the Germanic languages (e.g. English, German, Dutch/Afrikaans, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, and Icelandic), non-Germanic languages also appear to have five factors, as well. However, the non-Germanic languages also sometimes contain a sixth factor, such as honesty-humility, a factor likely subsumed within the Germanic languages as agreeableness (Ashton, Lee Perugini, Szarota, de Vries, di Blas, Boies, and de Raad 2004; see also Saucier and Goldberg 2001).

Evidence as to the generalizability of the five factors found in English seems weakest for openness to experience, which different languages and cultures appear to conceive in a variety of manners. However, we must keep two things in mind. First, any additional factors are just that – additional. Scholars have produced evidence the five factors of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience exist in a variety of cultures and languages, with some cultures tacking on a sixth (or seventh) factor. Second, the additional factors appear sporadically in research, oftentimes found by one group of researchers but not by another studying the same language. Nevertheless, the five trait dimensions found in English appear to be universal.

Other Criticisms of the Big Five

Other Independent Variables Accounting for Personality Differences

Perhaps studies including a standard battery of independent variables such as age, education level, gender, or race account for personality. If these variables account for differences in personality, scholars would gain little in the way of accounting for personality independent of these other factors. One could argue, for instance, age would correspond with openness to experience or conscientiousness; perhaps the young possess a propensity for risk-taking behaviors not seen in older populations or the old prove more responsible and dutiful than younger cohorts.

Previous scholars (Goldberg, Sweeney, Merenda, and Hughes, Jr. 1998; Mondak 2010) examined whether these four demographic indicators correlate with the Big Five personality dimensions. Employing bivariate correlations between personality dimensions and demographic indicators, this research has demonstrated at most only moderate relationships. As a result, scholars can feel confident the content measured through personality dimensions differs from the content measured through demographic indicators. Therefore, including personality dimensions in addition to demographic indicators brings additional value to research.

Number of Factors – Too Many or Too Few?

The five-factor framework often faces criticisms of the Goldilocks variety – too many or too few factors. Some scholars claim the five factors, in fact, really equate to only two or three factors. Remember, Eysenck's models (1947 and 1970) call for three dimensions: psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism. Additionally, Digman (1997) argues the five factors actually

group together into two metatraits – what he calls alpha and beta. In his model, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience comprise one metatrait, while extraversion and emotional stability comprise the other. Unfortunately, the various proposals for combining the five factors are mutually inconsistent; a trait one model emphasizes will collapse into a different domain in another. As a result, it appears all five trait dimensions prove necessary to the framework.

However, the more critical concern involves not too many factors but rather not enough. Some people argue five factors is simply too few and prefer other models of personality, like Cattell's 16PF for nuance and stronger predictive power. Scholars of this line of thinking argue five factors seem a bit on the low side when describing the complexity of human personality or find additional factors in their own works (see Lanning and Gough 1991).

Assuredly, other studies have found additional factors. However, these studies often vary on the dimensions and contents of this extra factor. These findings could occur due to differences in languages and culture (see above), method bias, varying sampling procedures, or the selection of variables (McCrae and John 1992, 191). Nevertheless, these studies also repeatedly confirm the five factors already in existence. Extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience appear to represent universal dimensions of personality, regardless of language, culture, or statistical method. As a result, we as social scientists should feel most comfortable employing these five dimensions and withholding approval on the odd additional sixth factor found sporadically.

Additionally, most advocates of the five-factor approach do not believe the five dimensions represent the end-all-be-all of personality. Rather, they represent the highest level

of a hierarchical framework of personality, providing a foundation on which to conduct further research. Finally, explorations of personality's effects on political attitudes and behavior are in their infancy. Rather than trying to subsume all behavior into two overarching trait dimensions or determining how aspects of each trait dimension manifest themselves in particular behaviors (e.g. studying particular components of openness to experience), we must first understand how these five trait dimensions matter.

Realism vs. Projection

Implicit personality theory, or the general expectations we build about individuals' personalities after observing some of their central traits, also poses a threat to the validity of the Big Five framework. If individuals' implicit personality theories structure themselves on dimensions similar to those of the Big Five, then the Big Five could simply represent a cognitive artifact. Rather than arising from the individuals we observe, we could be forcing our own projections onto others. The extreme conclusion of this line of thinking mandates the Big Five has occurred as an artifact of language. However, Borkenau (1992) discusses two reasons why this criticism falls flat.

First, if individuals simply project a cognitive schema onto personality, then substituting the personality terms used in a lexical analysis would change the factors at which we arrive. However, studies in languages radically different from English still come to the conclusion of the same five factors. Surely, one can more easily believe human nature has created terms to describe these five factors rather than each language and culture independently creating the same set of five factors (McCrae and John 1992, 193). Second, studies have repeatedly demonstrated the link between the Big Five and behavior. If not true manifestations of

personality but rather cognitive schemas of personality, how can we explain the Big Five's apparent effects on behavioral outcomes?

Research Design

This dissertation employs survey methodology with a variety of independent and dependent variables designed to test the potential influences of personality on legislative behavior. Put in the field in September 2010 (just before the November general elections), the survey researchers contacted 7,199 state legislators by email, of which 835 legislators responded (a response rate of approximately 12%)[4]. The researchers assured participants of confidentiality. They also provided their contact information in the forms of phone numbers and email addresses; however, in no instance did a legislator contact the investigators to express concerns of confidentiality. The primary focus of the study was on legislative attitudes towards legislative professionalism. However, the survey also asked respondents about partisanship, length of service, attitudes towards particular legislative behaviors, and a short personality inventory.

Unfortunately, not all of the responses provided prove useable for my purposes. First, not all 835 individuals answered the personality-related questions in the survey. Because these

[4] The survey did not include any mechanism to ensure legislators themselves completed the survey and did not delegate the task to a staffer. However, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, self-reported measures and reports from second parties familiar with the subject prove highly correlated. Unfortunately, I do not have the data to test whether self-reported personality information and personality information provided by staffers correlate within this sample. Nevertheless, prior research in both legislative behavior and personality leads me to believe I can trust and employ information potentially provided by legislative staffers, even if those staffers prove relative strangers (Watson 1989) and especially if one considers legislative staffers as part of an enterprise wherein staff "...share an identity and a set of goals not because of the payroll they are on, the office they work in, or the tasks they perform, but because of their loyalty and commitment to that particular member" (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981). Furthermore, because the majority of respondents serve in less professionalized legislatures, we can likely assume one of two things. Because legislators in less professionalized legislatures often lack access to permanent staff, it is more than likely the members themselves completed the surveys. Yet, even if a staffer did complete the survey, that staffer likely has greater knowledge of the legislator because he or she is one of only one or two staffers.

questions provide the basis for my independent variables of interest, I have chosen to perform my analyses on those responses containing answers to the all ten personality questions. Therefore, I have 685 useable responses for analysis in the following chapters[5]. Nevertheless, I cannot employ all of these responses in predicting my dependent variables. For example, several states (including Idaho, Kansas, Oregon, and Pennsylvania) do not maintain records on introductions and cosponsorship. However, the remaining sample still provides a large number of observations with which to test how personality affects legislative behaviors and preferences.

Conclusion

An individual's personality seems a logical place to investigate when searching for explanations of attitudes and behaviors. Indeed, for decades, academics have sought to include personality in their studies of human behavior. Unfortunately, the lack of a definition of personality within scholarly literature, the resulting myriad conceptualizations of personality, and the multiple personality scales led to great confusion and a body of research composed of studies isolated from one another.

However, recent innovations in psychological research have helped define some of the major boundaries of personality through lexical analysis and genetic studies. The resulting five trait dimensions of personality – extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience – make a great deal of intuitive sense and help explain a

[5] Please see chapter 2 for a discussion on the potential differences between the group of legislators who provided personality information and the group who did not. Briefly, t-tests demonstrate almost no significant differences between the two groups save one: the group who did not provide personality information comes from more professionalized state legislatures than the group who did provide personality information. However, even when I use other methods to increase the overall Ns of the sample (e.g. using imputation for those missing responses or including those who answered at least one question per trait dimension), the overall results stay the same.

variety of different attitudes and behaviors, ranging from the mundane to the consequential. While critics have brought up a number of concerns over this framework, studies have demonstrated the reliability and validity of the instruments used to measure the five dimensions.

Some worried the framework only applied to English speakers and the Western world. Yet, cultural studies have demonstrated the universality of these five trait dimensions. Some have worried the framework contains too many factors while others worry the framework contains too few. Perhaps critics of the Five Factor model simply do not appreciate the roundness the number five provides. Although the Big Five do not represent the entirety of personality – for personality obviously expresses itself as a function of genetics, the environment, contextual changes, and structural changes to the brain – they do provide us with a cohesive framework, allowing scholars across multiple subfields and even disciplines to speak to one another in a coherent and logical fashion.

The use of personality variables provides researchers an opportunity to account for internal factors motivating the behavior of individuals. Because of the largely genetic origins of personality, researchers can employ personality variables and find reassurance in the directionality of the causal chain. Genes, in combination with environmental influences and structural changes to the brain, influence personality. Personality affects beliefs, values, and attitudes; and, those beliefs, values, and attitudes affect the behaviors in which individuals engage. Personality allows us to account for the "nature" side of the equation in the "nature vs. nurture" debate without necessitating studying and attributing political attitudes and behaviors to the genotypic level, something even those in the hard sciences fail to achieve.

With the acceptance of the Big Five framework has come a flurry of research concerning the effects of personality on individuals' beliefs and behaviors. While initial work investigating personality's impact on behavior focused on aspects of life such as education, work, and health, scholars in political science have increasingly begun to employ the Big Five framework to study political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Through these works, researchers have demonstrated a clear link between personality and politics. Indeed, personality influences the ideological stances of individuals and whether and how much individuals engage with aspects of political life, including everything from voting to news consumption to protesting.

However, the vast majority of these works take place at the level of the mass public for understandable reasons – the mass public represents the majority of those encountering politics, they prove the foundation for the construction of our political system, and they are easiest to study. Indeed, for years, political scientists have recognized the possibility of personality's effects on the political behaviors of political elites. Unfortunately, the lack of a distinctive personality framework from the field of psychology meant researchers had to engage in methodologically unsound investigations using small-N studies or controversial psychoanalytic techniques.

Now, political scientists interested in elite political behavior can employ a framework proven valid, reliable, and generalizable across cultures. While this dissertation only begins to probe personality's effects on elite political behavior, I believe it provides a solid first step in including personality dimensions amongst the variety of explanatory variables currently employed by scholars. In combining both intrinsic and external independent variables, we can

more fully account for the wide variety of possible influences on a legislator's behavior and gain a fuller understanding of human behavior within institutionalized settings.

Chapter 2: Validating Measures of Personality among State Legislators

Introduction

How an individual behaves in any situation reflects the influence of factors both intrinsic to the individual and to the context or environment. For instance, how an individual spends his vacation will depend on whether he enjoys lounging around on the beach or going parasailing in shark-infested waters *and* whether he can only travel to a local lake or the Bahamas. Similarly, these intrinsic and external factors also affect an individual's political behavior: vote choice depends not only on ideology and party identification but also on economic conditions or the presence of a challenger.

In this chapter, I focus on the attitudes and behaviors of elected officials, particularly state legislators. In doing so, I make the explicit assumption the behavior of legislators will vary based on the influence of institutional norms and structures *and* individual-level factors such as political predispositions, values, and motivations. Legislators do indeed differ from one another. Some hold much more ideological positions while others work the middle ground. Some will go on to seek higher office while others will serve only a limited time and leave politics altogether. Certainly, these differences emerge partly in response to situational factors. For instance, an elected official might want to pursue higher office but never encounter a friendly electoral context in which to do so. However, basic psychological tendencies also influence these differences in behaviors. While previous work on elites largely focuses on how external factors affect their political behavior, I contend attention to personality can also help explain how legislators behave in a variety of contexts.

As discussed in the previous chapter, various scholars have sporadically undertaken research concerning the possible effects of personality on political elites, both in how they might potentially differ from those they represent and how their personalities influence their behaviors once in office. While these works can provide a great deal of insight about a single individual or a very small sample of political elites, these approaches do not allow for broad-scale analysis in which researchers can obtain and analyze data in a systematic fashion.

This chapter has three primary purposes. First, it seeks to demonstrate political elites will indeed answer questions concerning their personalities, allowing for more rigorous analysis than psychoanalytical profiles of individuals. Second, it will establish whether variance in the personality responses of elites exists. Third, it will determine whether the self-reported responses to personality questions demonstrate results consistent with findings concerning personality's effects on politics at the mass level. In the next chapter, I will move on from laying the groundwork for personality and political elites to demonstrate personality does indeed play a role in shaping legislative behavior.

Descriptive Statistics of the Data

The survey data I employ in this dissertation come from a study conducted by researchers at Western Kentucky University, in collaboration with a team of researchers at the University of Illinois, myself included (Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Remmel, and Turner 2012). Put in the field in September 2010 – just before the November general elections – the researchers contacted 7,199 state legislators by email, of which 835 legislators responded (a response rate of approximately 12%). The researchers assured participants of confidentiality. They also provided their contact information in the forms of phone numbers and email addresses.

However, in no instance did a legislator contact the investigators to express concerns of confidentiality. While the primary focus of the study was on legislative attitudes towards professionalism, the survey also asked respondents about partisanship, length of service, attitudes towards particular legislative behaviors, and a short personality inventory.

Unfortunately, not all of the responses provided prove useable for my purposes because not all 835 individuals answered each of the ten personality-related questions in the survey. As those questions provide the basis for my independent variables of interest, I chose to discard those responses lacking a response to both of the two personality trait items for each trait dimension. In total, 685 legislators did indeed answer all ten personality trait items; an additional 39 answered at least one of the two trait dimension questions for all five traits. However, because the personality inventory included in the survey consists of only two questions per trait dimension, I have chosen to include only the respondents who answered all ten personality questions rather than also including those who answered at least one of the two trait dimension questions for each trait.[6]

Undoubtedly, skeptics could claim any results I find might be attributable to differences in the two groups of respondents: those who provided personality information and those who did not. To ensure the comparability of the group containing the legislators who provided answers to the ten personality questions and the group who did not, I conducted t-tests. Using a dummy concerning whether I had responses to all ten personality inventory responses as the factor, I analyzed the variance of means of the two groups concerning gender ($t = -1.931$, $p =$

[6] I conducted all the analyses in this chapter and the following chapter three times: once using only the respondents who answered all ten personality trait items, once imputing the means of responses to the personality items for those who did not answer all ten personality questions, and once using both the respondents who answered all ten personality trait items and the additional respondents who answered at least one of the trait items per trait dimension. The results do not significantly differ.

0.06); education (t = 0.236, p = 0.81); race (t = 1.309, p = 0.09); chamber (t = 0.830, p = 0.41); political ideology (t = 1.158, p = 0.25); party identification (t =.610, p = 0.54); length of service in office (t =-0.642, p = 0.52); majority status (t =- 0.134, p=0.89); legislative professionalism (t = 3.178, p = 0.00); and, serving in a state with term limits (t = 1.315, p=0.19). Of these measures, the two groups only differ statistically in terms of legislative professionalism, although effects approaching significance emerge in two additional tests. Not surprisingly, individuals serving in more professional legislatures feel more reticent providing answers to more personal questions.

Of legislators who provided both their identifying information and answered both questions per trait dimension (N=685), 470 were men (68.6%) and 215 were women (31.4%). According to the National Conference on State Legislatures, women constitute approximately 23.5% of state legislators across all fifty states. The sample also proves overwhelmingly white (626 respondents; 91.8% of the sample); other ethnicities include black (28 respondents; 4.1%), Latino (8 respondents; 1.2%), and an "other" category, including Asian-Americans and Native Americans (20 respondents; 2.9%). I cannot determine race for three respondents.

More members of the lower chambers of state legislatures responded to the survey than did members of the upper chambers of state legislatures – 559 representatives (81.6%) vs. 126 senators (18.4%). In terms of party affiliation, more Democrats (377; 55.1%) responded to the survey than did Republicans (307; 44.9%); one representative identified as an independent but caucuses with Democrats. Although more Democrats responded to the survey than Republicans, the balance of power in state legislatures in 2010 leaned Democratic and could explain this disparity.

Majority-minority status also influences legislative behavior. During the legislative session year in which the survey was conducted, 247 respondents (36.9%) served in the minority of their chamber in their state at the time of survey administration while 422 respondents (61.1%) served in the majority. The remaining legislators served in the Nebraska nonpartisan unicameral legislature or did not provide their names, so I cannot determine whether they served for the majority party or the minority party.

Finally, the respondents possess a variety of legislative experience and leadership experience. In terms of tenure in office, 149 respondents (21.8%) had served fewer than two years; 222 (32.4%) had served between three and six years; 132 (19.3%) had served between seven and ten years; and, 182 (26.6%) had served more than ten years as legislators. In addition, only 39 individuals (5.8%) held party leadership positions during the time of survey administration, while 111 (16.5%) held committee leadership positions as either chairs or ranking minority members.

Personality and the Legislator

Although obtaining personality information from legislators likely has a great deal of utility, that utility remains unrealized if legislators simply refuse to answer such personal questions. While past research has not encountered difficulty in obtaining personality data from legislators, researchers conducted many of these works decades ago. While a more recent and smaller effort demonstrated state legislators will indeed answer survey questions concerning personality (Dietrich et al. 2012), I still must confront the possibility something over the last few decades has changed, leaving legislators less responsive to answering personality-related questions.

First, I begin with a simple examination concerning response patterns in the raw data. As mentioned above, the survey researchers sent the survey to 7,199 state legislators and received 835 responses, which constitutes a response rate of 11.6 percent[7]. Certainly, such a response rate demonstrates legislators do not respond to academic surveys at the same level as members of the public. In addition, not all of these 835 responses contain answers to the ten personality questions, as 151 respondents did not provide answers to all ten personality measures.

However, other questions in the survey also demonstrate variance in the number of legislators willing to provide responses. Remember, approximately 18% of the legislators who responded to the survey did not complete all ten personality inventory items. But, other, less personal survey items also had similar rates of nonresponse. For instance, 11.6% (N=96) of respondents did not answer a question asking their opinions on the overall quality of the legislatures in which they served. In addition, over14% (N=120) of respondents refused to rank the priority they placed on particular policy issues. Therefore, response rates for the personality measures prove comparable with other items in the survey. The difficult threshold to surpass in studying the personality of political elites involves getting them to answer the survey at all. But, it appears if legislators choose to respond to an academic survey, the vast majority of them will indeed respond to the personality questions.

Certainly, as over 600 legislators responded to all ten personality items, we can feel confident legislators will respond to personality-related questions on surveys. However, simply obtaining personality-related information from legislators does not necessarily mean that

[7] Other elite survey efforts have faced similarly low response rates (see Broockman and Skovron 2013, Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, and Stone 2006, and Maisel and Stone 1997 as examples).

information will prove analytically useful. Therefore, I now move to a more thorough investigation of personality and the legislator by examining whether personality data from legislators provides any meaningful variance and how differences in personality correlate with legislators' attitudes.

Drawn from the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann, Jr. 2003), the trait items used in the survey employed a univocal seven-category response format. Respondents read a prompt stating, "Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the scale below, please tell me which answer indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other." The terms posed to the respondents included: "sociable and active person"; "critical and quarrelsome person"; "dependable and self-disciplined person"; "anxious and easily upset person"; "open to new experiences and intellectual person"; "quiet and shy person"; "generous and warm person"; "disorganized and careless person"; "calm and emotionally stable person"; and, "uncreative and unimaginative person". The respondents could choose from the following responses: "strongly disagree"; "disagree"; "somewhat disagree"; "neither agree nor disagree"; "somewhat agree"; "agree"; and, "strongly agree".

Table 2.1 summarizes legislators' responses to the ten personality items. Certainly, results prove mixed with regard to variation. On the plus side, one or more respondents opted for every available response option. In addition, under no circumstances did a majority of respondents place themselves in the highest category. Unfortunately, on the negative side, a minimum of 58.9 percent placed themselves in one of the two extreme categories for each

item. Indeed, for openness to experience, only approximately 3 percent of respondents placed themselves in one of the lower categories.

However, the lack of variation in the legislator Big Five responses does not prove surprising. As personality likely plays a role in career choice (e.g. an introvert would likely not go into sales as a profession), we should expect to observe less variance when studying a particular profession rather than a random sample of the entire population. Unfortunately, Table 2.1 does not give us enough information to determine if the limited variation amongst respondents proves useful for analysis. At a glance, it does not appear as though the distributions are so narrow as to prove useless for analysis. However, rather than relying on impressions, one can answer questions of the usefulness of limited variation empirically.

To demonstrate whether the limited variance in personality measures proves analytically fruitful, I now turn to whether personality corresponds to measures of ideology and partisanship. Remember, research amongst the mass public demonstrates clear relationships between the Big Five and ideology, and to a lesser degree, partisanship (see Chapter 1 for more information). In testing whether personality effects emerge with the legislator data, I regress a measure of self-reported ideology (0 = extremely liberal, 1 = liberal, 2 = somewhat liberal, 3 = moderate, 4 = somewhat conservative, 5 = conservative, 6 = extremely conservative) and partisanship (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican) on the Big Five measures, controlling for age; gender (1 = female, 0 = male); education level (0 = high school education; 1 = some college; 2 = associate's degree; 3 = bachelor's degree; and, 4 = post-graduate degree); and, race (0 = white; 1 = not white). I employed ordered logistic regression to estimate possible personality effects on ideology and binomial logistic regression for the model of partisan affiliation.

Table 2.2.summarizes the findings concerning the relationships between personality variables and measures of ideology and partisanship.[8] The legislators in the sample possess a mean score of 0.72 on openness to experience (N = 717; sd = 0.22). The average conscientiousness scores falls below that of openness to experience at 0.68 (N = 713; sd = 0.22). The mean score on extraversion is 0.63 (N = 722; sd = 0.25). With the lowest mean score of the Big Five dimensions, agreeableness averages 0.60 (N = 715; sd = 0.21). Finally, the emotional stability of the legislators displays a mean of 0.63 (N = 718; sd = .23).

Even when controlling for variables typically associated with ideology and partisanship, including age, education level, gender, and race, the Big Five measures still prove both substantively and statistically significant. Indeed, all five personality measures demonstrate significance for ideology and party identification, with even emotional stability reaching conventional levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, I achieve nearly identical results employing Shor and McCarty's data (2011) on the ideological positions of state legislators[9]. Such concurrence provides further evidence self-reported personality data can predict not only self-reports of ideology and partisan affiliation but also objective measures of ideal points.

Additionally, these findings replicate previous work on the relationships between the Big Five dimensions and ideology and partisanship. Indeed, liberals and Democrats display higher levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. Conversely, conservatives and Republicans

[8] I created personality scales by flipping each original measure to run from one (high trait) to seven (low trait), taking the natural log, and then adding the two matching personality items and flipping them back to run from low to high. I then rescaled these variables to run from 0-1. All remaining analysis in this chapter and the following chapters employs these scales rather than the legislators' responses to single trait items.

[9] Shor and McCarty employ roll-call data and legislators' responses to Project Vote Smart's National Political Awareness Test (now called the Political Courage Test) to estimate state legislators' ideal points. Similar to Poole and Rosenthal's DW-Nominate scores, ideal points of less than zero signify a more liberal ideal point, and scores above zero signify a more conservative ideal point.

report higher levels of conscientiousness and extraversion. Because the findings concerning the Big Five and ideology and partisan affiliation of elites conform to findings for members of the mass public[10], we should feel more comfortable in formulating hypotheses concerning elite political behavior and personality. In other words, because being a political elite does not alter how personality affects political values and attitudes, we should feel reassured personality will affect the political behaviors of elites in a manner similar to the mass public. Had I found null results, one could argue the present data are useless. Thus, any null results in the remainder of this dissertation could simply be the result of bad data. However, by validating the data, any later null results can be deemed to signify the true absence of effects.

The Predictive Value of Personality

Personality certainly has a strong substantive influence on ideology. When the average legislator in the sample – a 58.5-year-old, white, college-educated male – with mean values on the other four trait dimensions increases his openness to experience score from zero to one, the predicted probability the legislator identifies as liberal rises from 0.088 to 0.251, and the predicted probability the legislator identifies as conservative falls from 0.774 to 0.496. An increase from zero to one in agreeableness raises the predicted probability the legislator identifies as liberal from 0.099 to 0.282 and lowers the predicted probability of identifying as conservative from 0.750 to 0.457. However, increasing the scores of both openness to experience and agreeableness from zero to one proves most influential, raising the predicted

[10] Studies of the mass public finding Big Five effects on ideology and/or partisan affiliation include Alford and Hibbing 2007; Barbaranelli, Caprara, Vecchione, and Fraley 2007; Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2011; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, Raso, and Ha 2011; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha 2010; Jost, Federico and Napier 2009; Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008; Mondak 2010; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, and Anderson 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, and Richter 1993; Stenner 2005; and, Van Hiel, Kossowska, and Mervielde 2000.

probability of identifying as liberal from 0.043 to 0.357 and lowering the predicted probability of identifying as conservative from 0.881 to 0.373.

Additionally, increasing a member's score on extraversion from zero to one moves the predicted probability of a legislator identifying as conservative from 0.450 to 0.654 and lowers the predicted probability of identifying as liberal from 0.288 to 0.149. Moreover, an increase in conscientiousness from zero to one increases the predicted probability of identifying as conservative from 0.389 to 0.666 and decreases the predicted probability of identifying as liberal from 0.342 to 0.142. Finally, increasing emotional stability from zero to one increases the probability of identifying as conservative from 0.411 to 0.676 and lowers the predicted probability of identifying as liberal from 0.322 to 0.137. Again, however, raising extraversion, conscientiousness, and emotional stability simultaneously from zero to one increases the probability of identifying as conservative from 0.158 to 0.802 and cuts the predicted probability of identifying as liberal from 0.638 to 0.076.

Not surprisingly, personality also influences the predicted probability of identifying as either a Democrat or a Republican. Both openness to experience and agreeableness increase the probability of identifying as a Democrat while extraversion, conscientiousness, and emotional stability increase the probability of a respondent identifying as a Republican. Again, for the average legislator in my sample (a 58.5-year-old white, college-educated male), an increase from zero to one in the respondent's score for openness to experience increases the predicted probability of identifying as a Democrat from 0.260 to 0.527 and reduces the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.740 to 0.473. Additionally, an increase from zero to one in agreeableness raises the predicted probability of identifying as a

Democrat from 0.249 to 0.593 and lowers the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.751 to 0.407. However, the biggest change occurs when the respondent's scores in both openness to experience and agreeableness increase from zero to one, with the predicted probability of identifying as a Democrat increasing from 0.125 to 0.667 and decreasing the probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.875 to 0.333.

As expected, increasing a legislator's extraversion score from zero to one increases the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.429 to 0.621. In addition, an increase from zero to one in conscientiousness increases the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.344 to 0.646. In line with previous findings (Mondak 2010, 129; Gerber et al. 2010) and achieving greater statistical and substantive significance than expected, an increase from zero to one in emotional stability also increases the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.432 to 0.621. Again, simultaneously increasing all three of these scores from zero to one raises the predicted probability of identifying as a Republican from 0.164 to 0.836.

Results for ideology and partisanship prove encouraging. Although the raw personality data display a limited amount of variance, legislators' self-assessments correspond in a manner similar to findings concerning personality and ideology and partisanship at the level of the mass public. These results provide me confidence in the validity of the data. Had the data failed to produce the expected effects in models of legislators' political predispositions, I would have had a difficult time moving to models of other legislative behaviors. Though limited, what variance occurs in the personality measures appears meaningful. To place this variance in context, consider the batting averages of professional baseball players and the average

individual. In baseball, every position player in the Major Leagues, even pitchers, hits infinitely better than the average American. Therefore, if we employed an average American hitting scale, Major League players would reside within the far right tail. However, within Major League players themselves, the difference between batting averages of 0.200 and 0.400 has meaning. The same concept applies here. Certainly, legislators likely possess higher levels of all five trait dimensions than members of the average public. However, the limited differences between the legislators themselves still prove meaningful.

I devote the remainder of this chapter to demonstrating how personality affects progressive ambition – both intrainstitutional and extrainstitutional. I do so for two reasons. First, scholars have demonstrated the importance of ambition for current and future behavior (see below). Yet, these studies tend to focus on the environmental factors influencing whether a legislator opts to run for higher office. But second, a desire to run for higher office seems a likely place to study how personality might affect legislative behavior. For instance, how open or extraverted an individual is might influence his willingness to take the risk of running for higher office. I proceed by discussing the extant literature on progressive ambition and demonstrate how personality affects the desire to run for higher office. In the next chapter, I will move on to discuss the literature on a variety of legislative activities, such as working with constituents; studying legislation; participating in caucuses; attending floor debate; and, working with party leaders to build coalitions. Then, rather than replicating previous results as I do in this chapter, the models in the next chapter demonstrate how personality affects the amount of time in which legislators engage in various activities.

Personality and Progressive Ambition

The study of progressive ambition began with Joseph Schlesinger's *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (1966). In this work, Schlesinger argues all legislators possess ambition in some manner. He categorizes ambition in three ways: discrete, static, and progressive. Schlesinger describes discrete ambition as seeking political office for a set period of time or until the achievement of a particular policy goal. Once the legislator's self-imposed time limit arrives or the legislator accomplishes his goal, he voluntarily leaves office. With static ambition, a legislator remains in office indefinitely, content with the office he holds and does not seek a different office. Finally, progressive ambition concerns legislators who leave their current offices in pursuit of more prestigious offices.

Following Schlesinger's work, scholars undertook studying progressive ambition in two ways: differentiating between those who display progressive ambition and those who do not and studying how progressive ambition affects behavior in office. Undoubtedly, the first vein of research has proven far more dominant and focuses on the personal characteristics of legislators and the characteristics of the district and/or state.

Certain personal characteristics make a legislator more or less likely to pursue higher office. For instance, the young and the old often avoid running for higher office, making those of middle age most likely to pursue higher office (Brace 1984; Maestas et al. 2006). Also, minority members, more likely to risk losing their seats than majority members, also run for higher office more frequently (Gilmour and Rothstein 1993; Schansberg 1994). Finally, women members, who often face greater personal costs than their male counterparts, run for higher office at lower rates (Maestas et al. 2006; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2006).

Though personal characteristics certainly play roles in the decision-making calculus of progressive ambition, district- and state-level characteristics also play an important part. First, the imposition of term limits increases the likelihood a legislator will run for higher office (Powell 2000). By limiting the amount of time a member can spend in a single office, term limits often lead these individuals to run for higher office in furtherance of their goals (whether personal or policy). Second, the competitiveness of a district also influences the decision to run for higher office. Essentially, when a legislator faces a close race, he will often forgo seeking reelection in pursuit of a higher office.

Nevertheless, choosing to run for a higher office or seeking a prestigious position within the institution constitutes a personal decision. As such, personality should influence those decisions. In particular, three of the Big Five trait dimensions seem particularly applicable when considering how personality might influence intrainstitutional and extrainstitutional ambition. First, openness to experience could possess a positive relationship with progressive ambition. Scholars have demonstrated risk-taking more strongly correlates with progressive ambition (Rohde 1979). Because jeopardizing a currently-held position for the chance to win a higher office constitutes a great risk, open individuals (who often thrive on risk-taking behavior) will likely consider a run for higher office at greater rates than less open individuals. Second, running for higher office provides two new arenas in which extraverted individuals can interact with others – on the campaign trail and by reaching a larger electorate through media exposure. Therefore, extraversion could also demonstrate a positive relationship with progressive ambition. Finally, because pursuing a higher office entails greater media scrutiny,

effort in raising campaign funds, and a longer election cycle, the emotionally stable may consider running for higher office more than their more neurotic counterparts.

In the following table, the variables are coded as follows: age (continuous variable); gender (0 = male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); education (0 = high school diploma or GED; 1 = some college; 2 = associate's degree; 3 = bachelor's degree; 4 = post-graduate degree); time in office (continuous variable); first term dummy (0 = not first term, 1 = first term); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); competitive election (0 = not a competitive election; 1 = competitive election, defined as winning by less than 20%); majority (0 = minority; 1 = majority); term-limited (0 = no term limits; 1 = term-limited); party leader (0 = not a party leader; 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee leader; 1 = committee leader); and, progressive ambition (0 = will not run for higher office; 1 = not currently interested in running for higher office; 2 = would run for higher office if opportunity presented; 3 = will definitely run for higher office).

Unfortunately, results proved mixed in regards to personality's potential effects on progressive ambition, both intrainstitutional and extrainstitutional (see Table 2.3). Although openness to experience appears to have very little effect on the decision to run for higher office (labeled progressive ambition in the table), extraversion proves influential. Indeed, a move from zero to one on extraversion increases the predicted probability of the legislator reporting he will certainly run for higher office from 0.037 to 0.145. Though no personality variables reach conventional levels of statistical significance in predicting whether a legislator holds a leadership position on a committee, both openness to experience and emotional stability appear to have some influence on whether an individual holds a party leadership position. An

increase from zero to one in openness to experience negatively correlates with the chances a legislator holds a party leadership position, reducing the predicted probability from 0.103 to 0.024. Conversely, increasing a legislator's score from zero to one in emotional stability increases the predicted probability of serving as a party leader from 0.013 to 0.068.

These findings do not prove particularly surprising given the characteristics associated with openness to experience and emotional stability. Those high in openness may feel constrained by the work of a party leader and not enjoy having limited opportunities to engage in wider variety of legislative activities and policy topics. On the other hand, the emotionally stable may find themselves better mentally equipped to deal with the stress associated with leadership. Furthermore, the metaphor of herding cats seems appropriate for this finding, as well; the emotionally stable may handle the constraints of attempting to further the party's agenda while working with legislators operating in such a candidate-centered electoral system better than their more neurotic counterparts.

Conclusion

For decades, scholars have indicated the potential significance of the personalities of political elites. Unfortunately, these earlier efforts lack any rigorous scientific method and relied largely on a case study approach. Certainly, the lack of large-N studies of political elites traces to uncertainty in the grounding field of psychology. Until relatively recently, psychologists lacked a comprehensive framework for personality employable by political scientists. Without that common framework, scholars could highlight the potential significance of personality while having no way to act upon those suspicions. In this chapter and the preceding chapter, I have argued the Big Five framework provides the conceptualization and operationalization of

personality necessary to overcome this problem. This five-factor model, focusing on openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability, has gone on to become the predominant psychological perspective.

In furthering the work of Dietrich et al. (2012), I have sought to demonstrate three things. First, political elites will indeed respond to personality-related measures. The major obstacle comes in simply getting political elites to answer a survey instrument in the first place. However, when legislators do respond to surveys, they do not avoid answering personality questions at a higher frequency than they avoid answering less personally-invasive questions. Second, political elites do display some variance in personality. Certainly, they likely display less variance than a random sample of members of the mass public. If personality has any influence of career choice, I would likely discover the same lack of variance in populations of sales associates, medical professionals, or artists. However, the level of variance in personality amongst political elites does not appear so concentrated as to prove useless for analysis.

Third, validity tests yielded encouraging results. The patterns of political influence of the Big Five in the mass public appear to replicate themselves at the elite level. For instance, personality corresponds with both political ideology and partisan identification. Conservatives tend to possess higher levels of conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability while liberals tend to possess higher levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. The same patterns also appear for partisanship, with Republicans demonstrating higher levels extraversion, conscientiousness, and emotional stability and Democrats having higher levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. Because personality behaves similarly at the mass and elite levels in regards to ideology and partisanship, the manner in which personality

influences political behavior at the mass level provides us with meaningful guidance concerning how personality affects political behavior at the corresponding elite level.

However, while demonstrating personality influences ideology and partisan identification in similar ways at both the elite and mass levels, does personality also influence legislative behavior in manners expected based on findings at the mass level? Or, do institutional constraints play such a dominant role as to minimize any influence of personality? In the next three chapters, I delve more deeply into how personality influences engagement in a variety of legislative behaviors, both subjective and objective.

Chapter 3: Personality and Engagement in Legislative Activities

Introduction

Investigations concerning political psychology and political behavior study engagement with politics at different stages by studying values, which lead to attitudes, which lead to engagement in political behaviors. Undoubtedly, personality appears to play an important role in determining the most basic political inclinations of individuals: their ideological positions. Personality also influences how individuals take their ideological positions and formalize them by attaching themselves to a particular political party, and additional research has demonstrated personality also drives engagement in a variety of political activities at the mass level.

However, while recent works have established personality plays a similar role among both the political elite and the mass public, very little, if any, research has investigated whether personality affects political elites' engagement in activities consistent with findings from the mass public. Certainly, research replicating findings from the mass level concerning ideology and partisanship at the elite level provides us with confidence personality will impact the political behavior of elites in manners consistent with the public. This chapter seeks to act as a first step in studying whether and how personality influences elite engagement in political activities by investigating personality's effects on the self-reported time legislators spend on various activities related to their work. In this chapter, I will first discuss the conventional wisdom concerning what influences engagement in a variety of legislative activities. Then, rather than focusing solely on environmental factors exogenous to the legislator, I will include personality measures in addition to established explanations of legislative activity in an effort to

determine whether legislators' personalities also impact engagement in particular legislative behaviors.

Engagement in Extrainstitutional Activities – Constituency Service and Fundraising

What factors determine how much time legislators devote to their constituencies? For many legislators, constituency activities prove their least favorite aspect of their jobs. Indeed, a retired legislator told Hibbing, "I came to Washington to be a member of the greatest legislative body in the world and I ended up being an errand boy" (1991, 145). If members dislike engaging in constituency activities so much, why do they bother at all?

First, interacting with constituents can provide electoral benefits to the legislator. In fact, most state legislators believe performing service activities will benefit them electorally (Rosenthal 1993, 129). Engaging in constituency activities allows members to make names for themselves back in the district, earn the approval of the public, and hopefully garner more votes in the next election. Electorally vulnerable members may engage in greater constituency service as a means to boost sagging approval ratings or to expand their support bases, while less vulnerable members may engage in constituency service to shore up their support bases during the protectionist phases of their careers where established incumbents face younger challengers (Fenno 1978).

However, electoral safety does not necessarily always guide members' engagement with their constituencies. One would assume electorally vulnerable members would lessen their amount of engagement in institutional activities and increase their engagement with their constituents in an effort to garner more votes. However, the opposite often proves true. More marginal members increase their participation within the institution (Hall 1996, 204). Rather

than going back to the district for support, these electorally vulnerable members may feel the need to "try harder" within the institution itself. Nevertheless, the simple feeling of electoral vulnerability may increase the amount of time a legislator devotes to constituency-related activities. In addition, progressive ambition may drive some legislators away from more "work horse" activities such as constituent service and toward more "show horse" activities such as speeches to attract publicity (Ellickson and Whistler 2001).

Second, tenure in office influences the amount of time legislators devote to constituency-related activities. Conventional wisdom concerning members and their constituents dictates a decrease in local legislative activities over time. The theory postulates that as members grow more embedded within the institutional structure, they will spend less time engaging in district-oriented activities. Essentially, junior members will engage with their constituencies more frequently than senior members, likely in an effort to shore up their next reelection bids, while senior members grow less attentive to constituents but more involved in actual legislating (Hibbing 1991, 174). While this conventional wisdom still holds true – longer periods of tenure in the House lead to fewer trips home and fewer staffers allocated to the district– tenure does not provide the same level of variation in constituency activities as in the past (Hibbing 1991, 155).

Nevertheless, legislators tend to devote more time to constituent activities early in their legislative careers when they are less established in their districts and have less influence over policy matters while devoting more time to policy in the later stages of government service (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). Although state legislators do not necessarily face the same constraints on time and resources when considering going back to their districts (traveling from

Austin to Abilene does not require the time and planning of traveling from Washington, DC to Abilene), the same tenure pattern likely holds true at the state level, though perhaps not as drastically.

Third, the demographic characteristics of legislators also play a role in determining the amount of time legislators allocate to their constituents. Female legislators and legislators of racial minority groups tend to spend more time on constituency-related activities (Richardson and Freeman 1995; Thomas 1992). However, women and racial minorities tend to represent more urban districts from which scholars believe a greater demand for casework emanates (Nelson 1991: 27, 45). In addition, minority legislators believe more than their white counterparts their constituents have a greater interest in service than issues and also feel an obligation to serve their minority constituents (Thomas 1992, 171). Finally, legislators who believe in a greater role for government (e.g. liberals) may devote more time, energy, and resources to constituent service than those who believe in a smaller government (e.g. conservatives) (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 95; Ellickson and Whistler 2001).

Undoubtedly, electoral marginality, tenure in office, and legislator demographic characteristics play roles in the amount of time legislators allocate to engaging with their constituencies. However, some members simply do not follow the predictable patterns. For instance, "…some members, regardless of career state, electoral situation, or formal position, pay much more attention to constituents and are more legislatively involved than others" (Hibbing 1991, 166). What accounts for this variation and deviation from prescribed patterns? I posit personality helps account for these legislators who do not follow the more typical

patterns of behavior based on their other characteristics. In particular, it seems logical to argue the extraverted would enjoy working with constituents over the introverted.

Another form of behavior outside the legislature itself involves campaign fundraising. Here, too, gender and race appear to affect legislators' fundraising efforts, with women worrying about campaign finance at a higher rate than men, leading them to engage in more fundraising efforts (Jenkins 2007). Also, women in highly professionalized legislatures still face a disadvantage in terms of fundraising. Thompson, Moncrief, and Hamm (1998) show women in professionalized legislatures receive less funding than men, which could indicate an increased necessity to engage in fundraising for women in professional legislatures. Finally, minority candidates may also face a fundraising disadvantage (particularly in more professional legislatures) and may need to engage in fundraising more frequently than white candidates (Hogan and Thompson 1998).

Additionally, electoral vulnerability also greatly influences the amount of fundraising in which a candidate engages (Hogan 2001; Goodliffe 2005). Essentially, weak incumbents raise more money in an effort to deter challengers and to build a war chest for the upcoming election. Yet, the characteristics of the state in which an individual serves also influence the necessity to engage in fundraising. Studies have demonstrated a consistently positive relationship between levels of legislative professionalism and fundraising (Moncrief 1992; Hogan and Hamm 1998; Hogan 2001). Candidates must raise more money for campaigns when they participate in elections for the more professional legislatures.

Certainly, these personal and state characteristics play roles in determining who would engage in more fundraising efforts. However, personality also likely plays a role. Because

fundraising often involves associating with a wide variety of individuals, extraverted individuals may enjoy participating in fundraising as a social activity. Additionally, emotional stability might negatively correlate with fundraising. High-stress individuals, low in emotional stability, might engage in fundraising in an attempt to alleviate reelection anxieties.

Participation in Aspects of the Legislative Process

The survey I employ asked legislators about the amount of self-reported time they devote to particular activities within the institution, including committee participation, studying legislation, participating in caucuses, attending floor debate, and working with party leaders to build coalitions. What does literature on legislative behavior say about who participates in these particular activities and why?

First, tenure in office plays a role in determining the amount of time individuals devote to legislative activities. Overall, a generally linear relationship exists between tenure in office and engagement in floor speeches, introductions, and amendments offered on the floor (Hibbing 1991, 115). Over the course of their careers, members undoubtedly grow more active in the legislative process by speaking on the floor more frequently, offering amendments to legislation on the floor, and introducing legislation. Additionally, members grow more specialized and more efficient the longer they serve in office (Hibbing 1991, 126).

Indeed, legislators also grow more successful in pushing their bills out of committee and oftentimes out of the institution itself over time (Hibbing 1991, 127). Years of experience have likely taught these legislators how to target their limited resources towards legislative success. Tenure also plays a role in the amount of committee participation members display. Despite the

decline of apprenticeship norms in legislatures, junior members participate less in committees than do more senior members (Hall 1987).

Second, seniority within the institution influences behavior within legislatures. Typically, more senior members gain formal leadership positions whether within the party or on committees and subcommittees. This pattern could potentially prove problematic for data concerning formal leadership positions in state legislatures. Likely due to the lower levels of professionalism in many state legislatures, more junior members often serve in formal leadership positions. However, the trend of seniority and tenure in office influencing the acquisition of leadership positions in Congress has grown more tenuous over time. Representatives now acquire formal leadership positions earlier in their legislative careers than in the past (Hibbing 1991, 181). Therefore, I expect a similar relationship between tenure and formal leadership positions at the state level, with tenure playing a minor role in determining who holds formal leadership positions.

Third, both gender and race appear to have varying effects on behaviors within the institution. As women first gained a foothold in legislatures, they participated in activities like introductions and floor speaking at lower rates than their male counterparts. However, women have begun to participate more equitably in the full range of legislative activities (Thomas 1994). Nevertheless, research has suggested men may act more aggressively in committee as the number of female legislators increases, which in turn decreases the participation of those female legislators (Kathlene 1994). Additionally, black legislators participate at higher levels in committee than their white counterparts on both racial and nonracial legislation (Gamble 2007).

The leadership positions gained through service within the institution also influence engagement in various legislative behaviors. For example, those in formal leadership positions participate in committee meetings and hearings more frequently than rank-and-file members (Evans 1991; Duffin 2003). In addition, progressive ambition also plays a role in determining the amount of time legislators engage in particular legislative activities. As in the case of constituent services, progressively ambitious legislators often forgo participating in committees (Perkins 1980), typically considered a work-horse behavior, for more show-horse behaviors.

Participation in Legislative Caucuses

Caucuses provide an interesting area of exploration because they allow members to voluntarily select into a group wherein they can gather information, represent their constituencies, build reputations, and signal to other members and the institution more broadly. Unfortunately, studies of legislative organization and behavior have focused primarily on the committee system and individual roll-call behavior. Somewhat surprisingly, scholars have undertaken very little work on investigating legislative caucuses although research into caucuses seems to be increasing in response to the rapid rise in the number of caucuses in the last thirty years. Nonetheless, a few researchers have conducted the majority of the existing preliminary work on caucuses, providing information and routes for further exploration.

Much of the existing work on caucuses has a descriptive tone. Such works often detail the histories of congressional caucuses, provide typologies of congressional caucuses, and discuss how congressional caucuses interact with congressional leadership (Forgette 2004) and forces outside the legislative branch, oftentimes the executive branch (Hammond 1991, 1998).

However, others have detailed how caucuses provide a service to the institution as a whole through an agenda-setting mechanism (Hammond, Mulholland, and Stevens, Jr. 1985).

According to Fenno (1973), members of Congress pursue three goals: reelection, the creation of good public policy, and power within the chamber. Caucuses, or "…voluntary associations of members of Congress, without recognition in chamber rules or line item appropriations, which seek to have a role in the policy process" (Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens, Jr. 1985, 583), help members of Congress achieve all these objectives. Members can appeal to constituency interests by joining particular caucuses. Legislators can affect the creation of public policy by joining caucuses and receiving information or crafting legislation. Some caucuses appear to hold quite a bit of leverage within the chamber. However, despite this multitude of purposes, all caucuses exist to affect policy in some manner (Hammond 1998, 23).

Because caucuses can serve a variety of important functions within legislatures, I find it important to understand who joins these caucuses and how those individuals invest their time in them. Indeed, caucuses do have distinctive patterns in membership. Different types of legislators appear to join caucuses at different rates. For instance, more Democrats join caucuses than Republicans; junior members join more caucuses than senior members; and, party leaders join fewer caucuses than rank-and-file members (Hammond 1998, 78). However, personality also likely influences caucus membership. For example, caucuses could potentially provide an outlet for legislators to meet one another, build coalitions, and gain support for legislation. Such an outlet provides a great opportunity for those who enjoy engaging in social

activities, like extraverts. Also, caucuses can supply unique information to members, piquing the informational interest of those high in openness to experience.

Legislative Professionalism

Although not an issue when studying Congress, state legislatures display highly varying levels of legislative professionalism. Because legislative professionalism could play an important role in the story of how personality affects legislative behaviors, I will provide a brief overview of the concept and how scholars have measured it. Scholars typically associate year-round legislative sessions, increased permanent staff resources, and adequate pay with legislative professionalism. Essentially, these measures seek to identify how similarly to the United States Congress a state legislature treats its members.

The most well-known professionalism index, developed by Squire in 1992 and updated by the same in 2007, compares congressional pay, days in session, and the number of staff per member to the same attributes of state legislatures. A score of 1.0 would represent a perfect resemblance between Congress and a state legislature while a score of 0.0 represents no resemblance. While the component measures of Squire's professionalism index relate to attributes of the institution itself and not the individuals serving within the institution, more behaviorally-based measures also indicate similar levels of professionalism (see Maddox 2004 as an example).

The component measures of professionalism have implications for both the legislators and the legislatures in which they serve. Increased salary provides a greater incentive to serve a longer time in office. The existence of these more veteran members creates a more experienced and knowledgeable body. Additionally, the number of days spent in legislative

session places a potential burden on the legislators in terms of the activities in which they can engage outside the legislative arena. Nevertheless, spending more time in session allows for greater policy creation and deliberation. Finally, increased staff provides for greater policymaking capabilities. Because such a resource allows for improved policy creation and enhanced reelection prospects, more professional state legislatures have greater power vis a vis the executive.

While measures of legislative professionalism somewhat overlap with careerism, they do not necessarily concern the same underlying concepts. For instance, legislative pay constitutes a component of legislative professionalism, with legislators in more professional legislatures making more money than individuals in less professional legislatures. While the higher salary could provide greater incentive for a legislator to consider serving a longer tenure in office, pay also represents compensation for the time demands placed on legislators. In addition, state term limits on legislators do not affect legislative professionalism. Term limits do not restrict the number of staff members can employ, the number of days they spend in session, or the amount of money they make as legislators.

Models of Legislative Activity

In the following models, I employ personality variables rescaled to run from zero to one. Remember, within the full dataset, the legislators average 0.72 on openness (N = 717; sd = 0.22); 0.68 on conscientiousness (N = 713; SD = 0.23); 0.63 on extraversion (N = 722; sd = 0.25); 0.60 on agreeableness (N = 715; sd = 0.21), and 0.63 (N = 718; sd = 0.23) on emotional stability. The dataset I employ asked legislators to describe how much time they spent on eleven activities: (1) meeting with citizens back in the district; (2) meeting with constituents in the

capital; (3) fundraising; (4) participating in committee matters; (5) working on legislative issues; (6) studying legislation; (7) working with caucuses; (8) attending floor debate; (9) working with party leaders to build coalitions; (10) engaging in oversight; and, (11) giving speeches about legislation outside the district. These questions employed a four-category response format, with response options of "almost none" (0), "a little" (1), "a moderate amount" (2), and "a great deal" (3).

Undoubtedly, the legislators demonstrate far more variance in their self-reports concerning the amount of time they dedicate to the variety of legislative activities than they do for personality (see Table 3.1). Because of desirability bias and the use of self-reports, legislators could have indicated they spend a great deal of time engaging in every activity. Fortunately, in only three circumstances (committee attendance, studying legislation, and attending floor debate) do a majority of respondents place themselves in the most extreme category. In every other instance, the majority of legislators place themselves in the two middle categories of "a little" and "a moderate amount".

Next, I move on to whether personality affects engagement in various legislative activities. While I include a table with the results of eleven separate regression models (see Table 3.3), it seemed prudent to determine whether the activities included in the survey constitute dimensions of some higher-level factors. Therefore, rather than solely running models on all eleven activities separately, I conducted factor analysis to determine whether which, if any, of these activities load together on some underlying dimension. Using varimax rotation, ten of the eleven dependent variables appear to load on two underlying dimensions.

Almost all the variables fall along two fundamental dimensions (see Table 3.2). First, the variables concerning meeting with citizens and constituents, fundraising, working with party leaders to build coalitions, engaging in oversight activities, and giving speeches about legislation outside the district load onto some dimension concerning the tasks in which most legislators engage (labeled Factor One). Second, the variables concerning time spent working on committee matters, working on legislative issues, studying legislation, and attending floor debate all load onto some dimension concerning more purely legislative tasks (labeled Factor Two). The one outlier, working with caucuses, appears to fall in between these two underlying dimensions.

In the following models, I have chosen to employ hierarchical level modeling for several reasons. First, while the dependent variables of interest all occur at the individual level of analysis, the independent variables I include exist at multiple levels of analysis. For instance, while variables such as ideology or progressive ambition measure concepts at the level of the individual, variables such as term limits and professionalism reside at a state level of analysis. Therefore, observations include individuals nested within states. Second, simply glancing at the raw data demonstrates each state appears to have its own norms about service unrelated to the level of legislative professionalism. In other words, professionalism alone does not appear to account for the amount of self-reported time legislators devote to particular activities. As a result, grouping respondents by their states allows me to better account for these varying norms.

In these analyses, I coded the independent variables as follows: gender (0 = male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); years

in office (continuous variable); first term dummy (0 = not first term, 1 = first term); majority (0 = minority member, 1 = majority member); chamber (0 = lower chamber, 1 = upper chamber); party leader (0 = not a party leader, 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee leader, 1 = committee leader); progressive ambition (0 = will definitely not run for higher office, 1 = not currently interested in running for higher office; 2 = would run for higher office if opportunity presented, 3 = will definitely run for higher office); and, competitive (0 = not a competitive race in the last election; 1 = competitive race in the last election, defined as winning by less than 20% of the vote). In addition, the models include several higher-level variables including a dummy variable about whether the state in which the individual serves employs term limits (0 = no term limits, 1 = term-limited) and a continuous variable of professionalism ranging from zero to one (taken from Squire 2007). Finally, I rescaled the personality variables to range from zero to one to make interpretation simpler.

Before running any models including my independent variables of interest, I first ran the intercept-only (unconditional) models to establish how much of the variance in the data occurs at the individual level and how much occurs at the state level. As several of the original dependent variables of interest lie on the border of conventional acceptability for inclusion in the factor-analyzed variables (namely participation in caucuses, coalitions, and oversight), I have created two versions of the Factor One model. The first version (labeled "Minimal Factor One" in Table 3.7) includes the variables concerning time spent with citizens and constituents, fundraising, and giving speeches. The second version (labeled "Full Factor One") includes participating in coalition-building and oversight in addition to the four component measures of the Minimal Factor One model. For the Minimal Factor One model, 15.9% of the variance

occurs at the state level, leaving the remaining 84.1% of the variance at the individual level. In the Full Factor One model, 10.4% of the variance occurs at the state level, leaving 89.6% of the variance at the individual level. For the Factor Two model, 5.1% of the variance occurs at the state level, while 94.9% of the variance occurs at the individual level.

Next, to ensure the usefulness of my models, I compared the variance explained by the intercept-only models and the variance explained by the models including my variables of interest (both extrinsic and intrinsic). In all cases, the conditional models explain a much greater amount of the variance. For the Minimal Factor One model, my model explains 27.1% of the variance at the state level (level 2) and 25.8% at the individual level (level 1). The Full Factor One model explains 34.0% of the variance at the state level and 20.1% of the variance at the individual level. Finally, the Factor Two model explains 26.6% of the variance at the state level and 16.4% of the variance at the individual level.

Results

As previously mentioned, I ran a variety of models employing different statistical approaches. In the first set of models (Table. 3.3), I employed ordinal logistic regression and regressed each of the eleven original dependent variables on the respondents' scores on the Big Five and a set of independent variables theoretically likely to influence legislative behavior. In the second set of models (Table 3.4), I conducted restricted maximum likelihood regressions within hierarchical-level modeling and regressed each of my factor-analyzed scales on the independent variables employed in Table 3.3. First, I will discuss the models involving the

eleven original dependent variables included in the survey, and then I will move onto the results of the models employing the factor-analyzed variables.[11]

As expected, personality appears to significantly impact the amount of time respondents indicate they spend engaging in myriad legislative activities (see Table 3.3). In particular, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion seem to do the bulk of personality's work in terms of participation in those activities. First, openness to experience appears to influence the amount of a time a legislator engages in institutional activities. For instance, open legislators report spending a substantial amount of their time attending committee hearings and studying pending legislation. As openness correlates with information-seeking behavior, open individuals participating in activities in which they can gain additional knowledge comes as no surprise.

Second, the amount of time a legislator reports spending on more purely legislative activities also positively correlates with conscientiousness. Therefore, the highly conscientious likely view attending committee meetings, studying pending legislation, and attending floor debate as routine parts of the job and feel duty-bound to fulfill their perceived job descriptions. Third, extraversion positively impacts the amount of time legislators report engaging in activities in which they can work with or be around others. For example, extraverted legislators spend more time meeting with citizens, engaging in fundraising activities, and giving speeches than their more introverted counterparts.

[11] In hierarchical-level modeling, the estimated coefficients provided by the ordinal logistic regression tell us about the probability of the respondent placing himself within the first category of the dependent variable of interest (e.g. engaging in almost no contact with constituents) as opposed to the other response option categories. In practice, positive coefficients relate to a higher likelihood of falling in the first (or lowest) category, which means coefficients appear in reverse of what one would expect. Therefore, negative coefficients indicate that as the independent variable increases, the amount of time in which a legislator reports engaging in a particular activity also increases.

While agreeableness and emotional stability prove less consistent as statistically-significant predictors of behavior, they do impact the amount of time legislators spend engaging in certain activities. For instance, the agreeable spend more time working with constituents than the less agreeable. Because agreeableness relates to a desire for social harmony, agreeable legislators likely seek to appease their constituents beyond pandering for reelection. Rather, agreeable legislators may simply want to keep the individuals back home happy.

Additionally, the emotionally stable report spending more time working with constituents than their more neurotic counterparts. As working with the mass public could prove a mentally taxing activity, neurotic legislators might try to avoid the stress they could feel by minimizing their engagement with constituents. Conversely, emotionally-stable legislators may have a greater ability to more easily cope with the mental strain of working with the mass public.

Such results also hold true at a more aggregate level of analysis. Remember, the dependent variables composing the Factor One and Factor Two models deal with more extrainstitutional behaviors and more purely institutional behaviors, respectively. Least surprising, extraversion positively influences the amount of time members report engaging in behaviors largely occurring outside the institution itself, such as meeting with constituents, engaging in fundraising, and giving speeches (see Table 3.4). A move from least extraverted to most extraverted leads to an increase of 0.09 (from 0.45 to 0.54) for a legislator's scalar score on both Bare Factor One and Full Factor One.

For comparability, let us consider a variable typically associated with variation in engagement of extrainstitutional activities: years in office. As a legislator grows more entrenched within the institution, research typically finds legislators devote less time to activities outside the institution like meeting with constituents and more time engaging in the production of legislation. However, a change in tenure in office produces virtually no change in a legislator's scalar score on either the bare or full factors (from 0.50 to 0.51 over the course of ten years in office).

However, extraversion does not appear to play a significant role in the amount of time legislators devote to more purely legislative tasks (producing a change of 0.03 in the scalar score over the range of extraversion). This finding proves particularly interesting in light of extraversion's positive effect on progressive ambition. In terms of the individuals interested in running for higher office, we find individuals who prefer socializing willing to run, but these individuals do not display a great amount of interest in actually doing the work of legislators. In addition, agreeableness also influences engagement in legislative tasks involving working with others. Finally, conscientiousness plays a role in engagement in both extrainstitutional and intrainstitutional behaviors. The conscientious likely view these activities as duties they must perform as part of the job. However, this effect proves especially pronounced for activities occurring within legislatures.

Certainly, several variables commonly used within more traditional legislative behavior also impact time spent participating in these activities. For instance, the amount of time in office negatively correlates with the amount of time a member spends meeting with citizens back in the district but positively correlates with the amount of time a member spends working

on oversight or in meetings in the capital. As expected, more entrenched legislators devote less time to working with those voting them into office and more time to actually accomplishing legislation. Additionally, members serving in more professionalized legislatures report spending more time studying potential legislation and meeting about legislative issues. Finally, gender appears to impact the amount of time legislators report engaging in more purely legislative tasks. These findings comport with existing literature suggesting female legislators feel a desire to prove themselves within the institution.

Conclusion

For decades, scholars have indicated the possible significance of personality in studying political attitudes and behaviors. However, although researchers have sporadically undertaken studies concerning personality and politics, such studies remain unfortunately rare. While political scientists have steadily increased the use of personality as an explanatory variable in their works, most work has neglected to address large-N studies of personality and political elites. However, the rise of the Big Five framework within psychological literature now provides political scientists a well-validated and reliable method of studying potential links between personality and elite political behavior.

In this chapter, I have argued psychology's Big Five framework offers scholars an opportunity to satisfy the desire to include personality in studies while maintaining methodological rigor. Certainly, the five-factor approach has grown into the dominant perspective in personality over recent decades. In the previous chapter, I sought to replicate at the elite level findings concerning personality and politics from studies at the level of the mass public. Conducting such replicative work proves necessary to ensure personality-related

hypotheses derived from the mass level have logical underpinnings. However, in this chapter, I have moved beyond purely replicative work. By applying the Big Five framework in this chapter, I have argued personality affects engagement in a variety of legislative behaviors. And, indeed, personality appears to influence the behaviors of political elites in logical ways.

Overall, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion appear to act as the personality dimensions driving engagement in various types of legislative activity. Yet, we must remember each of the legislative activities under investigation matters for whether and which personality trait dimensions rise to the foreground. Certainly, not all activities provide an opportunity for individuals' personality traits to play a role. For instance, nothing intrinsic in studying pending legislation or conducting oversight inherently appeals to an individual's susceptibility to stress (emotional stability).

However, certain legislative activities do have logical connections with certain personality trait dimensions. In an effort to understand the influence of personality on engagement in individual activities and broader groupings of activity, I conducted the analyses in this chapter in two ways. First, I investigated personality's effects on self-reported engagement in the eleven activities included in the survey. Second, using factor analysis, I studied personality's effects on self-reported engagement in two broad types of legislative activities: those activities with some kind of extrainstitutional and/or social component and those activities occurring within the institution. Again, three personality trait dimensions – openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion – stand out as contributing factors and a fourth, agreeableness, appears to play a somewhat secondary role, as well.

First, openness to experience appears to play a role whether the activity occurs within or outside the legislature. As openness to experience relates to information-seeking behavior, it comes as no surprise those scoring high in openness report spending a greater amount of time engaged in purely legislative tasks, such as attending committee hearings or studying pending legislation wherein they can learn new things. However, because those open to experience also enjoy trying new things and have an interest in many different areas, it also makes sense open individuals enjoy the more social aspects of legislative activity, such as meeting with constituents or fundraising.

Second, conscientiousness and extraversion both play roles in determining the amount of time legislators report spending on particular legislative activities. However, these roles occur in opposing arenas. While the conscientious display similar patterns to those high in openness in that they participate in both extrainstitutional and intrainstitutional activities, it appears the more purely legislative tasks do hold more appeal to the conscientious, and they choose to spend more of their time engaged in these activities. Perhaps the highly conscientious see their first duty as legislators as creating public policy. Therefore, they may prioritize working on the formulation and implementation of policy over ancillary legislative activities such as fundraising. In contrast, extraverts enjoy the more purely social aspects of a legislator's job, such as meeting with constituents or working to form coalitions with others. Rather than engaging in activities failing to provide a social outlet such as engaging in oversight activities, extraverts will prioritize working on the activities the conscientious seem to see as somewhat more secondary. This same pattern occurs for the more agreeable, wherein they

prioritize engaging in more social aspects of the representative role rather than working on purely legislative tasks.

Chapter 4: Personality and Introductions, Cosponsorship, and Legislative Effectiveness

Introduction

Studies involving the intersection of personality and politics have focused mostly on the mass public. While scholars have recently undertaken studying personality and politics at the more elite level (see Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo 2002; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Consiglio, Picconi, and Zimbardo. 2003; and, Best 2011 as examples), these studies still largely concern the personality connections between the mass public and their representatives. However, this chapter seeks to move beyond studying elites in conjunction with the mass public to studying how personality affects legislative behavior more directly. Certainly, the connections between elites and those they represent have profound implications for representation and quality of governance. However, once those elites gain office, how do their personality characteristics influence their behaviors?

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated personality does indeed have an impact on the time legislators report devoting to the various duties required of their offices. For instance, while state legislators undoubtedly meet with their constituents to provide representation and to ensure their reelection efforts, meeting with constituents serves another purpose. Indeed, for some legislators, particularly the extraverted, meeting with constituents appears to provide a kind of psychological satisfaction by providing the legislator with the opportunity to engage with others.

Unfortunately, although the survey I employed in the previous chapter does ask legislators how much time they devote to a variety of legislative behaviors within the institution, the responses rely on self-reports. While the respondents do demonstrate

variability in the reported amount of time they devote to various activities, the measures are largely subjective. To solidify the findings in the previous chapter, this chapter explores a more objective realm of legislative behavior by investigating introductions and cosponsorship patterns and legislative effectiveness. Therefore, not only does this chapter demonstrate personality has effects on objective measures of legislative behavior, it does so for behaviors many legislative scholars find important as mechanisms of representation and functioning of government.

Legislative Activity – Introductions and Cosponsorship

Within the body of literature concerning American state legislatures, scholars have focused largely on issues of representation. In doing so, they have concentrated on how well state legislatures represent women and minorities, respond to constituents, and operate under varying levels of term lengths, election schemes, and/or campaign finance restrictions. Unfortunately, however, not many scholars have studied legislative behavior at the state level in ways similar to scholars investigating behavior at the congressional level (see Ray 1982; Francis 1985; Browne 1985; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; and, Wright and Schaffner 2002 as exceptions). For instance, few state-level works concern topics such as the introduction of measures or cosponsorship.

However, state legislative studies scholars have found a number of similarities between state legislatures and Congress and those serving within those institutions, including feelings of electoral insecurity despite wide margins of victory, committee autonomy within the institution, and the importance of legislative casework (see Cohen 1984; Browne 1985; Francis 1985; Jewel and Breaux 1988; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; Holbrook and Tidmarch 1991;

and, Freeman and Richardson, Jr. 1996 for examples). Therefore, when reviewing existing literature on activities such as introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness, I turn to research conducted at the congressional level for guidance and make the explicit assumption state legislators will act similarly to members of Congress. Therefore, this chapter should provide direct insight about personality's effects on legislative behavior at the state level and indirect insight about its effects at the congressional level.

According to Fenno (1978), legislators have three goals. First, they seek reelection. Second, they hope to gain power within the institution. Third, they seek to further public policy. In pursuing reelection, legislators must appeal to and appease their constituents by engaging in meetings with them and working to further a district's interests. By gaining the trust of their constituents, legislators can more easily pursue the second and third goals (Bianco 1994). In achieving power within the institution, members can serve as committee and subcommittee chairs or within the party leadership. Finally, to create good public policy, members can introduce or cosponsor measures, among other activities. In serving as the introducer, legislators dedicate a portion of their resources to crafting legislation. In serving as a cosponsor, legislators signal their intentions to others within the chamber.

In the past, legislative studies scholars have conducted a great deal of research on legislative roll-call voting behavior. Undoubtedly, roll-call voting behavior matters because it determines the final outcomes of measures. However, while data on roll-call voting proves rather easy to obtain, particularly in comparison to other legislative behaviors, roll-call votes represent neither the majority of votes cast by legislators nor the majority of policy issues addressed within legislation. Rather than relying simply on roll-call voting to understand

legislative behavior, I have chosen to investigate personality's effects on introductions and cosponsorship.

Indeed, studying introductions and cosponsorship provides a dynamic understanding of legislative behavior. Studying roll-call voting focuses on a reactive behavior where virtually all members participate; studying behaviors such as introductions and cosponsorship serves to help us understand a proactive behavior in which legislators must make conscious decisions whether or not to participate (Burden 2007, 9). Indeed, whereas roll-call voting represents a group behavior undertaken by the entirety of the chamber, introductions (and to a lesser extent cosponsorship) allow legislators to highlight their unique contributions (Schiller 1995; Wilson and Young 1997). Therefore, the use of introductions and cosponsorship as dependent variables allows for a greater breadth and depth of understanding of how legislators interact with the institution than simply relying on roll-call votes.

But what motivates members to engage in these activities? Some may argue introducing and cosponsoring legislation have only symbolic meaning. However, each legislator introduces or cosponsors only a fraction of the total number of bills introduced each session (Sulkin 2011; Sulkin 2005). If solely symbolic, legislators would likely engage in these activities at higher rates. However, because members selectively engage in these activities even in spite of constraints on their time and resources, we can assume legislators spend time and energy on these activities because they have significance beyond mere symbolism (Hall 1996, 26). Indeed, by sponsoring and cosponsoring legislation, members can address a number of concerns: communicating the concerns of their constituencies, following through on their campaign promises and increasing their chances of reelection, and addressing policy and institutional goals (Sulkin 2011).

First, members can respond to the concerns of their constituencies and attempt to fulfill their campaign promises by introducing and cosponsoring measures. For instance, by attaching one's name to a measure, the legislator can address constituency concerns and even pander to new constituencies (Schiller 1995; Koger 2003; Harward and Moffett 2010; Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010). Not only can members directly address the concerns of their constituencies, but they can then use these efforts as concrete and tangible vehicles through which they can claim credit (Arnold 1990). For instance, vulnerable first-term members cosponsor more than secure first-term members (Koger 2003), likely in an effort to increase their credit-claiming ability by associating themselves with a variety of measures.

Second, legislators can employ introductions and cosponsorship in an effort to fulfill their campaign promises and shore up their next election bids. For instance, members with a moderate number of introductions find more legislative success than those who introduce "too much" or "too little", demonstrating a level of balance in their efforts and providing them an opportunity to point to their efforts in later campaigns (Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Box-Steffensmeier, Kimball, Meinke, and Tate 2003). By engaging in introductions and cosponsorship, legislators can demonstrate to their constituencies they made an effort at fulfilling promises and addressing concerns raised in previous elections even when the proposed legislation does not succeed (Sulkin 2011, 31-32; Sulkin 2005). Related to the above considerations for introducing and cosponsoring legislation, engaging in these activities can have financial rewards, as well. By taking clear positions on legislation and having the ability to point to their contributions within the legislature, members can attract increased campaign contributions from donors (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999; Rocca and Gordon 2010).

Third, introductions and cosponsorship can serve as ways to take positions on issues; express those stances to constituents, others within the institution, interest groups, and potential campaign donors (Rocca and Gordon 2010; Highton and Rocca 2005); and, affect the resulting policy. For example, Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) show policy extremists on the political spectrum sign on as cosponsors before moderates. As time goes on, moderates take the cue of the initial more extremist cosponsors and also sign on as cosponsors. Members also introduce more when in the majority and their party controls the chamber (Garand and Burke 2006) and cosponsor more when in the minority party because they cannot successfully signal their preferences on legislation as often as members in the majority (Koger 2003). In addition, attaching one's name to a bill can provide different types of signals, and these different signals can play out in a variety of ways, particularly in committee (Wilson and Young 1997). While introductions entail a somewhat higher degree of commitment to a piece of legislation, cosponsorship is viewed as a low-cost position-taking measure (Campbell 1982).

Additionally, introductions and cosponsorship can also have policy implications even when the measures do not necessarily survive very far into the legislative process. Kingdon (1984) describes how policies often go through a "softening up" period, where what might appear as wasted effort on a measure might lead to success on that measure in the future. In addition, one must remember the demise of a measure does not indicate failure. As Koger (2003) points out, another bill can co-opt the previously introduced or cosponsored measure, stop a different bill, or send a signal to the executive branch (230). Indeed, engaging in sponsorship and cosponsorship provides signals about the content and quality of a measure; helps vulnerable politicians in reelection bids; and, furthers or alters public policy.

Finally, proactive participatory behaviors such as introductions and cosponsorship can affect a legislator's standing within the institution. Rather than looking at introductions or cosponsorship in isolation, Wawro (2001) attempts to account for a variety of non-roll-call voting behaviors by investigating why members of Congress engage in legislative entrepreneurship rather than free-riding on the efforts of others. He defines legislative entrepreneurship as "…a set of activities that a legislator engages in, which involves working to form coalitions of other members for the purpose of passing legislation by combining various legislative inputs and issues in order to affect legislative outcomes" (4).

Wawro also measures four types of effort expended by members: coalition building (cosponsorship); issue grouping; complexity of legislation; and, knowledge of policy. He finds a consistent relationship between political parties and committees and entrepreneurship; party leaders turn to members who have demonstrated entrepreneurship when filling leadership positions. Essentially, rewards come to legislative entrepreneurs, providing an additional incentive for the increased workload.

However, the above authors focus on largely exogenous factors in studying the sponsorship and cosponsorship patterns of legislators. In these models, factors independent of the legislator, such as potential financial reward, "…the receptiveness of the political and policy environment, institutional position, potential administration support, financial cost, [and] another [legislator]'s role in the issue and opportunities for publicity" (Schiller 1995, 190) largely determine whether a legislator does or does not introduce a measure. These models do not account for the internal motivations of legislators or how those internal motivations might influence how legislators perceive external pressures. In other words, we have focused on the

behavior but not all its root causes. Rather, the above works deal solely with the situational factors influencing behavior. But how individuals respond to these situational factors may also vary according to dispositional factors. Currently, we have a firmer understanding concerning how situational factors influence behavior than how dispositional factors influence reaction to those later situational factors.

Legislative Effectiveness

While introductions and cosponsoring measures prove important for a variety of reasons, one must also consider whether those measures become law. Indeed, although introductions or cosponsored measures may influence resulting policy indirectly, they most directly influence policy when they *become* the policy. Therefore, studying legislative effectiveness has importance for several reasons. First, passing legislation represents one of legislators' most important job responsibilities. Indeed, Frantzich (1979) states, "Despite variations in job expectations, all enumerations of the congressional task, whether posited by academics, congressmen, or the general public, include the writing and passing of legislation" (409). Second, as Fenno (1973) states, making good public policy constitutes one of legislators' three primary goals, and to make good public policy, one must work to pass legislation. Third, according to Mayhew (1974), passing legislation provides members the opportunity to claim credit to constituents, which helps in reelection efforts.

Since at least Matthews (1960), scholars have demonstrated an interest in which legislators prove the most successful. Research has demonstrated the importance of both institutional-level variables and the individual-level characteristics of the legislators. At the level of the institution, work has demonstrated the importance of residing within the majority party

of the chamber (Frantzich 1979; Meyer 1980; Weissert 1991a; Ellickson 1992; Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Volden and Wiseman 2009; and, Cox and Terry 2011). These works posit institutional rules make pushing legislation through the chamber simpler for those in the majority party. While majority status does appear to prove critical for legislative success, other work has conditioned its importance by considering interactions of majority/minority status with variables such as legislative expertise, issue salience, party loyalty, and leadership status (see Meyer 1980; Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Weissert 1991b; Hasecke and Mycoff 2007; and Cox and Terry 2011). In other words, these other variables, when interacted with majority/minority status, may, in fact, make success more difficult to attain for majority members or easier to attain for minority members.

Additionally, holding a leadership position on a committee or within the party also plays an important role in legislative success, though often in contradictory ways. For instance, the most successful legislators reside within the majority party while also holding leadership positions (Frantzich 1979; Adler and Wilkerson 2008; Kypriotis 2009; Cox and Terry 2011). Conversely, holding a leadership position but residing in the minority party negatively affects legislative success (Box-Steffensmeier and Sinclair-Chapman 1996; Volden and Wiseman 2008; but also see Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983). Essentially, leaders within the majority party enjoy the institutional conveniences provided to members of the majority and the prestige and respect afforded by holding a leadership position. On the other hand, leaders within the minority party, as the most visible and vocal opponents of majority party legislation, may face punishment from the majority and not get their measures out of committee.

Other characteristics of where a member resides within the institution may also affect levels of legislative effectiveness. For instance, seniority plays an important role. Whether due to policy expertise, the respect of others within the institution, or having acquired the political know-how to pass their desired legislation, research has consistently demonstrated more senior members have greater legislative success than more junior members (Frantzich 1979; Moore and Thomas 1991; Ellickson 1992; Pedro i Miquel and Snyder 2006; Volden and Wiseman 2009; Cox and Terry 2011).

Additionally, moderation in terms of both political ideology and the number of measures with which a member involves himself also proves key. In terms of ideology, more moderate members may have higher levels of legislative success because they can appeal to a greater number of their colleagues on both sides of the aisle (Frantzich 1979; Kirkland 2010; but see also Hasecke and Mycoff 2007). Concerning introductions and cosponsorship, proving one's ability to balance the variety of legislative activities for which members are responsible also positively influences legislative effectiveness (Moore and Thomas 1991; Anderson et al. 2003).

Finally, gender and race may affect the success of legislators. On the whole, female legislators have higher success rates than their male colleagues (Saint-Germaine 1989; Thomas and Welch 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Jeydel and Taylor 2003; Bratton 2005; and Volden and Wiseman 2008). Contrary to the consistent findings concerning the influence of gender on legislative success, studies have indicated mixed results for the legislative effectiveness of legislators of ethnic or racial minority groups, with some studies indicating minorities having lower levels of legislative success (Ellickson 1992; Volden and Wiseman 2008) and others

indicating ethnic and racial minorities having success rates no different than their white counterparts (Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Rocca and Sanchez 2011).

More recently, scholars have moved past determining the characteristics of the most successful legislators and begun investigating the effects of legislative success. For instance, members who successfully push more of their preferred legislation through the legislative process receive more campaign contributions (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999). In addition, legislative success may have a positive impact on the probability of moving on to a higher office (Pedro i Miquel and Snyder 2006).

Descriptive Statistics of Data

As mentioned in chapter 2, the survey received 835 responses. However, state legislatures display a variety of openness and record-keeping capabilities. Some states have fully-functioning websites providing individuals the capability to search by member for measures introduced, cosponsored, and passed over time; some states only have this information available for the most recent legislative sessions. Other states provide this information, but gathering that information requires a bit more creativity in terms of searching through the legislative records. Some states maintain records concerning introductions but not cosponsorship (e.g. Louisiana, Nevada, and New Mexico). Unfortunately, other states do not maintain any public records concerning introductions and cosponsorship. These states include Idaho, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Because legislative activity varies over the course of a legislator's career, I have chosen to study the legislators who serve in 29 states[12] providing the

[12] The states included in the analysis are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,

capability of searching introductions and cosponsorship over time. This reduction in states under investigation leaves me with 459 legislators. However, not all of these legislators provided answers to the ten personality questions or to questions serving as the basis for important control variables (particularly progressive ambition). After removing legislators who did not answer these questions[13], the sample then contains 365 legislators.

To study the patterns of introductions and cosponsorship over time, I have employed hierarchical linear modeling (HLM). The following models contain data from three levels. The first-level dataset contains information on the legislators varying from legislative session to legislative session. These variables include tenure in office; a dummy concerning whether the member was serving in his or her first term; competitive status of the previous election; majority/minority status; party leadership positions; full committee leadership positions; chamber; the number of measures introduced; the number of measures cosponsored; the number of measures introduced and codified; and, the number of measures introduced or cosponsored and codified. Because each unit of analysis is a legislator-session year, the sample contains 1,157 observations at the first level.

The second-level dataset contains variables unique to the legislator but relatively stable over time. These variables include: the scores on the Big Five trait dimensions; race; gender;

North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.

[13] As a robustness check, I also ran the models in this chapter with the dataset using all 459 legislators and imputing the means on the personality and progressive ambition questions for those observations missing answers to the relevant questions. Furthermore, I ran the models while including those who answered at least one of the two personality items per trait dimension. The models do not substantially differ from the models simply removing the missing observations in terms of substantive effects.

ideology; partisan affiliation; and, attitude toward running for higher office[14]. This level contains 365 observations. The third-level dataset contains variables unique to the legislatures in which the legislators serve. These variables include level of legislative professionalism and a dummy variable concerning whether the state has term limits for legislators. The third-level dataset contains the 29 states.

At the first level, the legislators have served anywhere from 0 to 32 years in their positions (mean = 4.21; sd = 5.27). These legislators faced competitive elections (defined as winning by less than 20% of the vote) only a third of the time. Few legislator-session units have a legislator serving as a party leader (N = 98). In contrast, far more legislator-session units have a legislator serving as either the chair or ranking member of a full committee (N = 298). Over time, approximately 60% of the legislators resided within the majority party of the chamber. Finally, 79% of legislator-session observations occurred inside the lower chamber of the state legislature.

The first level also contains data on the number of measures introduced and/or cosponsored by a legislator. Keep in mind, each state appears to possess a distinct culture in terms of the amount of legislation members introduce and cosponsor. However, I provide the following descriptive statistics to give a general sense of the amount of legislation introduced by the legislators in my sample. The remaining legislators in the sample introduced anywhere from 0 to 238 measures during a legislative session (mean = 26.20; sd = 24.47). They also

[14] I recognize progressive ambition may not be a stable attribute over time. However, the survey data I employ only asked the legislators how they currently felt about running for higher political office. While the question did allow respondents to indicate their interest levels in both concrete and contextual terms, I cannot say progressive ambition does not vary over the course of a legislative career. Unfortunately, determining the level of progressive ambition for a legislator (particularly at the state level) over time proves a surely impossible challenge. Therefore, I treat progressive ambition as a stable attribute of the legislators.

cosponsored 0 to 619 measures during a legislative session (mean = 106.44; sd = 99.54). Of the bills they introduced over the course of a single session, the legislators saw up to 59 of their measures turned into law (mean = 5.29; sd = 6.94). Of the bills they either introduced or cosponsored over the course of a session, the legislators saw anywhere from 0 to 437 measures codified (mean = 28.44; sd = 34.27). On average, the legislators saw 22.1% of the bills for which they served as introducers signed into law (sd = 21.87%). Of all the bills to which the legislators signed on as introducers or cosponsors, the legislators successfully saw an average of 24.12% of the measures signed into law (sd = 19.38%).

The second level contains data concerning characteristics of the legislators with relative stability over time, including race, gender, attitude toward running for higher office, and scores on the Big Five trait dimensions. The legislators are overwhelming white. Indeed, only 7.4% (N = 27) identify as non-white. Furthermore, the majority of legislators in the remaining sample are male (N = 249 or 68.2%). The vast majority of respondents indicated they do not have definite preferences on running for higher office as they chose one of the middle categories on the progressive ambition question (N = 274).

In chapter 2, I demonstrated the patterns of variance concerning personality and state legislators. Critics of applying personality trait psychology to politicians could argue the respondents will not truthfully describe themselves and/or will cluster at the extreme (and positive) end of each dimensions. While state legislators do describe themselves as possessing relatively high levels of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability, these descriptions also have relatively high standard deviations, indicating a certain degree of variance.

To calculate overall personality trait dimension scores, one flips the original measure to run from one (high score on a trait) to seven and then takes the natural log of the result. Then, the researcher adds together the two measures for each personality trait dimension and reverses the score to make the low score indicate a lower level of the trait. To make interpreting these scores simpler, I then rescaled the results to range from zero to one. The legislators in the sample possess a mean score of 0.71 on openness to experience (sd = 0.22). The average conscientiousness score falls just below that of openness to experience at 0.70 (sd = 0.23). The mean score on extraversion is 0.63 (sd = 0.25). With the lowest mean score of the Big Five dimensions, agreeableness averages 0.60 (sd = 0.22). Finally, the emotional stability of the legislators displays a mean of 0.61 (sd = 0.23). As demonstrated in chapter 2, though the data concerning personality do display a somewhat limited amount of variance, that variance has sensible, theory-consistent effects on political attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, I feel comfortable employing these measures as explanatory variables[15].

Finally, the third level contains data on legislative professionalism and a dummy variable to control for whether or not a state employs term limits. The mean level of legislative professionalism for all 835 legislators in the original dataset is 0.165; the mean score of legislative professionalism of the legislatures under investigation in this chapter is almost identical at 0.169. Both of these scores indicate relatively nonprofessional legislatures. In addition, the majority of states in both datasets do not employ term limits.

[15] There exists the possibility the election process whittles down the diversity of the personalities of legislators leading to greater homogeneity over time. To ensure the reelection process did not affect the personality profiles of legislators who win reelection, I conducted t-tests comparing: those who served only a single term in office against those who served more than one term in office; those who had served two or fewer years and those who had served more than two years; those who had served four or fewer years and those who had served more than four years; and, those who served ten or fewer years and those who served more than 10 years. I found no statistically-significant differences in any of the groups.

Analysis

I approach the analysis of data from two perspectives. First, I investigate whether any of the personality variables alone influence patterns of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. In these efforts, I essentially test personality in opposition to existing explanations of legislative behavior. Such models test the most difficult case in which personality might have an influence because they take a more deterministic view of how personality impacts behavior by essentially assuming personality directly impacts behavior regardless of environmental constraints.

However, the effects of personality could express themselves in a number of different scenarios. First, personality's potential effects on introduction and cosponsorship activity could occur linearly (Figure 4.1), with personality producing a relatively constant rate of change in the dependent variables of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. Second, personality could have a hyperbolic relationship where changes in personality trait dimensions produce a large amount of change at lower levels of the independent variables but taper off as the independent variables approach their maximum levels (Figure 4.2). Third, personality's effects on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness could occur parabolically. In this case, graphing the independent and dependent variables of interest would produce an upside-down U shape, with the midpoint indicating personality's greatest effects (Figure 4.3).

All of these varied statistical relationships have meaning for how personality possibly affects legislative activity. For instance, if the relationship between personality and introductions occurs linearly, then scoring high in a trait will indicate an individual engages in a correspondingly high level of activity. If the relationship takes on a hyperbolic shape, then

personality has some type of ceiling effect on legislative activity; once a person reaches a certain score on the trait dimension, any further activity will stagnate. If the data display a parabolic relationship, then personality has some ideal score wherein moving that score any higher of lower will reduce activity.

However, an individual's personality characteristics do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they grow more pronounced or suppressed by varying environmental factors. Therefore, I also investigate the potential effects of interactions of personality variables and environmental variables. Rather than juxtaposing personality and exogenous variables, these models seek to understand how personality operates in conjunction with exogenous variables. In particular, I will demonstrate how various personality trait dimensions interact with tenure in office and levels of legislative professionalism.

To begin, I start with models including no interaction terms. First, I investigate whether personality affects the raw number of measures for which legislators serve as introducers and as cosponsors. Serving as the introducer of a measure entails expending valuable legislative time and resources. Indeed, the legislator must devote his own time to studying the legislation to know it well enough to convince both constituents and other legislators. Furthermore, because many of the legislators in the sample do not have access to permanent staff, their actual involvement could be quite high.[16] However, should the legislator have permanent staff, he must direct his staff members to dedicate *their* time and effort on the legislation.

[16] This lack of permanent staff for members serving in less professional legislatures also bodes well concerning the question of whether the legislators themselves answered the personality inventories. If the legislators lack permanent staff, such a dearth indicates the legislators actually completed the survey.

Additionally, a legislator's reputation, both within the institution and with constituents, may ride on the passage of the measure for which the member serves as an introducer.

In light of these considerations, I view serving as an introducer as a risk-taking activity. Therefore, a positive relationship between openness to experience and introductions may exist because those high in openness to experience tend to engage in risky behaviors. In addition, while serving as a legislator does not necessarily require members to actually introduce legislation, both legislators and constituents likely view the creation of legislation as a part of the job description of a legislator. As a result, conscientiousness may impact levels of introduction. However, such influence could take one of two forms. Conscientious individuals may view introductions as one of the principal mechanisms by which they perform their legislative duties. As a result, they may introduce more measures than their less conscientious peers. Conversely, because the conscientious prioritize responsibility, they may introduce fewer measures than the less conscientious in an attempt to focus their efforts on a handful of measures. In sum, the conscientious may work to achieve a breadth of legislation or they may seek to achieve a depth of legislation.

Additionally, personality may affect the number of measures to which legislators attach their names as cosponsors. While cosponsorship involves little in terms of time or resources from the legislator, serving as a cosponsor can serve as a signal to other legislators. Because legislators do not exist in isolation from one another, I assume they speak with one another and ask their peers to sign onto legislation as cosponsors. As individuals who enjoy social activity and engaging with others, extraverts may cosponsor more legislation than their introverted counterparts because they hear about such opportunities by interacting with those who know

of pending legislation. In addition, those high in agreeableness seek to maintain social harmony and may potentially sign on as cosponsors more frequently because they acquiesce to others' requests.

In the following tables, the primary independent variables of interest – openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability – run from zero to one. Other independent variables include gender (0 = male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); majority status (0 = minority member, 1 = majority member); tenure in office (continuous variable measured in whole years); first term dummy (0 = not the member's first time, 1 = member's first term in office); competitive prior election (0 = not a competitive race in the last election; 1 = competitive race in the last election, defined as winning by less than 20% of the vote); party leader (0 = not a party leader, 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee leader, 1 = committee leader); progressive ambition (0 = will definitely not run for higher office, 1 = not currently interested in running for higher office, 2 = would run for higher office if opportunity presented, 3 = will definitely run for higher office); chamber (0 = lower house; 1 = upper house); and, a continuous variable of professionalism concerning ranging from zero to one (taken from Squire 2007).

Results of Linear Relationships

The results of these models prove less than overwhelming concerning the direct impact of personality on introductions and cosponsorship activity (see Table 4.1). None of the personality variables reaches statistical significance for introductions and cosponsorship. While the trait dimensions move in logical directions, they do not produce statistically significant or

substantively significant results. Remember, I hypothesized a positive relationship between openness to experience and introductions. Indeed, openness to experience does positively correlate with introducing more measures, though increasing a legislator's openness score from zero to one increases introductions by only a single measure.

Conversely, increasing the legislature's level of professionalism in which a legislator serves creates a much greater impact. For the least professional legislature, the model predicts a member with mean scores for all the other included variables would introduce approximately 16.5 measures. A legislator serving in a legislature of average professionalism should introduce nearly 27 measures, and a legislator serving in a highly professionalized legislature will likely introduce almost 67 measures. Aside from legislative professionalism, however, other conventional explanations for introduction activity, while statistically significant, also do not prove substantively impactful. For instance, residing in the majority party in the chamber only leads a legislator to introduce an additional 4.5 measures, and acting as a committee leader only leads to an increase of 4 additional introductions.

The same types of patterns occur for cosponsorship. None of the personality variables reaches statistical significance. And although some of the variables produce substantively nontrivial results (for example, the model predicts an increase in openness from zero to one will lead to additional 17 cosponsored measures), other personality variables I hypothesized as positively correlating with cosponsorship, such as extraversion, produce virtually no change. Furthermore, while I hypothesized a positive relationship between agreeableness and cosponsorship activity, the model produces a negative coefficient. Such a finding could mean

those high in agreeableness engage in less cosponsorship because they do not wish to alienate their colleagues.

Next, I move to measures of legislative success. Legislative success certainly proves important to legislators because it allows them to achieve all of Fenno's goals (1978). It lets them to point to their effectiveness to both constituents and donors when running for reelection. It also builds a member's reputation as an efficacious counterpart and could help build the legislator's reputation within the institution. Finally, getting legislation signed into law allows members to satisfy their own personal policy interests.

Certain personality traits may predispose some legislators toward getting more of their proposed legislation signed into law. Primarily, emotional stability may positively influence legislative success. Turning a measure into a law is a long process with obstacles along the way. Therefore, the emotionally stable, with their low reactivity to stressors, may have greater success in getting their proposed legislation turned into chaptered law. On the other hand, the emotionally stable might be so laid back as to not care whether their desired measures become law, while the less emotionally stable may display a hyper vigilance about seeing their measures codified.

Unlike the results of models testing the potential impact of personality and introductions and cosponsorship, personality does have substantive effects on legislative effectiveness. First, openness to experience positively influences the number of measures a legislator successfully introduces or cosponsors and sees passed into law (see Table 4.2). Indeed, an increase from the lowest score of openness to experience to the highest score secures an additional 11.5 measures passed. This change proves more substantively meaningful

than other conventional explanations for legislative success. For instance, residents of the majority party of the chamber only see an additional seven measures passed in comparison to their minority-member counterparts.

Such a relationship between openness to experience and legislative effectiveness could exist for several reasons. First, highly open individuals crave knowledge and information. As a result, they may view introductions and cosponsorship as ways to gather information on policy arenas. Second, highly open individuals enjoy taking risks. Although introductions prove potentially more costly than cosponsored measures, signing one's name to a measure indicates a certain degree of commitment. Highly open individuals may enjoy the challenge of trying to see measures to which they attached their names passed. Moreover, open legislators may craft better legislation and attract the votes of their colleagues because of the quality of the measure.

Second, agreeableness positively correlates with seeing introductions codified, the percentage of introductions codified, and the percentage of introductions or cosponsored measures codified. For raw number of introductions passed, highly agreeable legislators will see an additional 3.5 measures codified over their most disagreeable counterparts. Those 3.5 measures translate into an increase of over 6% in legislative success for introductions and a 4% increase in overall legislative effectiveness. These results move in logical directions. The highly agreeable value getting along with others and working toward compromise. As other legislators likely view these individuals as easy to work with, those other legislators may vote for agreeable individuals' measures because that agreeableness allowed the individuals involved to work out a suitable compromise.

Third, emotional stability does produce both statistically and substantively significant results. However, those results work in the opposite direction from the one I hypothesized. For measures introduced, the model predicts the least emotionally stable legislators will see fewer than 8.5 of their measures passed into law; conversely, the most emotionally stable legislators will see fewer than five of their introductions codified. This decline in successful introductions corresponds to a decrease of 7% for percentage of introduced measures passed and 4% for percentage of all introductions and cosponsored measures passed. While contrary to hypothesized expectations, logical explanations exist for why emotional stability might negatively correspond with legislative effectiveness. For instance, the worry and anxiety felt by the less emotionally stable could act to propel them to work harder to pass their preferred measures. These findings could serve as an example of a time when the less normatively desirable aspects of a personality trait dimension serve useful purposes.

Results of Hyperbolic Relationships

Remember, the above models simply test the potential influence of personality on legislative activity. However, in studying personality traits in isolation, any hypotheses and results assume personality will have a relatively linear effect on introductions and cosponsorship; as a person's score in a personality trait increases, the number of measures introduced or cosponsored will either increase or decrease at a relatively constant rate. However, the Big Five trait dimensions do not assume a "perfect" personality. High or low scores on the five trait dimensions have both advantages and disadvantages. For example, scoring high on conscientiousness signifies high levels of personal responsibility; however, it also reflects rigidity and stubbornness. Therefore, I next estimate models wherein I square the

legislators' scores on the Big Five trait dimensions. By squaring these variables, I hope to account for a potential parabolic effect where low scores on a personality trait dimension increase activity up to a point and then only act to inhibit engagement in that activity.

Indeed, the results of these models indicate personality does indeed play a role in affecting legislative activity (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). However, that relationship can have diminishing returns after a certain point (see Figure 4.4). For example, increasing an individual's score on agreeableness from 0 to 0.5 leads that individual to cosponsor 16 additional measures. However, moving that score from 0.5 to 1 decreases the number of measures a legislator cosponsors by about the same number. Furthermore, this same parabolic relationship occurs for both conscientiousness and extraversion when studying the number of measures a member cosponsors. For instance, a move from 0 to 0.7 on conscientiousness increases the number of measures an individual cosponsors by thirty; however, a move from 0.7 to 1 decreases the number of measures a member cosponsors by seven. For extraversion, a move from 0 to 0.6 increases the number of measures a member cosponsors by 37; yet, a move from 0.6 to 1 leads to a decrease of 16 cosponsored measures.

This same pattern occurs when investigating personality's effects on the number of measures introduced or cosponsored by a member and passed (see Figure 4.5). As individuals' scores on openness increases from 0 to 0.9, the number of measures to which they attached their names that successfully passed increases from just under 11 measures to over 28 measures. However, the gains taper off as scores on openness reach 0.9 and even decline at the highest level of openness. Again, this parabolic effect occurs with extraversion and the number of measures a legislator introduced or cosponsored and passed. By increasing a

legislator's score on extraversion from 0 to 0.5, the number of successful measures introduced or cosponsored by that member increases from just fewer than 22 measures to 27.5 measures. However, after 0.6, increased levels of extraversion negatively affect legislative success, with a legislator scoring a one in extraversion seeing around 23.5 measures passed.

In other words, personality may have a limiting effect. The positive characteristics associated with any trait only take a legislator so far. After a certain point, personality may no longer positively contribute to legislative productivity and could, in fact, inhibit it. This finding receives additional support in models combining the squared personality terms. For instance, including both the squared extraversion and squared agreeableness terms in one model and including the squared conscientiousness term, the squared extraversion term, and the squared agreeableness term in another model for predicting cosponsorship all demonstrate this same relationship (models not shown). Furthermore, although the extraversion term only approaches statistical significance, including both the squared openness term and the squared extraversion term produces this same parabolic effect for the number of measures a member introduced or cosponsored and passed. While not all of the squared terms achieve statistical significance in these models, the same parabolic pattern continues.

Results of Personality and Environment Interactions

Conscientiousness and Tenure in Office

In table 4.3 and figure 4.4, conscientiousness demonstrates the highest point before a legislator begins to see diminishing returns. This finding proves especially interesting because conscientiousness has always played the spoiler in hypotheses of political behavior and personality. At first glance, one would assume an increase in conscientiousness would lead to

an increase in political behavior. However, initial results from studies at the mass level proved this relationship false (Bekkers 2005; see Mondak 2010, 55 and 164-165 for more information). More recent works (see Bloeser, McCurley, and Mondak 2012; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, Raso, and Ha 2011; and, Mondak 2010 as examples) have demonstrated the conditionality of conscientiousness. Essentially, conscientiousness only works as a predictor of political behavior when the individual already views political behavior as important. If the highly conscientious individual views other aspects of his life as more important, he will then prioritize his engagement in those areas over politics.

However, one can make a reasonable assumption that conscientiousness may work as initially predicted for legislators. These individuals chose to run for office, which demonstrates a commitment to political engagement. Nevertheless, conscientiousness may be enhanced by tenure in office. Essentially, as a conscientious individual learns his way through the institution, he will establish his own list of important legislative activities. Therefore, interacting conscientiousness and tenure in office seems like a potentially fruitful pursuit.

Indeed, the interaction of tenure in office and conscientiousness appears particularly useful as a predictor of legislative effectiveness (see Table 4.5). Furthermore, tenure in office may help counteract some of the negative attributes of scoring low on conscientiousness. For example, consider the number of measures a legislator successfully introduces. When a legislator has the lowest score on conscientiousness, the model predicts he will successfully introduce about five measures during his first time in office. By his tenth year in the position, the model predicts he will successfully introduce nearly nine measures. However, tenure produces less steep gains to those of middling and high levels of conscientiousness. A legislator

with a score of 0.5 on conscientiousness will successfully introduce just over five measures during his freshman term; that same legislator will only successfully introduce seven measures during his tenth year in office. Finally, being highly conscientious leads a legislator to successfully introduce about 5.5 measures his first term; but, that legislator's high level of conscientiousness has virtually no impact on his number of successful introductions during his tenth year in office, with the model predicting just over six introductions passed.

However, this relationship reverses itself when considering the effect of interacting tenure in office and conscientiousness and other measures of legislative effectiveness. Overall, tenure in office has a negative effect on legislative effectiveness, contrary to conventional expectations. Conscientiousness appears to attenuate that effect. For example, a legislator with a score of 0 on conscientiousness will see approximately 31 measures to which he attached his name signed into law; that success rate drops to 28 measures after ten years in office. At moderate levels of conscientiousness, legislators increase the number of measures they introduced or cosponsored and passed from 26 measures at year 0 to over 29 measures at year 10. However, the highest levels of conscientiousness completely counteract the negative effects of tenure. For instance, a highly conscientious freshman member will successfully introduce or cosponsor 22 measures during his first term and almost 30 measures during his tenth year (see Figure 4.6).

In some ways, one could view tenure in office as a coping mechanism for the less conscientious. These individuals, characterized by a lack of personal responsibility and duty, learn the legislative process during their years in office, and that learning contributes to them successfully introducing more of their *own* legislation. However, the already highly

conscientious do not change in their behaviors to the same extent; they already viewed passing their own legislation as important, and that does not change over time.

In other ways, tenure in office does not alleviate some of the negative characteristics of conscientiousness. While it may lead to more successful introductions over time, it does not always improve a legislator's effectiveness, and may, in fact, decrease it. The highly conscientious, however, have the tenacity, stubbornness, and even unbending nature necessary to see more legislation codified as law, even legislation to which they served only as cosponsors, and spending more years in office only emphasizes that aspect. However, it appears the less conscientious do not work as hard to see their cosponsored measures also pass, and spending more time in office does not change that fact.

However, it is important to understand not only how different levels of personality and tenure impact successful introductions but also to understand how environmental variables act in comparison. Scholarship has demonstrated women have higher levels of legislative effectiveness, and the present data only confirm that finding. However, female legislators only successfully introduce one more measure than their male counterparts. Furthermore, residing in the majority party of the chamber only increases legislative success by two measures. Therefore, personality interacted with tenure proves just as fruitful an explanation for legislative effectiveness as other exogenous explanations.

Conscientiousness and Legislative Professionalism

Certainly, studying the influence of conscientiousness at different stages of legislators' careers proves useful. As a result, I believe conscientiousness might also interact with other institutional characteristics in meaningful ways. Therefore, I also ran models concerning

interactions between conscientiousness and legislative professionalism. Remember, scholars measure legislative professionalism primarily by determining how many days a legislature is in session, the pay provided to legislators, and the availability of permanent staff dedicated to an individual legislator. If an individual serves in a more citizen legislature, he or she also likely has a job outside of working in the legislature. Having two jobs could lead a legislator to prioritize activities outside the legislature over his duties as a lawmaker. If an individual serves in a more professional legislature, that individual likely only works as a legislator and does not engage in another profession to make ends meet. As a result, the conscientious could focus their energies on their duties as lawmakers because they do not need to divide their lives into as many separate spheres.

Indeed, an interaction of conscientiousness and professionalism appears to play a role in determining the number of measures a legislator introduced or signed on as a cosponsor. And again, the effect proves most pronounced for the highly conscientiousness (see Table 4.6). While an increase in legislative professionalism always leads to an increase in the number of measures a member introduces, combining that professionalism with an increase in conscientiousness proves even more influential. For instance, a legislator with a score of zero on conscientiousness will introduce approximately 21.5 measures in the least professional legislature. That same individual serving in a state legislature with an average level of professionalism will introduce about 26 measures. However, a legislator with a score of 0.5 on conscientiousness will see a rise from just under 18 measures to 25.5 measures as he moves from the least professional legislature to one of average professionalism. Finally, a highly conscientious legislator will introduce approximately 14.5 measures in the least professional

legislature; however, he will introduce almost 25 measures in a legislature of average professionalism (see Figure 4.7).

While somewhat less pronounced this same pattern continues for the number of measures a member cosponsors (see Figure 4.8). In this figure, one can see how conscientiousness positively affects the number of measures to which a member signs on a cosponsor. However, as those individuals begin serving in more professionalized legislatures, conscientiousness can play a role of varying magnitude. Indeed, the highly conscientious see the most pronounced rise in the number of measures they cosponsor as professionalism varies followed by those of average conscientiousness. Those with low levels of conscientiousness do not change their behavior as drastically as legislative professionalism increases.

In other words, by operating within more professional legislatures wherein they can prioritize legislative activity as their jobs, the highly conscientious engage in greater levels of legislative activity. As legislators serving in citizen legislatures have to divide their time between working as legislators and earning a living through some other venture, the highly conscientious do not involve themselves with as many measures. Conversely, those low in conscientiousness do not face such a decision to split their energies. As a result, moving them from citizen legislatures to professional legislatures does not produce as large a change in behavior.

Other Personality and Environment Interactions

While conscientiousness certainly plays a role concerning individuals' engagement in introductions and cosponsorship, other Big Five trait dimensions could also play an influential part. For instance, agreeableness may prove an important trait for legislators. Despite the increased political polarization of elites in recent decades, the ability to work with others

undoubtedly serves as a fundamental characteristic of a legislator's job description. However, interacting agreeableness with tenure may prove particularly important. As a legislator spends more time in his position, he will learn when to fight (e.g. act disagreeably) and when to cooperate (e.g. act agreeably).

As mentioned earlier, I hypothesized agreeableness might demonstrate a positive relationship with cosponsorship. Yet, agreeableness does not reach statistical significance as a predictor of cosponsorship behavior, and it actually works to decrease cosponsorship. However, an interaction of tenure in office and agreeableness does indeed produce a statistically-significant and substantive effect on the number of measures an individual cosponsors (see Table 4.9). Overall, tenure negatively impacts cosponsorship behavior. This result could occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, as tenure increases, legislators tend to engage more with the lawmaking process itself and devote less time to extrainstitutional behaviors such as meeting with constituents. Therefore, rather than simply attaching their names to others' measures, more senior members may choose to introduce measures on their own. Or, as members spend more time in office, they often face less electoral competition and have also established reputations within the institution. As a result, they might not feel the need to credit claim or signal their preferences to others as much.

However, agreeableness appears to counteract the negative impact of tenure on cosponsorship behavior (see Figure 4.9). Indeed, while the least agreeable individuals will sign onto fewer measures as they spend more time in office, this pattern reverses at the highest levels of agreeableness. For instance, individuals with low and middling levels of agreeableness still cosponsor fewer measures over time (a decline of 24 and 6 measures from the first to tenth

years in office, respectively). However, the model predicts those with high levels of agreeableness will cosponsor an additional twelve measures from their first year in office to their tenth year in office.

These effects prove to be just as substantively influential as more conventional explanations for cosponsorship behavior, such as facing a competitive election. For instance, Koger (2003) argues competitive elections lead legislators to cosponsor more in an effort to attach their names to more measures to provide them more opportunities for credit-claiming. However, while the result proves statistically significant, a legislator having faced a competitive race in the election in the prior legislative session actually proves less amenable to cosponsoring legislation, with legislators who faced a serious campaign challenge in the previous election cosponsoring almost eight fewer measures than those who did not face a competitive election.

This same relationship concerning agreeableness and tenure appears when considering the number of measures a legislator successfully introduces or cosponsors. The least agreeable legislator sees approximately 27 measures to which he attached his name passed into law during his first term in office. That same disagreeable legislator sees 24.5 measures passed by his tenth year in office. However, middle and high levels of agreeableness increase legislative success over time, with those of moderate agreeableness seeing an additional 2.5 measures signed into law from their first to tenth years in office and a highly agreeable legislator seeing an additional eight measures signed into law. For comparison, a legislator residing in the chamber's majority party sees 6.5 additional measures passed into law under these same conditions. It appears as though agreeable individuals may have a greater potential to win the

support of fellow lawmakers by not engaging in disputes and simply "going with the flow"; in doing so, they gain an increase in their general success rates.

As discussed with agreeableness, tenure in office allows for on-the-job learning. That learning also appears to impact legislative effectiveness for not only the agreeable but also for extraverts. Indeed, an interaction term of tenure in office and extraversion increases both the number of measures a legislator introduces or cosponsors and passes and the percentage of measures introduced or cosponsored and passed.

Tenure negligibly impacts legislative success (see Table 4.8). However, just as with conscientiousness, increasing levels of extraversion have varying effects at different stages of the legislative career. For instance, introverted legislators see no increase in legislative success as they spend more time in office. Perhaps their introversion precludes them from forming the social networks necessary to build coalitions of support for the measures they introduce and/or cosponsor. However, those with moderate and high levels of extraversion can counteract tenure in office's negative influence on legislative success. The model predicts those of moderate extraversion (scoring 0.5) will see an additional 3.5 measures pass after spending ten years in office. Furthermore, the highly extraverted will successfully introduce or cosponsor just under23 measures during their first term in office; that number approaches 28 measures after ten years office. Again, to place these gains in perspective, comparing these values to the models' predicted values for more institutional-level explanations for legislative success proves useful. For instance, female legislators, typically seen as more effective than male legislators, see 6.5 more measures passed than their male counterparts, and racial minorities see 3.5 fewer measures become law than their white colleagues.

Conclusion

An individual's personality characteristics not only help define his identity for himself and to those around them, they also help determine how an individual responds within a variety of environmental contexts. Recent works by political scientists have sought to understand how personality affects political behavior. In its preliminary stages, this work studied personality in isolation from environmental variables. Perhaps these efforts occurred because the researchers believed in personality acting in a deterministic manner. Or, these scholars were simply taking a first stab at understanding personality and politics. Regardless, the work in this area has more recently begun moving toward understanding personality in context by interacting personality with factors outside the individual.

However, these efforts have focused almost exclusively at the mass level. To my knowledge, this chapter serves as one of the first explorations of personality and legislative behavior. In following the footsteps of those performing political personality research at the mass level, I have undertaken two separate efforts in this chapter. First, I directly tested the Big Five trait dimensions as predictors of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. In structuring the models this way, the Big Five do not appear to impact the number of measures legislators introduce and/or cosponsor, but three of them (openness to experience, agreeableness, and emotional stability) may impact legislative effectiveness.

However, we must also remember one of the key features of the Big Five framework. While scoring high on a trait dimension brings with it a variety of positive attributes, scoring high also indicates negative characteristics. For instance, those high in openness to experience enjoy learning and trying new things. However, they may have an interest in too many things

and subsequently fail to focus their energies. As such, employing squared personality terms allows us to investigate whether personality demonstrates a Goldilocks-type effect on legislative behavior. Perhaps scoring too low or too high on a trait dimension proves detrimental while scoring in some ideal middle range leads to the preferred outcome. Indeed, these squared terms indicate increasing levels of the Big Five lead legislators to engage in more legislative activity. However, the results also demonstrate personality only carries a legislator so far; after a certain point, the gains brought about by the positive characteristics of the trait dimensions level off and may even negatively impact productivity.

Beyond understanding how personality directly impacts legislative behavior, we must also study legislators in context. Lawmakers exist and operate within institutions, and these institutions place a variety of external constraints on how legislators behave. Therefore, I also investigated the Big Five trait dimensions as they interacted with several of these external influences, including tenure in office and legislative professionalism. Indeed, these models prove fruitful in revealing how personality influences introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness.

First, tenure in office may offset some of the negative characteristics associated with particular Big Five trait dimensions and enhance some of the positive characteristics. For instance, the least conscientious legislators begin to produce more in terms of introductions and cosponsoring the longer they serve within the institution. Yet, these gains do not necessarily translate into increased legislative effectiveness for the least conscientious. Rather, tenure in office positively impacts the legislative effectiveness of the most conscientious. Although years of service do not affect their introduction and cosponsorship levels to the same

extent as the less conscientious, those years do provide the highly conscientious with the skills necessary to pass their preferred measures. In addition, tenure in office also increases the productivity and success of the extraverted and the agreeable, very possibly because this increased time in office allows these outgoing and friendly legislators to build the social networks necessary to successfully pass legislation.

Second, legislative professionalism also plays an important role in how legislators' personalities express themselves within the institution. For example, while all legislators introduce more measures as they serve in more professional legislatures, the effects of moving from citizen legislatures to professional legislatures proves more pronounced for the highly conscientious. I argue the highly conscientious who serve in citizen legislatures, necessitating outside employment, must divide their efforts to their lives both inside and outside the institution and consequently do not focus as much energy on legislative productivity. However, as legislative professionalism (and pay) increases, these conscientious legislators do not need to prioritize other obligations to the same extent and can devote their time to engaging with the lawmaking process.

Chapter 5: How Personality and Gender Interact to Affect Legislative Behavior

Introduction

In the preceding pages, I have demonstrated personality does have an impact on the behavior of political elites. In recent decades, legislative scholars have often focused on the institution to the exclusion of the individual. However, in exploring the relationships between personality and legislative behavior, I have attempted to study the individual within the context of larger, highly-constrained institutions. Likewise, scholars interested in the impact of gender on politics have demonstrated an interest in studying men and women within the context of the environments and institutions in which they reside through the study of gendered institutions, where "…gender is present in the processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distribution of power…" in the institution (Acker 1992, 567). Yet, these works attribute differences between men and women to something inherent in gender itself. However, in this chapter, I will argue personality may drive some of the differences found between the genders. In other words, rather than attributing potential causality to something inherent in gender, I argue the personalities of the men and women who choose to run and serve in political office lead to some of the observed differences between the sexes.

As with a great deal of the research on elite political behavior, much of the work on the topic of gender and legislative behavior has occurred through studies of the U.S. Congress. However, scholars have increasingly investigated the differences between the genders and the impact of gender at the state level. Studying women at the state level proves particularly fruitful because, although still underrepresented as a proportion of the legislature, far more women serve as state legislators than in state-wide executive positions or as members of

Congress. Therefore, scholars not only have a greater number of cases to examine at the state level, but they can also examine the women most likely to run for Congress. Nevertheless, the works at both levels tend to examine the personal characteristics, behavior, and impact of female state legislators. In these studies, scholars have highlighted the differences between men and women, oftentimes in an effort to make arguments for the benefits of descriptive and substantive representation provided by female representatives.

Women as Candidates

With the rise of the feminist movement in the 1960s and the dramatic increase in the number of women serving as legislators at both the state and national levels, scholars have increasingly explored the differences between men and women, both at the mass and elite levels. A major strain of literature concerns the proportion of female legislators in both Congress and state legislatures. Therefore, a number of researchers have investigated women as candidates.

When women do choose to enter the political arena, they win. Indeed, studies comparing male and female candidates in open-seat races, as challengers, and as incumbents find women win as often as men (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Darcy and Schramm 1977). Indeed, some scholars have gone so far as to say, “A candidate's sex does not affect his or her chances of winning an election… Winning elections has nothing to do with the sex of the candidate" (Seltzer, et al. 1997, 79). Given the fact women do indeed win political office when they choose to enter a contest, researchers have expended a great deal of effort trying to determine why legislatures suffer from a lack of women. Several competing arguments have thus emerged.

One theory concerns the paucity of the pool of candidates. Essentially, advocates of this theory assert the barrier to women's entrance into the political arena arises from the lack of women considered "eligible" for political office (Duerst-Lahti 1998; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994). However, the eligibility argument assumes men and women employ the same considerations when contemplating running for political office. Yet, recent works have demonstrated this assumption false. Scholars have demonstrated women reflect upon a greater number of considerations than male candidates (Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001). Furthermore, these considerations often involve roles reinforced by sex-role socialization (Elder 2004; Fox and Lawless 2004; Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001). In addition, women often feel less qualified to run for office (Fox and Lawless 2011; Fox and Lawless 2004), which may also be a consequence of socialization.

Finally, the institutional constraints imposed by the existing party and legislative structures may also contribute to the lack of female legislators. First, legislative professionalism negatively correlates with female representation (Maddox 2004; Squire 1992). Second, existing party elites may view women as an "outgroup" and discriminate against female candidates because of their lack of "surface similarity" (Fox and Lawless 2004; Niven 1998; Niven 2006). Therefore, even if a woman did choose to run for office, the structures she encounters might act as an additional barrier to entry.

In light of research concerning the decision to run for office, scholars have also investigated possible differences in levels of ambition. On the whole, these investigations do not bode well for a rise in the number of women serving as legislators at any level of government. Initially, scholars found female legislators expressed lower levels of ambition

(Diamond 1977). Another wave of work demonstrated a decrease in the difference of ambition expressed by male and female politicians (Thomas 1994; Stanley and Blair 1991; Costantini 1990). Yet, this research occurred around the so-called "Year of the Woman" (1992) and likely represents a historical blip as the most recent works demonstrate women still possess significantly less ambition to hold office in the first place (Lawless and Fox 2010; Fox and Lawless 2004), run for Congress after serving in state legislatures (Mariani 2008; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2006), or remain in office once they have reached Congress (Lawless and Theriault 2005). Yet, this lack of ambition may be mediated by the expected benefit of office (Fulton et al. 2006).

Women as Legislators

Studies concerning women as legislators take two main paths: analyzing their social, economic, and political characteristics and their roles within the legislatures (Cammisa and Reingold 2004). Concerning the first path, women tend to enter legislatures at a later age, with fewer children, as divorcees or widows, and come from different backgrounds than their male counterparts (Dolan and Ford 1998; Mezey 1978; Diamond 1977; Stoper 1977; Werner 1968). These characteristics largely relate to the social conceptualizations of women's roles in society: "It was more difficult for women to maintain a demanding professional career at the same time they fulfilled the role of wife. It was apparently even harder to maintain careers as well as the responsibilities for children" (Thomas 1994, 32).

However, many of these differences in demographic backgrounds have diminished over time (Whistler and Ellickson 1999). Furthermore, other differences between male and female legislators have diminished, as well. For instance, with an increase in the education levels of

women, female legislators have increasingly come from professional backgrounds not traditionally ascribed to women such as business (Thomas 1994). Furthermore, the political experiences of female legislators mirror those of their male counterparts (Dolan and Ford 1998; Thomas 1994). As a result, men and women's personal backgrounds may not have as profound an impact on differences in their behaviors as in previous generations.

For those interested in the potential policy impact of women, scholars must face the question of whether descriptive representation (electing women) leads to substantive representation (legislation on behalf of women). So, even if men and women arrive at the state house differently, do they also behave differently once in office? Beyond the demographic differences discussed above, scholars have investigated differences in the legislative priorities and activity of legislators of different genders. Female legislators do tend to differ from male legislators concerning ideology and the policy issues in which they choose to involve themselves. Female legislators often express more liberal positions from their male colleagues; these differences prove particularly pronounced for female Republican legislators (Poggione 2004; Swers 1998; Vega and Firestone 1995; but, see Hogan 2008).

Furthermore, female legislators tend to involve themselves in issues often described as feminine, such as education, healthcare, issues facing the elderly, and abortion politics, and they vote in support of legislation involving these policy areas at higher rates than men (Giles-Sims, Green, and Lockhart 2012; Frederick 2011; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007; Orey, Smooth, Adams, and Harris-Clark 2006; Bratton 2005; Levy, Tien, and Aved 2001; Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001; Swers 1998; Barrett 1995;Thomas and Welch 1991; Saint-Germain 1989; Githens and Prestage 1978; see Barnello 2001 as an exception). In addition, women may

conceive of their roles as legislators differently than men by describing themselves as feminists and seeing themselves as representatives of women more broadly (Thomas 1994; Reingold 1992). Therefore, it should come as no surprise female legislators devote more attention to constituency service and report lower levels of activity in committee, on the floor, and working with colleagues and lobbyists (Thomas 1994; Diamond 1977; Kirkpatrick 1974).

However, the pronounced differences between male and female legislators have greatly diminished over time. As a result, rather than studying the descriptive differences between the sexes, more recent work has focused on the impact of the institution on women and women's impacts on the institution. Essentially, these works address a normative question: should women adapt to the existing structure, or should they attempt to alter the structure to better suit their unique perspectives (Thomas 1994)? Therefore, a great deal of this literature falls along two lines: how women integrate into the institution and how they transform the institution.

The integrationist approach seeks to diffuse arguments about an inherent "otherness" of women (Githens and Prestage 1978). Early works in this tradition demonstrated female legislators did not deviate from female non-legislators and possessed important similarities to male legislators. In essence, Kirkpatrick (1974) argued women were not so different from men as to preclude them from working as legislators and operating similarly to men within the institution. On the other hand, those advocating the transformationist perspective argue the existing institution contains a bias against women (the so-called gendered institution), and female legislators can transform the institution so as to make the institution more hospitable to women. Examples of the transformationist literature include works concerning the policy

preferences and roll-call voting behavior of women lawmakers. Remember, female legislators tend to focus on issues largely considered part of the domain of women and hold more liberal stances on a variety of policy issues. In addition, they may frame debate of those issues differently from men (Levy, Tien, and Aved 2001). As a result, female legislators may magnify gender gaps in public opinion but also bring light to issues otherwise relegated to the periphery.

However, just as conventional research into legislative behavior has moved on from studies of roll-call voting, so, too, have studies involving gender and legislatures. Such next-generation works investigate behaviors including introductions, cosponsorship, and fundraising. Undoubtedly, women legislators tend to introduce and cosponsor more legislation than men (Anzia and Berry 2011). Nevertheless, the patterns of those introductions and cosponsorship still remain murky. For instance, several authors have investigated the cosponsorship behavior of women and come to opposite conclusions: Cook (2012) finds no support for the assertion that female legislators will be more inclined to support "women-friendly" legislation, while Swers (2005) finds women cosponsor "women-friendly" legislation more than men. However, Cook's study takes place in a single state legislature, and Swers' study uses data from the U.S. Congress, which could help account for the discrepant findings.

In addition to cosponsorship behavior, several scholars have investigated campaign fundraising for female candidates (Jenkins 2007; Green 1998; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Burrell 1985). These works demonstrate two important findings. Female candidates do feel more concerned about fundraising than male candidates and engage in the behavior at higher rates and among a greater variety of potential contributors. But, those feelings of concern may,

in fact, be misplaced, as women tend to raise the same, or even more, money than male candidates after accounting for political characteristics such as incumbency.

As more women have gained office, more women serve in leadership positions, both presiding over the chamber and over committees (Bratton 2005). Consequently, researchers have investigated what conditions have contributed to women achieving positions of authority and how those female leaders have acted in those positions. Jewell and Whicker (1993) attribute the rise in female leadership to fundamental shifts in society such as the permanent entry of women into the labor force, the shift away from focusing on the nuclear family, and the growth of women's groups dedicated to electing women. In a more systematic fashion, Deen and Little (1999) studied the factors contributing to the rise in female leadership and attribute that rise to institutional variables such as membership turnover and whether the state has had past female leaders and discount state-level variables such as state-wide education levels and geographic location.

Furthermore, how these leaders "rule" appears to differ between men and women. One could argue the institution and political considerations of leadership so constrain all leaders as to diminish any differences between male and female leaders (Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001). Yet, research has largely discredited such an argument. Female leaders do prioritize different issues for their agendas in comparison to male leaders (Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001; Bratton and Haynie 1999). Furthermore, female leaders tend to employ a more conciliatory and integrative style (Weikart, Chen, Williams, and Hromic 2006; Rosenthal 2000; Lyn 1994; Jewell and Whicker 1993; but, see Reingold 1996 and Costantini and Craik 1972), while men use a

more confrontational leadership style, and both genders are viewed in such terms from the outside (Fridkin and Kenney 2009).

Beyond stylistic differences, however, Lyn (1994) demonstrates that because male and female committee chairs behave differently, how committee members and witnesses behave also varies accordingly. While some of this variation takes on negative characteristics (for instance, men behave more aggressively when women constitute a greater proportion of the committee), this variation might also allow for greater policy enactment for issues of special concern to women because if a policy survives such a tough committee environment, it has a greater chance of success.

Researchers have also conducted a great deal of work concerning the effectiveness of women once they achieve office. The work undertaken on the effectiveness of female legislators involves two competing hypotheses. The first assumed female lawmakers would have lower rates of legislative effectiveness than men because women are fundamentally different, and those differences make them ineffectual in an environment such as a legislature (Ellickson 1992). As described above, if female legislators operate within so-called gendered institutions, institutional design will reward typically "male" behaviors and fail to reward typically "female" behaviors.

The second hypothesis has developed as the number of women legislators has increased. Because women have gained leadership positions and employ a more conciliatory legislative style, they may work more effectively with others from across the aisle to produce successes. Indeed, recent empirical analyses demonstrate the initial hypothesis false and the more recent hypothesis correct. Women fare no worse than their counterparts (Orey et al.

2006; Jeydel and Taylor 2003; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Ellickson 1992). Indeed, women often have higher success rates than men (Bratton 2005; Saint-Germain 1989), though factors such as majority-minority party status may condition that increased rate of effectiveness (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2011).

In addition to studying the demographic characteristics, ideologies, behaviors, and styles of female legislators, other scholars have, indeed, taken a more psychological approach similar to the one I advocate. For instance, works have investigated the stereotyping of legislators (Fridkin and Kenney 2009; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993) by voters and come to interesting and contradictory conclusions; voters perceive female legislators as more honest and caring but express a preference for stereotypically male characteristics in candidates. In addition, scholars have investigated the perceptions of the legislators and come to contradictory findings concerning whether or not women perceive themselves as separate or considered as "less" than men (Weikart et al. 2006; Thomas 1996; Freeman and Lyons 1991).

However, for my purposes, very few scholars have employed personality itself as an explanatory variable or only briefly allude to the possible influences of personality when studying gender and elite political behavior (Diamond 1977, 55, 150). Moreover, the few existing works exploring personality, gender, and political elites both conceptualize and operationalize personality differently from the Big Five framework I employ and often conflate personality with other concepts such as "…basic values, life goals, and conception of self or 'ego identity'" (Diamond 1977, 65). For instance, both Barth and Ferguson (2002) and Blair and Stanley (1991) discuss personality as it relates to orientations toward power, not as general and enduring attitudinal or behavioral orientations.

However, Costantini and Craik (1972) and Werner and Bachtold (1974) discuss personality in ways more similar to current understandings of personality and reach interesting conclusions. Costantini and Craik find the personality characteristics of female leaders appear similar no matter the partisan affiliation of those leaders; they "…try harder and worry more" (226). However, they find male Republican leaders differ from male Democratic leaders in that the male Republican leaders attain higher scores on endurance and emotional control while their Democratic counterparts score higher on exhibition and lability. Furthermore, Werner and Bachtold find female legislators score high "…on intelligence, dominance, adventuresomeness, unconventionality, and radicalism…" (83). While neither of these studies employs the Big Five framework, their findings are consistent with aspects of the Big Five. Remember, conservatives (and Republicans) tend to score higher on conscientiousness and emotional stability (e.g. endurance and emotional control) while liberals (and Democrats) tend to score higher on openness to experience (similar to exhibition and lability). In addition, concepts such as intelligence and unconventionality as employed by Werner and Bachtold fall under the umbrella of openness to experience.

Descriptive Statistics

In the subsequent analyses, I coded the independent variables as follows: gender (0 = male, 1 = female); race (0 = white, 1 = non-white); party affiliation (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican); years in office (continuous variable); first term dummy (0 = not first term, 1 = first term); majority (0 = minority member, 1 = majority member); chamber (0 = lower chamber, 1 = upper chamber); party leader (0 = not a party leader, 1 = party leader); committee leader (0 = not a committee leader, 1 = committee leader); progressive ambition (0 = will definitely not run

for higher office, 1 = not currently interested in running for higher office; 2 = would run for higher office if opportunity presented, 3 = will definitely run for higher office); and, competitive (0 = not a competitive race in the last election; 1 = competitive race in the last election, defined as winning by less than 20% of the vote). In addition, the models include several higher-level variables including a dummy variable about whether the state in which the individual serves employs term limits (0 = no term limits, 1 = term-limited) and a continuous variable of professionalism ranging from zero to one (taken from Squire 2007). Finally, I rescaled the personality variables to range from zero to one to make interpretation simpler.

This chapter contains analyses employing two different sets of data and dependent variables. First, I present findings concerning how personality and gender interact to influence the self-reported amount of time legislators dedicate to the eleven activities discussed in chapter three. Second, I present findings concerning how personality and gender and personality, gender, and either legislative professionalism or tenure in office interact to influence the number of measures introduced or cosponsored by legislators and their resulting legislative success. Recall, chapters three and four discuss these different datasets. The data I employ for the discussion of the self-reported time legislators spend on legislative activities involves the whole sample while the data for the discussion on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative success employs the subset of data containing the legislators from the 29 states with navigable records of those activities.

To have a general sense of the distributions of personality between the genders, I present descriptive statistics on the two samples: the full dataset and the subsetted dataset.[17]

[17] Recall, I have rescaled all personality variables to range from zero to one

For the full dataset, the legislators average 0.72on openness (N = 717; sd = 0.22); 0.68 on conscientiousness (N = 713; sd = 0.23); 0.63 on extraversion (N = 722; sd = 0.25); 0.60 on agreeableness (N = 715; sd = 0.21), and 0.63 (N = 718; sd = 0.23) on emotional stability. However, because this chapter focuses on differences in the gender, I also present the descriptive statistics for personality for each gender. The male legislators in the sample average 0.71 on openness (N = 488; sd = 0.22); 0.67 on conscientiousness (N = 490; sd = 0.23); 0.62 on extraversion (N = 495; sd = 0.25); 0.59 on agreeableness (N = 489; sd = 0.21); and, 0.62 on emotional stability (N = 493; sd = 0.23). The female legislators average 0.75 on openness (N = 229; sd =0.22); 0.73 on conscientiousness (N = 223; sd = 0.22); 0.65 on extraversion (N = 227; sd = 0.25); 0.62 on agreeableness (N = 226; sd = 0.21); and, 0.64 on emotional stability (N = 225; sd =0 .22). I also analyzed the variance of means for men and women. Within the full sample, the legislators significantly differ on openness and conscientiousness; those differences also approach statistical significance for agreeableness and emotional stability[18].

Furthermore, I present descriptive statistics concerning the self-reported amount of time the legislators dedicate to a variety of legislative activities. Recall, the survey I employ asked legislators to describe how much time they spent on eleven activities: (1) meeting with citizens back in the district; (2) meeting with constituents in the capital; (3) fundraising; (4) participating in committee matters; (5) working on legislative issues; (6) studying legislation; (7) working with caucuses; (8) attending floor debate; (9) working with party leaders to build coalitions; (10) engaging in oversight; and, (11) giving speeches about legislation outside the

[18] Please see table A.1 for full t-test results.

district. These questions employed a four-category response format, with response options of "almost none" (0), "a little" (1), "a moderate amount" (2), and "a great deal" (3).

Certainly, men and women demonstrate differences in the amount of time they report spending on different aspects of their jobs as legislators (see Table 5.1). By simply glancing at the distribution of responses, it appears as though male and female legislators differ most strikingly concerning the amounts of time they spend attending committee hearings and bill markup sessions, meeting in the capital on legislative issues, and studying legislation. However, to test whether these differences have any statistical significance, I conducted additional t-tests (see table A.2 for full results). Indeed, the t-tests indicate male and female legislators do significantly differ on the amounts of time they report attending committee hearings, meeting on legislative issues, and studying legislation. Recall, all of those behaviors loaded onto a single factor (Factor Two); and, male and female legislators do statistically differ when considering the purely legislative tasks taken together as a scale.

I next present the descriptive statistics for the personality variables for the legislators in the subset of legislators from the 29 states with accessible information on introductions and cosponsorship. Overall, the legislators average 0.71 on openness (N = 365; sd = 0.22); 0.70 on conscientiousness (N = 365; sd =0 .23); 0.63 on extraversion (N = 365; sd = 0.25); 0.57 on agreeableness (N = 365; sd = 0.22); and, 0.61 on emotional stability (N = 365; 0.23). The male legislators average 0.69 on openness (N = 249; sd = 0.22); 0.64 on conscientiousness (N = 249; sd = 0.23); 0.61 on extraversion (N = 249; sd = 0.25); 0.56 on agreeableness (N = 249; 0.22); and, 0.60 on emotional stability (N = 249; sd = 0.23). The female legislators average 0.76 on openness (N = 116; sd = 0.22); 0.75 on conscientiousness (N = 116; sd = 0.22); 0.65 on

extraversion (N = 116; sd = 0.26); 0.59 on agreeableness (N = 116; sd = 0.22); and, 0.62 on emotional stability (N = 116; sd = 0.21). Again, I analyzed the variance of means of the two genders. Within the subsetted data, the legislators significantly differ on openness and conscientiousness but do not significantly differ on extraversion, agreeableness, or emotional stability.[19]

I also provide descriptive statistics on the numbers of measures introduced, cosponsored, and passed by the legislators broken down by gender. On average, male legislators introduced 26.11 measures (N = 1,050; sd = 24.78) and cosponsored 98.67 measures (N = 978; sd = 91.57). They had 5.11 introductions codified (N=1,050, sd = 6.74) and saw 25.08 measures introduced or cosponsored passed. Those passages constitute a 21.5% success rate for introductions (N = 1,037; sd = 21.3%) and a 23.8% success rate for introductions and cosponsored measures (N = 1,046; sd = 18.8%). Female legislators introduced an average of 26.45 measures (N = 373; sd = 23.57) and cosponsored an average of 129.03 measures (N = 336; sd = 116.99). In addition, female legislators successfully passed an average of 5.78 introductions (N = 372; sd = 7.48) and 38.21 introductions and cosponsored measures (N = 336; sd = 52.22). Those passages translate to an introduction success rate of 23.8% (N = 336; sd = 23.3%) and a total success rate of 25.1% (N = 373; sd = 20.9%).

To better understand these averages, I conducted additional t-tests on introductions (t = -0.231; p = 0.82); cosponsored measures (t = -4.324, p = 0.00); codified introductions (t = -1.514; p = 0.11); codified introductions and cosponsored measures (t= -4.446; p = 0.00); percentage of introductions passed (t = -1.640; p = 0.10); and, percentage of all measures

[19] Please see table A.1 for full t-test results.

introduced or cosponsored passed (t = -1.042; p = 0.30). The two groups significantly differ on cosponsored measures and the total number of introductions or cosponsored measures passed; however, when taken as a proportion of all introductions or cosponsored measures, those successes no longer differ significantly.

Analyses

Engagement in Legislative Activities

Consistent with the previous chapters, I conducted a variety of analyses to test the potential effects of personality and gender interactions on legislative behavior. Based on the extant literature concerning women and legislative behavior, I propose several hypotheses. First, the effects of conscientiousness and emotional stability will differ between the genders concerning the amounts of time they report dedicating to different legislative activities. Remember, Costantini and Craik (1972) stated women "…try harder and worry more" (226). Based on such a statement, I contend conscientiousness and emotional stability may have different effects on male and female legislators.

Recall from chapter three that conscientiousness strongly correlates with engagement in more purely legislative tasks such as studying legislation and working on committees and weakly correlates with engagement in more social activities. I assert conscientiousness will negatively correlate with participation in the social aspects of representation for women while such a relationship will not exist for men. In addition, if, as Costantini and Craik argue, women "worry more", emotional stability may negatively correlate with the amount of time they devote to purely legislative activities and positively correlate with the amount of time they spend on the more social aspects of serving as legislators. In other words, the less emotionally-

stable female legislators may worry about the legislative aspects of serving as a legislator and devote more time to working on those aspects of the job related to creating policy and sacrifice time devoted to activities such as coalition-building, participating in caucuses, or meeting with constituents.

Indeed, conscientiousness does have different effects on legislators of different genders (see Table 5.2). Overall, as conscientiousness increases in female legislators, their self-reported amount of time dedicated to more social legislative activities declines. However, to make these models more concrete, I calculated both predicted values and predicted probabilities. Recall, the Minimal Factor One consists of the variables concerning time spent with citizens and constituents, fundraising, and giving speeches; the second version (labeled Full Factor One) includes participating in coalition-building and oversight in addition to the four component measures of the Minimal Factor One model. As models involving these factors as dependent variables employ ordinary least squares regression, I calculated the predicted values of the dependent variables for varying levels of conscientiousness in men and women (see Figure 5.1).

As female legislators increase from the lowest scores of conscientiousness to the highest scores of conscientiousness, their scalar scores concerning the more social aspects of legislative work decline from 0.547 to 0.503. Conversely, as male legislators increase from the lowest scores of conscientiousness to the highest scores of conscientiousness, their scalar scores for participation in the more social aspects of representation increase from 0.430 to 0.540. Furthermore, the predicted probabilities of dedicating time to particular social activities for male and female legislators demonstrate this same pattern. Take, for instance, the variable concerning the amount of time legislators report dedicating to building coalitions with party

leaders (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). Overall, most legislators reported spending a "moderate amount" of time on this activity. However, the predicted probability of women falling in this category decreases as conscientiousness increases while for men the probability increases as conscientiousness increases.

The least conscientious women have a 69.6% probability of placing themselves within the "moderate amount" category. That probability decreases to 64.4% for women with scores of 0.5 on conscientiousness. For the most conscientious women, the probability of reporting spending a "moderate amount" of time working to build coalitions decreases again to 57.9%. The least conscientious men have a 46.0% probability of placing themselves in the moderate category. As conscientiousness increases to 0.5, men have a 57.1% probability of placing themselves in the moderate category; the most conscientious men have a 66.3% probability of reporting a "moderate amount".

While less consistent than the findings for conscientiousness, emotional stability also demonstrates a similar pattern concerning the amount of time legislators of different genders report spending on more social legislative activities (see Table 5.3). Certainly, for the model employing the Minimal Factor One variable, emotional stability negatively correlates with female participation in social legislative activities but positively correlates with male participation in the same activities. As women's scores on emotional stability increase from zero to one, the predicted value for the Minimal Factor One declines from 0.580 to 0.500.

However, as men's scores on emotional stability increase from zero to one, the predicted value for the Minimal Factor One increases from 0.500 to 0.525. Although failing to achieve statistical significance, the Full Factor One model also demonstrates the same pattern,

with the predicted value for female legislators decreasing from 0.538 to 0.496 as emotional stability increases from zero to one and the predicted value for male legislators increasing from 0.476 to 0.520 as emotional stability increases from zero to one.

Remember, previous scholarship has demonstrated female legislators participate in behaviors like working with constituents at higher rates than male legislators. Those results hold true here, as well. Even the least conscientious female legislators engage in these social legislative activities at higher rates than the most conscientious male legislators. Unfortunately, I can only offer a possible explanation as to why conscientiousness works differently between the genders. Any potential increase we could have seen conscientiousness having for women and social legislative behaviors would simply signify going above and beyond their standard levels. Yet, perhaps these highly conscientious women know they will still perform a great deal of these activities even if they divert some of their attention to more purely legislative activities while highly conscientious men supplement their previous levels by engaging in more of these behaviors.

An explanation similar to the one for conscientiousness could describe the pattern concerning social legislative activity, gender, and emotional stability. Again, the least emotionally stable female legislator engages in social legislative activities at a higher rate than the most emotionally stable male legislator. Society expects its female legislators to engage in these social legislative activities. Less emotionally stable female legislators may engage in these social legislative activities even more as overcompensation to assuage anxiety about performing their expected duties. Those societal expectations may differ for men, leading the least emotionally stable male legislators to also devote attention to activities seen as less

masculine to lower their own stress levels about things like reelection while their emotionally stable counterparts may not feel that same anxiety.

Introductions, Cosponsorship, and Legislative Effectiveness

Next, I move to models concerning the potential effects of interactions of personality and gender on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. In chapter four, I proposed a hypothesis concerning emotional stability and legislative effectiveness. I argued the more emotionally stable would have greater legislative success because they would have a greater capacity to weather the ups and downs of pushing legislation through the multiple stages of the legislative process. However, models indicated emotional stability significantly and negatively correlated with legislative effectiveness. Yet, I propose investigating the effect of emotional stability and gender on legislative effectiveness. Does emotional stability negatively impact the effectiveness of all legislators, or do some benefit from emotional stability (see Table 5.4)?

As seen in the models, emotional stability does, indeed, positively correlate with legislative effectiveness for some legislators – women. Conversely, emotionally-stable men see a decline in their levels of legislative effectiveness. While emotional stability only negligibly increases the percentage of introductions a female legislator sees codified overall, a move from zero to one on emotional stability corresponds to an almost 10% drop in success for male legislators (from 26.6% to 17.0%). Concerning the percentage of introductions and cosponsored measures codified, an increase in women's emotional stability scores from zero to one translates to a 7% increase (from 21.5% to 28.5%) in the proportion of introductions and cosponsored measures codified, while a similar move in emotional stability for men equates to

an 8.5% drop (from 29.1% to 20.6%) in the proportion of introductions and cosponsored measures codified.

The pattern reverses itself concerning the number of introductions legislators make. Again, Table 4.1 in chapter four demonstrates a negative, though statistically-insignificant, relationship between emotional stability and the number of introductions made by legislators. However, when accounting for possible interactions of gender and emotional stability and introductions, male legislators see a negligible increase in introductions as their scores on emotional stability increase from zero to one (from 26.1% to 26.8%). However, female legislators see a large drop in the number of introductions they make as emotional stability increases from zero to one. The model predicts a female legislator with a score of zero on emotional stability will introduce approximately 39.5 measures; a female legislator with a score of one on emotional stability will introduce fewer than 22 measures.

By considering the results of the above models alongside the results of the regression analysis in Table 4.1, it is clear the model lacking a personality-gender interaction does not tell the whole story. Without testing the possible separate effects of emotional stability on men and women, we would likely believe emotional stability either has no impact (e.g. introductions) or a negative effect (e.g. legislative effectiveness) on legislative behavior. However, these more nuanced models demonstrate how the results from one group of individuals can overwhelm the results for another. For introductions, it appears the negative effect of emotional stability proves so strong for women as to overwhelm the men in the sample. For legislative effectiveness, the negative effect of emotional stability on male legislators' success completely overwhelms the female legislators in the sample. By including a

gender-emotional stability interaction, we can see emotional stability does not perform identically for all individuals.

Because emotional stability appears to operate in distinct ways for male and female legislators, I investigated the hypotheses I presented in chapter four concerning the possible direct effects of personality on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness by including a gender-personality term. Overall, the initial findings from chapter four regarding the potential direct effects of personality on introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness hold even after including a personality-gender interaction.

However, several gender-personality interactions do prove statistically and substantively significant. For instance, the model concerning the percentage of introductions codified returns a negative coefficient for conscientiousness in chapter four (see Table 4.2). However, it seems reasonable to argue conscientiousness should positively correlate with legislative effectiveness; the highly conscientious should view it as their responsibility to ensure the measures they introduce survive the legislative process. When accounting for differences in gender, conscientiousness does play a different role for male and female legislators (see Table 5.5).

As female legislators' scores on conscientiousness increase from zero to one, their predicted rate of success for introductions rises from 20.3% to 24.2%. Conversely, as male legislators' scores on conscientiousness increase from zero to one, their predicted rate of success for introductions falls from 24.8% to 18.7%. As with emotional stability, the negative effect on men overwhelms the positive effect on women when considering all legislators

together. By considering the interaction of personality and gender, we find another example wherein we should consider the variety of ways personality could affect behavior.

Beyond simple gender-personality interactions, I also ran a variety of models concerning potential three-way interactions between gender, personality, and either tenure in office or legislative professionalism. If the personalities of the men and women who choose to run for office differ, it stands to reason the time they spend in office accentuates or diminishes aspects of those personalities accordingly. In addition, it seems reasonable to argue legislative professionalism may impact male and female legislators differently. Even today, women report spending more time taking care of children and engaging in household maintenance than men (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012). If a female legislator with outside employment worked in a citizen legislature, she could face additional demands on her attention than a male legislator.

Overall, tenure in office does not significantly interact with gender and personality to affect the number of introductions or cosponsored measures to which a legislator attaches his or her name. For only one model does an interaction between gender, personality, and tenure in office produce statistically-significant results. When considering the number of introductions made by a legislator, an interaction of gender, conscientiousness, and tenure in office produces different patterns for male and female legislators.

The model predicts the least conscientious male legislators will introduce just over 25 measures during their first year in office; by their tenth years, they will introduce fewer than 24 measures. For men of middling conscientiousness, they will introduce 25.5 measures during their first year and 26.5 measures in their tenth years. The most conscientious male legislators will introduce just over 26 measures in their first year and 29 measures in their tenth years.

However, the opposite occurs for female legislators. The least conscientious female legislator will introduce fewer than 25 measures during her first term but will introduce nearly 52 measures by her tenth year in office. Female legislators with conscientiousness scores of 0.5 will introduce nearly 25 measures during their first year in office but over 36 measures in their tenth years. The most conscientious women see only a negligible increase in the number of introductions they make.

While tenure in office does not appear to consistently interact with personality differently in male and female legislators, legislative professionalism does. Legislative professionalism benefits the "less" women – less agreeable, less extraverted, and less open. For men, legislative professionalism benefits the "more" men – more agreeable, more extraverted, and more open.

Recall from chapter four that I hypothesized both extraversion and agreeableness would positively correlate with cosponsorship. For extraversion, I argued the extraverted, by virtue of their social nature, would speak with other legislators and staffers and learn of opportunities to cosponsor. For agreeableness, I argued the agreeable would want to maintain social harmony and would cosponsor legislation to foster that harmony. However, Table 4.1 demonstrated no statistically-significant relationships between extraversion or agreeableness and cosponsorship activity. Furthermore, contrary to expectations, agreeableness negatively correlated with cosponsorship.

Table 5.6 presents the results of interactions between gender, professionalism, and either extraversion or agreeableness on cosponsorship activity. The results of these interactions prove both statistically and substantively significant. While the genders see an increase in

cosponsored measures as both legislative professionalism and either extraversion or agreeableness increases, the magnitudes of those effects differ at various levels of extraversion or agreeableness for each gender (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5).

For male legislators, the model predicts the least agreeable and least extraverted men will see the smallest increase in the number of cosponsored measures as legislative professionalism increases, while the most agreeable and most extraverted men will see the greatest increase in the number of cosponsored measures as legislative professionalism increases. This pattern reverses itself for female legislators. The model predicts the most agreeable and most extraverted women will see the smallest increase in the number of cosponsored measures as legislative professionalism increases, while the least agreeable and least extraverted women will see the greatest increase in the number of cosponsored measures.

This same contradictory pattern occurs when considering gender, openness to experience, legislative professionalism, and the proportion of introductions and cosponsored measures codified (see Table 5.7). All male legislators see a decline in success as professionalism and openness increase. However, the declines prove greatest for the least open men; the model predicts the least open men in the least professional legislatures will see 29.1% of their introductions and cosponsored measures codified but only 6.0% in the most professional legislatures. The model predicts the most open men will enjoy a 28.3% success rate in the least professional legislatures but only a 20.2% success rate in the most professional legislatures.

Women demonstrate an opposite pattern. Both highly- and moderately-open female legislators will see a decline in legislative success in more professional legislatures. Yet, the least open women will actually see an increase in legislative success in more professional legislatures; the model predicts these women will encounter a 17.7% success rate in the least professional legislatures but a 23.6% success rate in the most professional legislatures.

These findings prove consistent with previous research into gender and legislative behavior, and I concur with previous explanations for these findings. For women, agreeableness, extraversion, and, to some extent, openness signal weakness to others – both inside and outside the institution. In states with less professional legislatures, where voters have less incentive to expect their representatives to behave in ways similar to members of Congress, agreeableness, extraversion, and openness do not necessarily act as negative characteristics. However, female legislators behave in more stereotypically male ways when serving in more professional legislatures. They behave more assertively in an effort to counteract potential negative associations with simply being female in society. Conversely, the more agreeable, extraverted, and open men prove both more active and more successful. Unlike women, where these traits potentially demonstrate weakness, behaving in an agreeable, friendly, and open manner signals willingness to compromise for men.

Essentially, because professional legislatures more closely resemble Congress, and these trait patterns are more prized in our national representatives, male and female legislators behave differently based on societal expectations. In other words, we as constituents want our female members of Congress to behave more like men and our male members of Congress to

behave more like women, and personality interacts with the environment of more professional legislatures to benefit those who fulfill societal gender norms.

Conclusion

According to the Center for American Women and Politics, females hold 97, or 18.1%, of the 535 seats in Congress. Similarly, the National Conference of State Legislatures states females comprise approximately 24.2% of the seats in state legislatures. Certainly, pundits, activists, and feminists argue the election of women to public office will bring greater attention to the concerns of women, children, families, and the elderly. If women constitute half of the American population but only one-fifth of the legislatures in America, half the population lacks descriptive and, very possibly, substantive representation. Therefore, the study of women in political office holds great potential for remedying such inequities.

In recent decades, scholars have greatly expanded our knowledge of female legislators by examining their personal characteristics, behavior, and impact on both the institutions in which they serve and on the policy outputs of those institutions. These works often focus on the many ways in which female legislators differ from their male counterparts. While it may once have been necessary to identify and categorize female legislators, we should broaden our examinations to understand the differences between female legislators as a group rather than juxtaposing them against male legislators (Cammisa and Reingold 2004). Such an approach provides us a greater understanding of female legislators and how they operate in particular institutional contexts.

The analyses in this chapter serve several purposes. First, they seek to provide a preliminary exploration of not only the effects of the personality differences of men and

women on legislative behavior but also the effects of personality differences within the group of female legislators on legislative behavior. Certainly, the analyses demonstrate personality sometimes operates differently in the genders. For instance, both conscientiousness and emotional stability operate differently in male and female legislators concerning the self-reported amount of time they dedicate to the more social aspects of their jobs. In women, conscientiousness and emotional stability negatively correlate with dedicating a substantial portion of time to activities such as fundraising, coalition-building, and meeting with constituents. In men, conscientiousness and emotional stability positively correlate with those same activities.

Furthermore, emotional stability also has opposing effects on male and female legislators when considering legislative effectiveness. For women, emotional stability positively correlates with levels of legislative effectiveness. Calm and laid-back women see a greater proportion of their introductions and cosponsored measures codified. Conversely, emotional stability negatively correlates with the legislative effectiveness of male legislators. Easily-stressed men appear to dedicate a greater deal of effort to ensuring their introductions and cosponsored measures survive the legislative process.

In addition to studying how personality operates differently between and within the genders, this chapter also sought to further studies of trait-environmental interactions in three ways. First, because scholars often consider gender a socially-constructed artifact, gender can essentially operate as an environmental factor. If gender truly is socially-constructed, then studying the two-way interactions of gender and personality provides us a greater understanding of how personality operates under different societal expectations. Second,

studying gender-personality interactions provides finer granularity and allows us to observe the influence of personality on subgroups of legislators. Throughout this dissertation, I have argued we need to not only focus on the institution but the individuals within the institution. By decomposing those individuals into distinct groups, we can better observe patterns of influence.

Finally, by including three-way interactions of gender, personality, and tenure in office or legislative professionalism, we have additional evidence of the importance of studying how biological predispositions and environmental context interact to influence observed behavior. Such knowledge may allow us to fine-tune the institutions to suit the dispositions of the legislators serving within them to help ensure more normatively ideal outcomes.

Chapter 6: The Consequences of Personality in State Legislatures

Introduction

I began this dissertation with a comparison of two members of Congress, Bruce Braley and David Loebsack. These two congressmen possess a number of resemblances. Concerning their extrainstitutional similarities, they were both born and raised in the state they now represent (Iowa), possess postgraduate degrees, and have wives and children. Furthermore, they represent fairly similar districts. Within the institution, they have taken similar paths by serving on committees related to military and veterans' affairs, but neither holds any leadership positions on those committees or within the chamber. However, while Congressman Loebsack has sponsored 54 measures during his three full terms in Congress, Congressman Braley has introduced nearly twice as many (93 measures).

Conventional explanations found in legislative behavior literature would argue these two men should introduce a comparable number of measures. However, if conventional explanations –factors such as personal history, constituency preferences, party pressures, or institutional constraints – fail to explain why these two men have behave differently, what could? I have argued personality, as conceptualized and operationalized by the Big Five framework, provides us additional insight into variations in legislative behavior. Employing personality as an explanatory variable allows us to take into consideration how individuals' core psychological predispositions affect how they respond to their environments. By doing so, we gain a more complete understanding of individuals within political institutions.

How Personality Might Matter for Legislative Behavior

In chapters one and four, I argued personality could affect behavior in several ways. First, rather than employing only environmental factors as explanatory variables for legislative behavior, we should also include personality variables to determine if and when they also directly impact behavior. Furthermore, how personality might directly influence behavior could take on several forms. First, personality's potential effects on legislative behavior could take on a linear form wherein a change in personality produces a relatively constant rate of change in the legislative behavior in question.

But remember, the personality dimensions lack an ideal. For example, scoring high in openness to experience has advantages, such as a willingness to listen to new ideas and try new things. However, that openness to new ideas and experiences means these individuals may partake in behaviors hazardous to their health like smoking. As a result, we must also consider other ways in which personality could affect behavior. Therefore, a second way personality might have a direct impact on behavior could be via a hyperbolic relationship wherein changes in personality produce a great deal of change in legislative behavior at lower levels of the independent variables but taper off as the personality variables approach their maximum levels. Or, third, personality's effects on legislative behavior could occur parabolically wherein graphing the relationship of personality and legislative behavior produce an upside-down U shape, with the midpoint indicating personality's greatest effects.

However, only considering the variety of ways in which personality could directly impact legislative behavior takes a rather deterministic view of how personality affects behavior. The environment in which a person is located influences how that person behaves. Both the extraverted and introverted will likely appear introverted at a funeral. But at a party, the

environment no longer constrains the extraverted individual. There is no "good" or "bad" or "right" and "wrong" when studying personality. Nor are the dimensions of personality deterministic. Rather, these five overarching dimensions simply describe individuals' psychological tendencies over a variety of times and situations.

Therefore, just as studies involving personality and mass political behavior have begun to do, we must also consider how the environment in which an individual legislator operates affects how his or her overarching psychological tendencies express themselves. Because there exists a variety of environmental factors that could act as constraints on individual legislators, I have chosen to focus on two of the most prominent differences in state legislators – tenure in office and legislative professionalism. In addition to providing leverage due to variation across state legislatures, these two environmental constraints also have substantive effects on the politics of states. Therefore, I believe studying personality's effects on behavior in light of these constraints could have some of the most substantive and normatively important impacts on states and their citizens.

Simply put, personality matters. Undoubtedly, genetics exert a substantial influence on individuals' personality traits. Additionally, personality has meaningful and intuitive impacts on behavior. Furthermore, personality influences the environments in which we place ourselves and how we behave inside those environments. In other words, we choose to go different places and do different things in part because of our personalities, and personality impacts how we behave once we go to those places or do those things.

However, in spite of its intuitive appeal, research on political behavior has only recently begun to include personality as an explanatory variable. This lack of inclusion largely rested on

the failure to develop an agreed-up conceptualization or operationalization of personality within personality's home field of psychology. However, with the rise and acceptance of the Big Five framework within psychology, scholars have been able to integrate valid and reliable measures of personality within political science. Initially, political scientists investigated the direct effects of personality on political behavior. More recently, they have moved away from investigating only the immediate impacts of personality on behavior by studying how individuals' personalities interact with their environments to influence behavior. And in doing so, scholars of political behavior have added to the plethora of evidence concerning personality's impacts on human behavior with a greater degree of nuance.

While personality has undergone resurgence in literature investigating mass political behavior, a similar resurrection has not occurred in studies of elite political behavior. Certainly, there are several reasons for this divergence from studies of mass political behavior. First, gathering from politicians the information necessary to employ personality as an explanatory variable proves more challenging than gathering that same information from everyday people. Second, historical works including personality in investigations of elite political behavior proved both conceptually and operationally unsound leading more recent scholars to approach personality with trepidation.

Third, current perspectives on legislative behavior often take a game theoretic, rational-actor perspective, sometimes to the exclusion of consideration of the inherent individuality of politicians. While works including gender, race, or personal backgrounds allow scholars to understand how more individual-level characteristics influence political behavior, I argue these efforts do not go back far enough along the causal chain to truly count as efforts accounting for

the inherent differences between individuals. Undoubtedly, existing explanations of legislative behavior matter. Indeed, the models found in this dissertation continue to demonstrate how factors such as electoral vulnerability, party and committee leadership, gender, legislative professionalism, and tenure in office affect how legislators behave, oftentimes reaffirming previous findings. Yet, personality traits also matter, both as standalone variables and as part of interactions with environmental constraints such as legislative professionalism.

Summary of Findings

In chapter 2, I set out to further the preliminary findings of Dietrich et al. (2012) by demonstrating three things. First, while politicians do not respond to surveys at the same levels as individuals in the mass public, when they do respond to surveys, they will likely answer personality-related measures. Critics might assert that politicians who complete surveys will selectively choose to which questions they will respond. And while that may be the case, when elites do choose to respond to a survey, they do not avoid answering personality questions at any higher rate than they choose not to respond to less provocative items. Second, political elites do display variance in personality. Again, critics might assert that politicians will respond to personality items in similar ways, likely to paint themselves in the best light. And although politicians display less variance than a random sample of the public, variance still exists, and that variance does not appear so concentrated as to prove useless for analysis.

Third, I conducted several tests to ensure findings from research on personality and political behavior at the mass level have validity at the elite level, as well. Indeed, if basic findings from the mass level did not replicate themselves at the elite level, we would have little foundation on which to base our theoretical expectations and would weaken the usefulness of

the Big Five framework. Yet, these validity tests yielded encouraging results. The basic relationships between the Big Five and ideology and partisan identification found at the mass level also exist at the elite level. For example, conservatives tend to possess higher levels of conscientiousness, extraversion, and emotional stability, while liberals tend to possess higher levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. The same patterns also appear for partisanship with Republicans demonstrating higher levels of extraversion, conscientiousness, and emotional stability and Democrats expressing higher levels of openness to experience and agreeableness. With this replication of findings, we can feel more assured the ways in which personality affect political behavior at the mass level should also operate similarly among elites.

Chapter 3 set out to move beyond purely replicative work by arguing personality affects engagement in a variety of legislative behaviors. In general, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion appear to play the largest roles driving engagement in various types of legislative activity. Superficially, it may seem odd neither agreeableness nor emotional stability plays major roles in undertaking the eleven legislative behaviors in question. But, those legislative activities matter for whether a personality trait dimension rises to the foreground. Certainly, not all activities provide an opportunity for individuals' personality traits to play a role. For instance, nothing inherent in the less social aspects of legislative activities (i.e. studying legislation or conducting legislative oversight) would elicit different behavior patterns along the lines of agreeableness.

Yet, legislative activities do have logical connections with certain personality trait dimensions. Again, I investigated how personality could influence engagement in each of the eleven surveyed activities and how personality might affect engagement in social legislative

activities and purely legislative activities more broadly. First, openness to experience has a robust influence on legislative behavior, whether that behavior occurs within or outside the legislature. Because increases in openness correlate with information-seeking, it makes sense those high in openness report spending a good deal of time engaging in intrainstitutional activities like attending committee hearings and studying legislation. But, openness also relates to a willingness to try new things, which makes the finding concerning increases in openness correlating with increased engagement in social legislative activities come as no surprise either.

Second, conscientiousness corresponds with increased engagement in the more purely legislative activities. While I cannot say for certain given the current data, one could argue the highly conscientious view their first duty as legislators as representing their constituents and creating public policy; they ran for office to represent their constituents and ensure those views received adequate attention. Therefore, the highly conscientiousness may prioritize engaging in the activities most likely to achieve those goals.

Third, and not surprisingly, extraverts enjoy the more purely social aspects of a legislator's job, such as meeting with constituents or working to form coalitions with others. While they may also view their jobs as representing their constituents and creating public policy, extraverts seem to choose to engage in activities like meeting directly with constituents that could serve those goals while simultaneously providing the social outlet they crave. Rather than engaging in activities failing to provide a social outlet such as participating in oversight activities, extraverts will prioritize working on the activities the conscientious seem to see as somewhat more secondary.

Yet, the data from chapter 3 rely solely on individuals' self-reports. Consequently, chapter 4 moved toward using a more objective data source – introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness – to examine personality's possible influence on legislative behavior. I chose to study these three particular legislative behaviors for two reasons. First, legislative scholars have demonstrated the importance of these activities. Introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative success can increase a legislator's power within the institution, earn him more campaign contributions, and provide a platform for future campaigns. Second, although roll-call voting is certainly an important legislative behavior, it is a reactive behavior in which almost all legislators engage. Rather than focusing roll-call voting, introductions and cosponsorship allow us to investigate activities in which legislators choose to engage themselves more proactively.

Similar to the trajectory of personality and political behavior research at the mass level, I undertook two separate paths to test how personality might impact introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative success. First, I directly tested the Big Five trait dimensions as predictors of introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness. Remember, personality could influence behavior in these activities in several ways – linearly, hyperbolically, or parabolically. In structuring the models to test a possible linear relationship, the Big Five do not appear to impact the number of measures legislators introduce and/or cosponsor, but three of them (openness to experience, agreeableness, and emotional stability) may impact legislative effectiveness.

Therefore, employing squared personality terms allows us to investigate whether personality demonstrates a Goldilocks-type effect on legislative behavior. Perhaps scoring too

low or too high on a trait dimension proves detrimental while scoring in some ideal middle range leads to the preferred outcome. And indeed, these squared terms indicate increasing levels of the Big Five lead legislators to engage in more legislative activity. However, the results also demonstrate personality only carries a legislator so far; after a certain point, the gains brought about by the positive characteristics of the trait dimensions level off and may even begin to negatively impact productivity.

Yet, while mass behavior scholars have begun studying personality in context, such an undertaking possibly proves even more important when investigating legislative behavior. Yes, individuals matter, but legislatures and political context place great constraints on how legislators might behave. In other words, lawmakers exist and operate within institutions, and these institutions place a variety of external constraints on how legislators behave. Therefore, I also investigated how personality might interact with several of these external influences – namely tenure in office and legislative professionalism – to demonstrate how personality influences introductions, cosponsorship, and legislative effectiveness.

Tenure in office may offset some of the normatively negative characteristics associated with different personality dimensions. For example, the least conscientious legislators introduce and cosponsor more measures the longer they serve within the institution. Yet, these gains do not translate into higher levels of legislative success. Conversely, while tenure in office does not necessarily change the introduction or cosponsorship patterns of the highly conscientious, that additional time in office does translate into increased legislative success. Additionally, tenure in office also increases the productivity and success of the extraverted and the agreeable.

Second, legislative professionalism plays an important role in how legislators' personalities express themselves within the institution. For instance, while all legislators introduce more measures inside professional legislatures, the theoretical effects of moving legislators from citizen legislatures to professional legislatures impact various personalities differently. Moving a legislator low in conscientiousness from a citizen legislature to a professional legislature does not greatly alter the behavior of that legislator concerning introductions. Yet, moving a highly conscientious legislator from a citizen legislature to a professional legislature greatly increases the number of introductions that legislator makes.

Finally, chapter 5 provides us another chance to examine a possible environmental constraint on legislative behavior. Research on gender and legislative behavior has examined the personal characteristics, behavior, and policy impact of female legislators. For the most part, these efforts have investigated ways in which female legislators differ from their male counterparts. And while studying the behavior of female legislators vis a vis male legislators is important, we must also consider how female legislators differ from one another. This additional perspective provides us a fuller understanding of how environmental constraints affect behavior.

If we subscribe to the view of gender as a social construct and to so-called gendered institutions, then gender may influence how individuals express their personalities within legislatures. In other words, society has different expectations of the genders, and those differing expectations influence behavior. As a result, those societal expectations serve as an environmental constraint influencing how men and women express their underlying

psychological tendencies. In turn, these gendered institutions (in this case state legislatures) interpret, reward, and punish the expression of those tendencies in varying ways.

Again, I had several purposes in this chapter. I sought to provide a preliminary examination of how personality may drive male and female legislators to behave differently. Yet, I also set out to compare individuals within the group of female legislators. Indeed, the models demonstrate personality can operate differently in men and women. For example, I found both conscientiousness and emotional stability play different roles for men and women. For women, these trait dimensions negatively correlate with the more social legislative activities but positively correlate with the same in men. Emotional stability also affects the legislative success of male and female legislators differently. Emotional stability positively correlates with legislative success for women but negatively correlates with legislative success in men. Finally, while interacting gender, personality, and tenure in office does not produce any statistically or substantively significant findings, interacting gender, personality, and legislative professionalism does.

Normative Implications of Personality and Legislative Behavior

I believe these findings all have meaningful implications. Concerning the findings of chapter 3, current institutional rewards may advantage legislators with certain personality profiles over others. Remember, the more extraverted legislators report dedicating a greater deal of time involving themselves in social legislative activities to the exclusion of more purely legislative activities. To understand the potential consequences, let us consider a hypothetical. Suppose we have Legislator A, who scores high in extraversion but low in conscientiousness.

Given his personality characteristics, Legislator A likely dedicates far more time to the more social legislative activities than to more conventional legislative activities.

Compare Legislator A to Legislator B, an individual who scores high in conscientiousness but low in extraversion. Because of his personality, Legislator B feels more comfortable working behind the scenes on legislation but does not spend a great deal of time engaging in the social legislative activities. Which legislator receives institutional rewards such as a prime committee assignment or a leadership position within the party? Legislator A acts as a show horse, while Legislator B acts as a workhorse. Ideally, the party would want Legislator C, someone high in both extraversion and conscientiousness. But lacking that ideal candidate, which legislator does the institution choose to reward?

Furthermore, the personality and environment interaction terms could also have meaningful normative consequences. Recall, agreeableness does not appear to affect legislative effectiveness at the beginning of legislators' careers. However, as time goes on, the more agreeable legislators see increasing legislative success while the less agreeable legislators see declines in the same. Given the high levels of political polarization and perception of partisan bickering in legislatures, we would likely prefer more agreeable legislators to less agreeable legislators. And while agreeableness does not move the ideal points of the two parties closer to one another, agreeableness might lead to more efforts to cooperate with members of the other party. If we limit the amount of time legislators can serve in office through term limits, we may impair the ability of the agreeable to temper some of the negative effects of political polarization.

Similarly, legislative professionalism affects the behavior of individuals along a conscientiousness dimension. In truly citizen legislatures, differing levels of conscientiousness do not impact legislative activity. Yet, as we move legislators into highly professionalized legislatures, we see how differences in conscientiousness impact how legislators behave. Again, although there are no ideal scores on personality traits, it seems reasonable to argue citizens would prefer to have more conscientious legislators representing them rather than less. Yet, most state legislatures fall on the less professionalized end of the spectrum. While citizen legislatures have their advantages, they inhibit the highly conscientious from engaging with the institution as they would if the legislature were more professional.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Undoubtedly, legislative behavior is a complex phenomenon. But as I have shown, personality influences legislative behavior both in direct opposition to and in conjunction with conventional explanations of legislative behavior. Yet given these preliminary findings, where do we go from here? First, personality likely impacts the initial decision to run for office. Although their efforts consider decisions to run for the US House of Representatives, I believe replicating the efforts of Stone, Maestas, and Maisel at the state legislative level could shed light on whether and how personality influences individuals' decisions to run for elective office. Furthermore, such an effort could move beyond the individual's calculation and also investigate how local influentials interpret and employ personality when advocating for individuals to run. As such, we could gain greater understanding of how personality impacts individual- and group-level behavior.

Second, personality likely impacts progressive ambition. Certainly, there exists a variety of factors impacting someone's decision to run for higher office including the similarity of the new constituency to the old constituency, the availability of higher-level positions, and personal considerations. Yet, it seems logical personality dimensions like extraversion and openness to experience would also play a role in a legislators' decision calculus. If a legislator scores high on openness to experience, he may enjoy taking the risk of leaving a current position to run for a higher office. Similarly, an extravert might enjoy the increased social opportunities of running for higher office.

Furthermore, while some legislators seek to move to higher office, some are content remaining within their existing institutions but gaining increased power with those lower institutions. Therefore, personality may also serve as a predictor of intrainstitutional ambition. Although several more years need to pass to allow legislators time to move within the institution and for new election cycles to occur, the data as they exist now lend themselves to studying this possible relationship in the not-too-distant future.

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Tables

Table 2.1. Personality Self-Assessments of State Legislators by Percentage

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Mildly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Sociable and Active (N = 728)	35.0	42.9	14.8	4.0	1.7	0.6	1.5
Quiet and Shy (N =724)	0.8	4.8	13.4	10.9	11.2	30.0	28.9
Generous and Warm (N = 717)	20.9	47.1	21.1	6.4	2.4	1.1	1.0
Critical and Quarrelsome (N = 728)	0.7	2.0	9.8	9.3	13.2	40.5	24.5
Dependable and Self-Disciplined (N = 724)	36.1	47.8	11.9	2.1	0.8	0.4	1.0
Disorganized and Careless (N =718)	1.4	1.4	5.4	8.6	12.1	38.3	32.7
Calm and Emotionally Stable (N = 720)	23.3	49.2	15.3	7.6	1.9	1.5	1.1
Anxious and Easily Upset (N = 727)	1.0	1.4	5.9	9.2	14.3	40.7	27.5
Open to New Experiences and Intellectual (N = 722)	38.9	42.0	14.7	2.5	0.4	0.6	1.0
Uncreative and Unimaginative (N = 723)	0.6	0.7	2.6	5.7	7.3	34.4	48.7

Table 2.2. The Influence of Personality on the Ideology and Partisan Affiliation of State Legislators

	Ideology	Party Affiliation
Openness to Experience	-1.25*** (0.34)	-1.15** (0.41)
Conscientiousness	1.14*** (0.34)	1.25** (0.41)
Extraversion	0.84** (0.30)	0.78* (0.36)
Agreeableness	-1.27** (0.41)	-1.48** (0.49)
Emotional Stability	1.10** (0.36)	0.77# (0.43)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Gender	-1.34*** (0.16)	-1.05*** (0.19)
Race	-1.14*** (0.26)	-1.95*** (0.45)
Education	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.14# (0.07)
Constant		0.03 (0.67)
Number of Cases	666	680
χ^2	153.10	96.67

Table 2.3. The Influence of Personality on Types of Political Ambition

	Progressive Ambition	Committee Leader	Party Leader
Openness to Experience	0.16 (0.38)	-0.79 (0.53)	-1.52# (0.81)
Conscientiousness	-0.20 (0.38)	-0.28 (0.54)	0.16 (0.83)
Extraversion	1.48*** (0.34)	-0.03 (0.47)	-0.69 (0.75)
Agreeableness	-0.43 (0.44)	-0.42 (0.64)	-0.46 (1.02)
Emotional Stability	0.30 (0.40)	0.12 (0.57)	1.73# (0.94)
Age	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Gender	-0.46** (0.17)	-0.55* (0.27)	0.06 (0.38)
Race	0.56# (0.30)	0.12 (0.42)	0.13 (0.59)
Education	0.04 (0.07)	0.28* (0.11)	-0.19 (0.13)
Years in Office	-0.03* (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
First Term Dummy	-0.12 (0.21)	-0.43 (0.35)	-2.08* (0.25)
Competitive Prior Election	-0.22 (0.16)	0.38# (0.23)	-0.08 (0.37)
Party Affiliation	0.01 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.25)	-0.46 (0.38)
Majority 2009-2010	0.05 (0.16)	0.64* (0.25)	-0.05 (0.37)
Term-limited	0.47* (0.19)	0.18 (0.30)	0.14 (0.46)
Party Leader	-0.03 (0.31)		
Committee Leader	0.53** (0.21)		
Constant		-1.52# (0.20)	-2.09 (1.48)
Number of Cases	623	630	630
X^2	149.045	54.63	30.48

Table 3.1. Self-Reported Measures of Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Activities				
	Almost None	**A Little**	**A Moderate Amount**	**A Great Deal**
Meeting with Citizens in the District (N=745)	0.8	10.5	43.0	45.8
Meeting with Constituents at the Capital (N=744)	7.3	30.9	46.0	15.9
Engaging in Fundraising (N=739)	23.8	40.9	29.5	5.8
Attending Committee Meetings, Markups, and Other Meetings (N=739)	0.5	4.2	34.6	60.6
Meeting in the State Capital on Legislative Issues (N=745)	0.7	8.9	45.5	45.0
Studying, Reading, or Discussing Pending Legislation (N=743)	0.1	2.3	34.7	62.9
Working with Informal Caucuses (N=743)	8.2	31.6	43.1	17.1
Attending Floor Debate (N=741)	2.0	8.2	31.4	58.3
Working with Party Leaders to Build Coalitions (N=736)	10.2	26.1	44.7	19.0
Overseeing how Agencies Carry Out Policies and Programs (N=739)	7.7	32.1	42.1	18.1
Giving Speeches Outside the District about Legislation (N=740)	25.5	42.2	26.5	5.8

Table 3.2. Factor Analysis of Legislative Activities included in Survey		
	Factor One	**Factor Two**
Citizens	0.681	-0.003
Constituents	0.644	0.142
Fundraising	0.595	0.015
Committees	-0.046	0.759
Legislative Issues	-0.021	0.755
Studying	0.267	0.522
Caucuses	0.324	0.365
Coalitions	0.481	0.388
Floor Debate	0.122	0.590
Oversight	0.406	0.310
Speeches	0.659	0.072

Table 3.3. Personality and Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Behaviors

	Citizens	Constituents	Fundraising	Speeches	Coalitions	Oversight
Constant	-2.75** (0.79)	-0.74 (0.55)	0.28 (0.57)	1.40** (0.47)	-0.70 (0.44)	-0.59 (0.46)
Openness to Experience	-0.38 (0.40)	-1.01* (0.39)	-1.15*** (0.40)	-0.63 (0.52)	-0.53 (0.38)	-0.69* (0.32)
Conscientiousness	-1.15*** (0.29)	-0.19 (0.37)	-0.21 (0.37)	-0.73* (0.32)	-0.48 (0.35)	-0.22 (0.36)
Extraversion	-0.81* (0.33)	-0.41 (0.28)	-0.57* (0.28)	-0.96* (0.39)	-0.90** (0.32)	-0.19 (0.28)
Agreeableness	-0.59 (0.52)	-1.01* (0.48)	-1.17* (0.49)	-0.11 (0.47)	-0.17 (0.46)	-0.46 (0.36)
Emotional Stability	-0.13 (0.40)	-0.86* (0.39)	0.74# (0.41)	0.25 (0.30)	-0.30 (0.44)	-0.33 (0.34)
Gender	0.13 (0.15)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.27# (0.16)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.09 (0.19)
Race	0.02 (0.30)	-0.73# (0.42)	0.20 (0.36)	-0.26 (0.30)	0.35 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.36)
Party Affiliation	-0.21 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.19)	0.13 (0.18)	-0.31# (0.17)	0.08 (0.19)	-0.28 (0.18)
Majority	-0.15 (0.18)	0.18 (0.17)	0.17 (0.17)	0.00 (0.17)	0.10 (0.18)	-0.50** (0.18)
Years in Office	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03# (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
First Term Dummy	0.06 (0.17)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.23)	0.08 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.16)	0.10 (0.21)
Competitive Election	0.07 (0.16)	0.34 (0.23)	-0.12 (0.22)	0.30* (0.15)	0.16 (0.17)	0.19 (0.13)
Party Leader	-0.07 (0.29)	0.15 (0.44)	-1.02** (0.38)	-0.70* (0.30)	-0.68* (0.27)	-0.42 (0.29)
Committee Leader	-0.15 (0.22)	-0.01 (0.23)	-0.46# (0.25)	-0.34 (0.21)	-0.30 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.25)
Progressive Ambition	-0.08 (0.10)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.42** (0.13)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.11)
Chamber	0.20 (0.23)	-0.37# (0.19)	0.19 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.17)	0.22 (0.22)	-0.12 (0.20)
Term Limits	0.41# (0.22)	0.25 (0.28)	0.02 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.20)
Professionalism	-3.48** (1.18)	-0.47 (1.35)	-2.38 (1.52)	-1.29 (0.80)	1.22 (0.77)	0.46 (0.56)
Number of Cases	L1: 600 L2: 45	L1: 599 L2: 45	L1: 595 L2: 45	L1: 596 L2: 45	L1: 594 L2: 45	L1: 596 L2: 45

Note: cell entries employ ordinal logistic regression.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 3.3. Personality and Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Behaviors (cont.)

	Committees	Legislative Issues	Studying	Debate	Caucuses
Constant	-3.61*** (0.63)	-3.21*** (0.74)	-4.08** (1.18)	-1.80 ** (0.60)	-1.60** (0.46)
Openness to Experience	-0.94* (0.41)	-0.23 (0.41)	-1.94*** (0.48)	-0.28 (0.34)	-0.53 (0.38)
Conscientiousness	-1.39** (0.48)	-0.68# (0.41)	-1.01* (0.44)	-1.01* (0.40)	0.09 (0.29)
Extraversion	-0.13 (0.50)	-0.33 (0.35)	0.18 (0.37)	-0.80* (0.34)	-0.27 (0.32)
Agreeableness	0.00 (0.40)	-0.32 (0.46)	0.79 (0.52)	-1.08* (0.45)	-0.89# (0.48)
Emotional Stability	0.24 (0.40)	0.13 (0.39)	-0.71 (0.46)	-0.05 (0.30)	0.43 (0.46)
Gender	-0.39* (0.17)	-0.53*** (0.13)	-0.55** (0.18)	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.17 (0.15)
Race	0.11 (0.32)	-0.12 (0.25)	0.00 (0.30)	0.25 (0.30)	-0.50 (0.36)
Party Affiliation	0.21 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.17)
Majority	-0.19 (0.15)	-0.46** (0.17)	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.26 (0.19)	0.30# (0.16)
Years in Office	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
First Term Dummy	-0.08 (0.25)	0.01 (0.21)	0.04 (0.21)	0.44* (0.21)	-0.16 (0.21)
Competitive Election	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.16)
Party Leader	0.70# (0.38)	-0.33 (0.36)	0.06 (0.35)	-0.43 (0.38)	0.07 (0.31)
Committee Leader	0.17 (0.25)	0.19 (0.27)	0.26 (0.22)	-0.23 (0.21)	0.48* (0.21)
Progressive Ambition	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.10)
Chamber	-0.14 (0.18)	-0.25 (0.18)	0.32# (0.19)	-0.08 (0.22)	0.27 (0.22)
Term Limits	0.07 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.33)	0.05 (0.14)	0.23 (0.36)	0.14 (0.21)
Professionalism	-0.80 (0.97)	-2.55* (1.15)	-2.18* (0.86)	-1.56 (1.22)	-1.11 (1.14)
Number of Cases	L1: 594 L2: 45	L1: 601 L2: 45	L1: 599 L2: 45	L1: 596 L2: 45	L1: 599 L2: 45

Note: cell entries employ ordinal logistic regression.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 3.4. Personality and Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Behaviors

	Minimal Factor One	Full Factor One	Factor Two
Constant	0.20*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.56*** (0.04)
Openness to Experience	0.10** (0.04)	0.10** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	0.05* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
Extraversion	0.08** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Agreeableness	0.09* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Emotional Stability	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Gender	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Race	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Party Affiliation	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Majority	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Years in Office	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
First Term Dummy	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Competitive Election	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Party Leader	0.06* (0.03)	0.08** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Committee Leader	0.03# (0.02)	0.04# (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Progressive Ambition	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Chamber	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Term Limits	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Professionalism	0.22# (0.11)	0.11 (0.10)	0.19* (0.08)
Number of Cases	L1: 590 L2: 45	L1: 581 L2: 45	L1: 625 L2: 45

Note: cell entries employ restricted maximum likelihood regression.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.1 Personality, Introductions, and Cosponsorship		
	Measures Introduced	**Measures Cosponsored**
Constant	2.45*** (0.24)	3.90*** (0.37)
Openness to Experience	0.04 (0.17)	0.15 (0.17)
Conscientiousness	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)
Extraversion	0.04 (0.13)	0.01 (0.09)
Agreeableness	0.12 (0.14)	-0.11 (0.10)
Emotional Stability	-0.12 (0.13)	0.03 (0.11)
Party Affiliation	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.05)
Majority	0.19** (0.06)	-0.06# (0.03)
Years in Office	0.01# (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
First Term Dummy	-0.34*** (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)
Competitive Election	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)
Party Leader	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.16* (0.07)
Committee Leader	0.14** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)
Progressive Ambition	0.07# (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Chamber	0.42*** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.12)
Professionalism	2.80* (1.07)	4.82** (1.34)
N	L1: 846; L2: 356; L3: 27	L1: 789; L2: 356 L3: 27

Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.2 Personality and Legislative Effectiveness				
	Measures Introduced and Passed	**Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**	**% Measures Introduced and Passed**	**% Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**
Constant	0.69* (0.31)	1.97*** (0.35)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.18* (0.08)
Openness to Experience	0.29# (0.18)	0.49** (0.18)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06*** (0.02)
Conscientiousness	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.21 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)
Extraversion	-0.30 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Agreeableness	0.63*** (0.15)	0.05 (0.17)	0.07* (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)
Emotional Stability	-0.53** (0.17)	-0.04 (0.30)	-0.07# (0.04)	-0.04# (0.02)
Gender	0.15** (0.06)	0.23* (0.11)	0.03# (0.01)	0.02# (0.01)
Race	-0.42*** (0.11)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)
Party Affiliation	0.02 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Majority	0.47*** (0.12)	0.30*** (0.09)	0.08** (0.03)	0.04** (0.01)
Years in Office	0.02** (0.01)	0.01# (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
First Term Dummy	-0.23** (0.08)	0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)
Competitive Election	-0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Party Leader	0.01 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Committee Leader	0.34*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02# (0.01)
Majority*Party Leader	-0.06 (0.24)	-0.23 (0.21)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Majority*Committee Leader	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.22* (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Majority*Tenure	0.06 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Progressive Ambition	0.14** (0.05)	0.11# (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)

Table 4.2 Personality and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)				
Chamber	0.73*** (0.10)	0.25** (0.08)	0.05* (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)
Professionalism	0.98 (1.64)	4.48** (1.43)	-0.62* (0.29)	-0.23 (0.36)

Note: cell entries for measures introduced and passed and all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ Poisson regression with overdispersion, while cell entries for percent measures introduced and passed and percent all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ ordinary least squares regression.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.3 Personality and Cosponsorship			
	Conscientiousness²	**Extraversion²**	**Agreeableness²**
Constant	3.63***	3.57***	3.74***
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.33)
Openness to Experience	0.14	0.17	0.16
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Conscientiousness	0.86*	0.03	-0.01
	(0.34)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Extraversion	0.01	1.17*	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.46)	(0.08)
Agreeableness	-0.11	-0.07	0.54
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.37)
Emotional Stability	0.03	0.00	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Personality Term²	-0.62*	-0.95*	-0.56#
	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.31)
Party Affiliation	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Majority	-0.06#	-0.06*	-0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in Office	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
First Term Dummy	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Competitive Election	-0.06*	-0.06*	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party Leader	-0.16*	-0.16*	-0.16*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Committee Leader	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Progressive Ambition	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Chamber	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Professionalism	4.81**	4.79**	4.82**
	(1.34)	(1.37)	(1.34)

Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdisperson.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.4 Personality and Total Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed		
	Openness to Experience^2	**Extraversion^2**
Constant	1.42* -0.58	1.70*** -0.41
Openness to Experience	2.24* -0.95	0.50** -0.18
Conscientiousness	-0.24 -0.26	-0.19 -0.25
Extraversion	-0.07 -0.09	0.87 -0.54
Agreeableness	0.08 -0.16	0.08 -0.17
Emotional Stability	-0.04 -0.30	-0.07 -0.3
Personality Term^2	-1.30* -0.61	-0.80* -0.4
Gender	0.25* -0.11	0.24* -0.11
Race	-0.13** -0.05	-0.14** -0.05
Party Affiliation	-0.03 -0.07	-0.04 -0.07
Majority	0.30*** -0.09	0.29*** -0.09
Years in Office	0.02* -0.01	0.01# -0.01
First Term Dummy	0.00 -0.07	0.01# -0.07
Competitive Election	0.01 -0.05	0.00 -0.05
Party Leader	-0.04 -0.17	-0.03 -0.17
Committee Leader	0.20*** -0.05	0.21*** -0.05
Majority*Party Leader	-0.23 -0.21	-0.24 -0.22
Majority*Committee Leader	-0.22# -0.08	-0.22# -0.08
Majority*Tenure	-0.02 -0.05	-0.01 -0.05

Table 4.4 Personality and Total Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed (cont.)		
	Openness to Experience[2]	**Extraversion[2]**
Progressive Ambition	0.12# -0.06	0.11# -0.06
Chamber	0.25*** -0.08	0.24** -0.07
Professionalism	4.40** -1.4	4.45** -1.44

Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.5 The Interaction of Tenure and Conscientiousness and Legislative Effectiveness			
	Measures Introduced and Passed	**All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**	**Percent All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**
Constant	0.60# -0.33	2.06*** -0.34	0.21* -0.08
Openness to Experience	0.28 -0.17	0.49** -0.17	0.06*** -0.02
Conscientiousness	0.04 -0.16	-0.33 -0.28	-0.06** -0.02
Extraversion	-0.29 -0.21	-0.12 -0.09	-0.02# -0.01
Agreeableness	0.65*** -0.15	0.04 -0.17	0.04* -0.02
Emotional Stability	-0.54** -0.17	-0.03 -0.3	-0.04# -0.02
Gender	0.14* -0.05	0.23* -0.11	0.02# -0.01
Race	-0.43*** -0.11	-0.14** -0.05	-0.02 -0.01
Years in Office	0.05*** -0.02	-0.01 -0.01	-0.01 0
Years in Office*Conscientiousness	-0.04* -0.02	0.04* -0.02	0.01* 0
First Term Dummy	-0.23** -0.07	0 -0.07	0.02# -0.01
Party Affiliation	0.02 -0.11	-0.04 -0.07	0.01 -0.01
Majority	0.46*** -0.12	0.30*** -0.09	0.04** -0.01
Competitive Election	-0.06 -0.06	0 -0.06	0.01 -0.01
Party Leader	0.02 -0.24	-0.05 -0.18	0.02 -0.03
Committee Leader	0.35*** -0.07	0.20*** -0.05	0.02* -0.01
Progressive Ambition	0.14** -0.05	0.11# -0.06	0.01* -0.01
Majority*Party Leader	-0.07 -0.23	-0.23 -0.22	-0.03 -0.04
Majority*Committee Leader	-0.01 -0.14	-0.22* -0.09	-0.01 -0.04

Table 4.5 The Interaction of Tenure and Conscientiousness and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)

	Measures Introduced and Passed	All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed	Percent All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed
Majority*Tenure	0.06	-0.02	0.01
	-0.07	-0.05	-0.01
Chamber	0.74***	0.24**	0.03*
	-0.1	-0.08	-0.01
Professionalism	0.9	4.53**	-0.23
	-1.62	-1.45	-0.36

Note: cell entries for measures introduced and passed and all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ Poisson regression with overdispersion, while cell entries for percent all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ ordinary least squares regression.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.6 The Interaction of Conscientiousness and Professionalism		
	Introductions	**Cosponsorship**
Constant	2.69***	4.18***
	(0.29)	(0.38)
Openness to Experience	0.04	0.16
	(0.18)	(0.17)
Conscientiousness	-0.38*	-0.44**
	(0.19)	(0.14)
Extraversion	0.06	0.02
	(0.13)	(0.08)
Agreeableness	0.10	-0.12
	(0.14)	(0.10)
Emotional Stability	-0.09	0.05
	(0.14)	(0.11)
Professionalism	1.31	3.06*
	(1.37)	(1.43)
Conscientiousness*Professionalism	2.20*	2.58**
	(0.85)	(0.89)
Party Affiliation	-0.10	-0.06
	(0.11)	(0.05)
Majority	0.19**	-0.07*
	(0.07)	(0.03)
Years in Office	0.01#	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
First Term Dummy	-0.34***	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)
Competitive Election	-0.07*	-0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Party Leader	-0.03	-0.16*
	(0.09)	(0.07)
Committee Leader	0.14**	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Progressive Ambition	0.07#	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Chamber	0.43***	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.12)

Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.7 The Interaction of Tenure and Agreeableness on Legislative Behavior		
	Measures Cosponsored	**All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**
Constant	3.97*** -0.38	2.06*** -0.33
Openness to Experience	0.16 -0.17	0.49** -0.17
Conscientiousness	0 -0.11	-0.21 -0.24
Extraversion	0.01 -0.09	-0.09 -0.09
Agreeableness	-0.24* -0.11	-0.1 -0.19
Emotional Stability	0.03 -0.11	-0.04 -0.3
Years in Office	-0.02 -0.01	-0.01 -0.01
Years in Office*Agreeableness	0.03** -0.01	0.04** -0.01
First Term Dummy	-0.05 -0.06	0 -0.07
Party Affiliation	-0.05 -0.05	-0.04 -0.07
Majority	-0.06# -0.03	0.29*** -0.09
Competitive Election	-0.07* -0.03	0 -0.06
Party Leader	-0.16* -0.07	-0.05 -0.17
Committee Leader	-0.01 -0.03	0.20*** -0.06
Progressive Ambition	0.02 -0.03	0.11# -0.06
Chamber	-0.01 -0.12	0.25*** -0.08
Professionalism	4.85*** -1.34	4.50** -1.43
Gender		0.23* -0.1
Race		-0.15** -0.05

Table 4.7 The Interaction of Tenure and Agreeableness on Legislative Behavior (cont.)		
	Measures Cosponsored	**All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**
Majority*Party Leader		-0.22 -0.21
Majority*Committee Leader		-0.22* -0.09
Majority*Tenure		-0.01 -0.05

Note: cell entries employ Poisson regression with overdispersion.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 4.8 The Interaction of Tenure and Extraversion on Legislative Effectiveness		
	All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed	**Percent All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**
Constant	2.02***	0.19*
	-0.33	-0.08
Openness to Experience	0.49**	0.06***
	-0.18	-0.02
Conscientiousness	-0.22	-0.03
	-0.25	-0.02
Extraversion	-0.17#	-0.03*
	-0.09	-0.01
Agreeableness	0.06	0.04**
	-0.17	-0.02
Emotional Stability	-0.05	-0.04#
	-0.29	-0.02
Years in Office	0.00	0.00
	-0.01	0.00
Years in Office*Extraversion	0.02#	0.00#
	-0.01	0.00
First Term Dummy	0.00	0.02#
	-0.07	-0.01
Party Affiliation	-0.04	0.01
	-0.07	-0.01
Majority	0.29***	0.04**
	-0.09	-0.01
Competitive Election	0.00	0.01
	-0.05	-0.01
Party Leader	-0.05	0.02
	-0.18	-0.03
Committee Leader	0.20***	0.02#
	-0.06	-0.01
Progressive Ambition	0.11#	0.01*
	-0.06	-0.01
Chamber	0.24**	0.03*
	-0.08	-0.01
Professionalism	4.50**	-0.23
	-1.44	-0.36
Gender	0.23*	0.02#
	-0.11	-0.01
Race	-0.15**	-0.02
	-0.05	-0.01

Table 4.8 The Interaction of Tenure and Extraversion on Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)		
	All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed	**Percent All Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed**
Majority*Party Leader	-0.22	-0.03
	-0.22	-0.04
Majority*Committee Leader	-0.22*	-0.01
	-0.09	-0.02
Majority*Tenure	-0.02	0.01
	-0.05	-0.01

Note: cell entries for all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ Poisson regression with overdispersion, while cell entries for percent all measures introduced or cosponsored and passed employ ordinary least squares regression.
*** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 # p<.10

Table 5.1. Self-Reported Measures of Time Spent Engaging in Various Legislative Activities				
	Almost None	**A Little**	**A Moderate Amount**	**A Great Deal**
Meeting with Citizens in the District (N=745)	M: 0.8 F: 0.9	M: 11.5 F: 8.3	M: 38.6 F: 53.0	M: 49.1 F: 37.8
Meeting with Constituents at the Capital (N=744)	M: 6.4 F: 9.2	M: 31.0 F: 31.0	M: 45.6 F: 46.7	M: 17.0 F: 13.1
Engaging in Fundraising (N=739)	M: 24.0 F: 23.1	M: 41.1 F: 40.6	M: 30.9 F: 26.6	M: 3.9 F: 9.6
Attending Committee Meetings, Markups, and Other Meetings (N=739)	M: 0.8 F: 0.0	M: 4.5 F: 3.5	M: 38.4 F: 26.4	M: 56.3 F: 70.0
Meeting in the State Capital on Legislative Issues (N=745)	M: 1.0 F: 0.0	M: 9.2 F: 8.3	M: 48.1 F: 39.6	M: 41.7 F: 52.2
Studying, Reading, or Discussing Pending Legislation (N=743)	M: 0.2 F: 0.0	M: 2.9 F: 0.9	M: 38.4 F: 27.0	M: 58.5 F: 72.2
Working with Informal Caucuses (N=743)	M: 9.4 F: 5.7	M: 31.6 F: 31.6	M: 43.5 F: 42.5	M: 15.6 F: 20.2
Attending Floor Debate (N=741)	M: 2.5 F: 0.9	M: 8.0 F: 8.8	M: 32.5 F: 29.4	M: 56.9 F: 61.0
Working with Party Leaders to Build Coalitions (N=736)	M: 11.0 F: 8.4	M: 26.8 F: 24.8	M: 42.9 F: 48.7	M: 19.3 F: 18.1
Overseeing how Agencies Carry Out Policies and Programs (N=739)	M: 7.6 F: 8.0	M: 31.1 F: 34.5	M: 43.2 F: 39.4	M: 18.0 F: 18.1
Giving Speeches Outside the District about Legislation (N=740)	M: 25.1 F: 26.3	M: 39.6 F: 48.2	M: 28.2 F: 22.8	M: 7.1 F: 2.6

Table 5.2 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Activities						
	Bare Factor One	**Full Factor One**	**Citizens**	**Coalitions**	**Caucuses**	**Oversight**
Constant	0.23***	0.20***	-2.39**	-0.40	-1.29**	-0.32
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.79)	(0.43)	(0.47)	(0.50)
Openness to Experience	0.10**	0.10**	-0.39	-0.53	-0.53	-0.70*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.33)
Conscientiousness	0.09**	0.11***	-1.75***	-0.98*	-0.46	-0.68#
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.40)
Extraversion	0.08**	0.09***	-0.78*	-0.86**	-0.22	-0.15
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.29)
Agreeableness	0.09*	0.07*	-0.60	-0.18	-0.89#	-0.47
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.35)
Emotional Stability	0.00	0.02	-0.16	-0.33	0.41	-0.34
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.34)
Gender	0.08*	0.12***	-1.22**	-1.21*	-1.46*	-1.03*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.59)	(0.50)
Gender*Conscientiousness	-0.09*	-0.15***	1.93**	1.66*	1.84*	1.57**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.62)	(0.72)	(0.80)	(0.61)
Race	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.40	-0.47	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Party Affiliation	0.02	0.02	-0.20	0.09	-0.07	-0.27
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Majority	-0.01	0.01	-0.14	0.12	0.31#	-0.49**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Chamber	0.01	0.00	0.21	0.22	0.26	-0.12
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Years in Office	0.00	0.00	0.02#	-0.02#	0.00	-0.03*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
First Term Dummy	0.01	0.01	0.08	-0.12	-0.15	0.11
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Competitive Election	-0.02	-0.02	0.07	0.16	-0.08	0.20
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Party Leader	0.06*	0.07**	-0.01	-0.63*	0.11	-0.36
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Committee Leader	0.03#	0.04*	-0.16	-0.31	0.47*	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.25)
Progressive Ambition	0.02*	0.12	-0.08	-0.13	-0.10	-0.12
	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Term Limits	-0.02	-0.01	0.42#	-0.05	0.14	-0.33
	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.20)

Table 5.2 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Activities (cont.)						
	Bare Factor One	**Full Factor One**	**Citizens**	**Coalitions**	**Caucuses**	**Oversight**
Professionalism	0.22# (-0.11)	0.12 (-0.10)	-3.58** (1.20)	1.17 (-0.80)	-1.22 (1.13)	0.46 (-0.57)

Note: cell entries for bare factor one and full factor one are ordinary least squares coefficients and cell entries for citizens, coalitions, caucuses, and oversight are ordered logistic regression coefficients.

***p < .001 ** p < .01 *p < .05 # p<.10

Table 5.3 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Activity			
	Bare Factor One	**Full Factor One**	**Constituents**
Constant	0.23*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	-0.44 (0.54)
Openness to Experience	0.11** (0.04)	0.10** (0.03)	-1.05*** (0.39)
Conscientiousness	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.18 (0.38)
Extraversion	0.08*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.44 (0.28)
Agreeableness	0.09* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	-1.04* (0.47)
Emotional Stability	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	-1.24** (0.44)
Gender	0.08* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.90# (0.48)
Gender*Emotional Stability	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	1.41* (0.65)
Race	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.72# (0.42)
Party Affiliation	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.26 (0.19)
Majority	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.19 (0.17)
Chamber	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.36# (0.20)
Years in Office	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00	-0.02 (0.02)
First Term Dummy	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.24 (0.20)
Competitive Election	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.33 (0.24)
Party Leader	0.06* (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.14 (0.44)
Committee Leader	0.03# (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.23)
Progressive Ambition	0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.11)
Term Limits	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.26 (0.28)

Table 5.3 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Activity (cont.)			
	Bare Factor One	**Full Factor One**	**Constituents**
Professionalism	0.22#	0.11	-0.44
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(1.34)

Note: all entries for bare factor one and full factor one are ordinary least squares coefficients and cell entries for constituents are ordered logistic regression coefficients.

***p < .001 ** p < .01 *p < .05 # p<.10

Table 5.4 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness			
	Introductions	**% Introductions Passed**	**%All Measures Passed**
Constant	2.30*** (0.24)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.22* (0.08)
Openness to Experience	0.08 (0.17)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)
Conscientiousness	0.02 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)
Extraversion	0.02 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Agreeableness	0.13 (0.14)	0.07* (0.03)	0.04*** (0.01)
Emotional Stability	0.23 (0.15)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Gender	0.42*** (0.10)	-0.04 -0.04	-0.07** -0.03
Gender*Emotional Stability	-0.62*** (0.14)	0.10# (0.05)	0.15*** (0.04)
Party Affiliation	-0.09 (0.11)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Chamber	0.41*** (0.08)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)
Majority	0.20** (0.07)	0.08** (0.03)	0.04** (0.01)
Years in Office	0.01 (0.01)	0.00# (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
First Term Dummy	-0.35*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)
Competitive Election	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Progressive Ambition	0.08# (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Party Leader	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Committee Leader	0.14** (0.05)	0.04** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Professionalism	2.83* (1.08)	-0.62* (0.29)	-0.23 (0.36)
Race		-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)

Table 5.4 Emotional Stability, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)			
	Introductions	**% Introductions Passed**	**%All Measures Passed**
Majority*Party Leader		0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)
Majority*Committee Leader		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Majority*Tenure		0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)

Note: cell entries for introductions are Poisson regression with overdispersion coefficients and cell entries for percentage introductions passed and percentage all measures passed are ordinary least squares coefficients.
***p < .001 ** p < .01 *p < .05 # p<.10

Table 5.5 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness	
	% Introductions Passed
Constant	0.25*** (0.06)
Openness to Experience	0.03 (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.06 (0.05)
Extraversion	-0.01 (0.03)
Agreeableness	0.07* (0.03)
Emotional Stability	-0.07 (0.04)
Gender	-0.04 (0.04)
Gender*Conscientiousness	0.10# (0.06)
Party Affiliation	0.02 (0.02)
Chamber	0.05* (0.02)
Majority	0.08** (0.03)
Years in Office	0.00# (0.00)
First Term Dummy	0.01 (0.02)
Competitive Election	-0.01 (0.01)
Progressive Ambition	0.01 (0.01)
Party Leader	-0.02 (0.03)
Committee Leader	0.03* (0.02)
Professionalism	-0.63* (0.29)
Race	-0.06** (0.02)

Table 5.5 Conscientiousness, Gender, and Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)	
	% Introductions Passed
Majority*Party Leader	0.04 (0.0)5
Majority*Committee Leader	-0.01 (0.02)
Majority*Tenure	-0.01 (0.02)

Note: cell entries for percentage introductions passed are ordinary least squares coefficients.

***p < .001 ** p < .01 *p < .05 # p<.10

Table 5.6 Personality, Gender, Professionalism, and Cosponsorship		
	Extraversion	**Agreeableness**
Constant	4.06*** (0.39)	4.12*** (0.35)
Openness to Experience	0.13 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)
Conscientiousness	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.10)
Extraversion	-0.18 (0.32)	0.01 (0.09)
Agreeableness	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.42 (0.35)
Emotional Stability	0.02 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)
Personality Term*Professionalism	1.21 (1.41)	2.16 (1.46)
Gender*Professionalism	3.44*** (1.08)	3.38* -1.51
Personality Term*Gender	0.61 (0.44)	0.54 (0.51)
Personality Term*Gender*Professionalism	-4.04* (1.81)	-4.46* (2.25)
Party Affiliation	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Majority	-0.07* -0.03	-0.07* (0.03)
Years in Office	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
First Term Dummy	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)
Competitive Election	-0.06# (0.03)	-0.06# (0.03)
Party Leader	-0.15# (0.08)	-0.15* (0.08)
Committee Leader	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Progressive Ambition	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Chamber	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)

Table 5.6 Personality, Gender, Professionalism, and Cosponsorship (cont.)		
	Extraversion	**Agreeableness**
Professionalism	3.73* (1.56)	3.28* (1.49)

Note: cell entries are Poisson regression with overdispersion coefficients.

***p < .001 ** p < .01 *p < .05 # p<.10

Table 5.7 The Effect of Openness, Gender, and Professionalism on Legislative Effectiveness	
	Introductions
Constant	0.23** (0.08)
Openness to Experience	-0.01 (0.05)
Conscientiousness	-0.02 (0.02)
Extraversion	-0.01 (0.01)
Agreeableness	0.04* (0.02)
Emotional Stability	-0.05# (0.15)
Gender	-0.11 (0.08)
Gender*Professionalism	0.58 (0.40)
Gender*Openness	0.17* (0.07)
Openness*Professionalism	0.30 (0.33)
Gender*Openness*Professionalism	-0.71# (0.40)
Party Affiliation	0.01 (0.01)
Chamber	0.03* (0.01)
Majority	0.04** (0.01)
Years in Office	0.00 (0.00)
First Term Dummy	0.02* (0.01)
Competitive Election	0.01 (0.01)
Progressive Ambition	0.01 (0.01)
Party Leader	0.02 (0.03)

Table 5.7 The Effect of Openness, Gender, and Professionalism on Legislative Effectiveness (cont.)	
	Introductions
Committee Leader	0.02# (0.01)
Professionalism	-0.46 (0.36)
Race	-0.02 (0.02)
Majority*Party Leader	-0.03 (0.04)
Majority*Committee Leader	-0.01 (0.02)
Majority*Tenure	0.01 (0.01)

Note: cell entries are Poisson regression with overdispersion coefficients.

***p < .001 ** p < .01 *p < .05 # p<.10

Figures

Figure 1.1



Figure 1.2


Majority Status
Years in Office
Leadership Positions
Electoral Vulnerability
Personality
Legislative Behaviors

Figure 1.3


External Constraints
External Constraints
Personality
Legislative Behaviors

Figure 1.4


Bouchard & McGue (2003)
Mondak et al. (2010); Mondak & Halperin
Mondak et al. (2010); Mondak & Halperin
Genes
Personality Traits
Political Attitudes
Political Behaviors
Fowler et al. (2008)

Figure 1.5


Environmental Influences
External Influences
Genes
Personality Traits
Political Attitudes
Political Behaviors

Figure 4.1


Introductions, Cosponsored Measures, or Legislative Effectiveness by Personality Trait Dimension Score
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Introductions, Cosponsored Measures, or Legislative Effectiveness

Figure 4.2


Introductions, Cosponsored Measures, or Legislative Effectiveness by Personality Trait Dimension Score
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Introductions, Cosponsored Measures, or Legislative Effectiveness

Figure 4.3


Introductions, Cosponsored Measures, or Legislative Effectiveness by Personality Trait Dimension Score
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Introductions, Cosponsored Measures, or Legislative Effectiveness

Figure 4.4


Levels of Cosponsorship with Varying Levels of Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Agreeableness
130
125
120
115
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Conscientiousness
Extraversion
Agreeableness

Figure 4.5


Number of Measures Introduced or Cosponsored and Passed by Openness to Experience and Extraversion
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Openness to Experience
Extraversion

Figure 4.6


Successful Measures Introduced or Cosponsored by Conscientiousness and Years in Office
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
0
2
4
6
8
10
Years in Office
Conscientiousness=0
Conscientiousness=.5
Conscientiousness=1

Figure 4.7


Cosponsored Measures by Conscientiousness and Legislative Professionalism
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.4
0.5
Legislative Professionalism
Conscientiousness=0
Conscientiousness=.5
Conscientiousness=1

Figure 4.8


Effects of Conscientiousness and Legislative Professionalism on Cosponsorship
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.4
0.5
Legislative Professionalism
Conscientiousness=0
Conscientiousness=.5
Conscientiousness=1

Figure 4.9


Effects of Agreeableness and Tenure in Office on Cosponsorship
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
Years in Office
Agreeableness=0
Agreeableness=.5
Agreeableness=1

Figure 5.1


Effect of Conscientiousness on Full Factor One Score by Gender
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Conscientiousness
Men
Women

Figure 5.2


Predicted Probabilities of Reporting Spending "Almost None" or "A Little" Time on Coalition-Building by Gender
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0
0.5
1
Conscientiousness
Men
Women

Figure 5.3


Predicted Probabilities of Reporting Spending "A Moderate Amount" or "A Great Deal" of Time on Coalition-Building by Gender
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0
0.5
1
Conscientiousness
Men
Women

Figure 5.4


Effects of Agreeableness and Legislative Professionalism on Cosponsorship for Men
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.4
0.5
Legislative Professionalism
Agreeableness=0
Agreeableness=0.5
Agreeableness=1

Figure 5.5


Effects of Agreeableness and Legislative Professionalism on Cosponsorship for Women
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.4
0.5
Legislative Professionalism
Agreeableness=0
Agreeableness=0.5
Agreeableness=1

Appendix A: Survey Instrument

1. Here are a series of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Using the scale below[20], please tell me which answer indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.
Sociable and active person
Critical and quarrelsome person
Dependable and self-disciplined person
Anxious and easily upset person
Open to new experiences and intellectual person
Quiet and shy person
Generous and warm person
Disorganized and careless person
Calm and emotionally stable person
Uncreative and unimaginative person

2. Which best describes your attitude toward seeking higher office in the future?
I would definitely like to run for higher office in the future.
I might run for higher office in the future if the opportunity presented itself,
I would not completely rule out running for higher office in the future, but I am currently not interested.
I would absolutely never run for higher office in the future.

3. This year (2010), have Republicans and Democrats in your legislature been working together more to solve problems or have they been bickering and opposing one another more than usual?
They have been working together more.
They have been bickering and opposing one another more than usual.
There has been no change from previous years.

4. When it comes to politics, do you think of yourself as:
Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Moderate or Middle of the Road
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Extremely Conservative

5. What about when it comes to economic issues – do you think of yourself as:

[20] Scale used consisted of the following response options: strongly agree; disagree; somewhat disagree; neither agree nor disagree; somewhat agree; agree; and, strongly agree.

Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Moderate or Middle of the Road
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Extremely Conservative

6. And what about when it comes to social issues – do you think of yourself as:
Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Moderate or Middle of the Road
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Extremely Conservative

7. Think of the other members of your legislature. When it comes to politics, do you think the other members of your legislature are generally:
Extremely Liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Moderate or Middle of the Road
Slightly Conservative
Conservative
Extremely Conservative

8. What is your party affiliation?
Democrat
Independent/Other
Republican

9. Do you believe that the compensation received by legislators in your state is too much, too little, or about right?
Too much
Too little
About right

10. Do you believe that the number of days your legislature spends in session is too much, too little, or about right?
Too much
Too little
About right

11. Do you believe that the number of legislative staff working in your legislature is adequate, inadequate, or about right?
Adequate
Inadequate
About right

12. The following is a series of statements about your state's legislature. Using the scale below[21], please tell me the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.
Increasing legislator compensation would improve the quality of work done by legislators
Increasing legislator compensation would improve the quality of legislator that serves in your state's legislature
Increasing the number of days in session would improve the quality of work done by legislators
Increasing the number of days in session would improve the quality of legislator that serves in your state's legislature
Increasing the number of legislative staff would improve the quality of work done by legislators
Increasing the number of staff would improve the quality of legislator that serves in your legislature

13. How much time do you spend engaging in each of the following activities[22]:
Meeting with citizens in your district
Meeting with constituents in the state capital
Engaging in fundraising activities
Attending committee hearings, markups, and other meetings
Meeting in state capital on legislative issues
Studying, reading, or discussing pending legislation
Working with informal caucuses
Attending floor debate (a great deal, a moderate amount, a little, almost none)
Working with party leaders to build coalitions
Overseeing how agencies are carrying out policies and programs
Giving speeches outside district about legislation

[21] Scale used consisted of the following response options: strongly agree; disagree; somewhat disagree; neither agree nor disagree; somewhat agree; agree; and, strongly agree.
[22] Scale options included: a great deal; a moderate amount; a little; and, almost none.

14. Ideally, how much time would you like to spend engaging gin each of the following activities[23]:

Meeting with citizens in your district
Meeting with constituents in the state capital
Engaging in fundraising activities
Attending committee hearings, markups, and other meetings
Meeting in state capital on legislative issues
Studying, reading, or discussing pending legislation
Working with informal caucuses
Attending floor debate (a great deal, a moderate amount, a little, almost none)
Working with party leaders to build coalitions
Overseeing how agencies are carrying out policies and programs
Giving speeches outside district about legislation

15. How would you evaluate the quality of legislator that serves in your state's legislature?

Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Very Poor

16. How would you evaluate the overall performance of your state's legislature?

Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Very poor

17. Overall, how professionalized would you say your legislature is?

Professionalized
Substantially professionalized
Marginally professionalized
Not professionalized

18. Do you believe your state leiglsature is adequately professionalized, or would your state benefit from having a more professionalized legislature?

Adequately professionalized
Would benefit from having a more professional legislature

[23] Scale options included: a great deal; a moderate amount; a little; and, almost none.

19. Thinking generally, please rank each of the following issues in terms of how you think they should be prioritized by the state legislature. Choose 1 for the issue you think should be the legislature's top priority, 2 for the issue that should be the second priority, and so on.

Taxes
Same-sex marriage
Abortion
Transportation
Higher Education
Secondary Education
Crime

Appendix B: Results of T-Tests for Personality and Control Variables		
	Full Sample	**Subset**
Openness	t=-2.409 p=0.02	t=-2.694 p=0.01
Conscientiousness	t=-3.367 p=0.00	t=-2.969 p=0.00
Extraversion	t=-1.387 p=0.17	t=-1.287 p=0.20
Agreeableness	t=-1.791 p=0.07	t=-1.274 p=0.20
Emotional Stability	t=-0.761 p=0.07	t=-0.595 p=0.55
Race	t=-1.234 p=0.22	t=-1.343 p=0.18
Party	t=6.467 p=0.00	t=3.639 p=0.00
Majority Status	t=-1.473 p=0.14	t=0.765 p=0.44
Progressive Ambition	t=2.667 p=0.01	t=0.884 p=0.38
First Term Dummy	t=-0.998 p=0.32	t=-1.603 p=0.11
Party Leader	t=1.601 p=0.11	t=2.688 p=0.01
Committee Leader	t=2.815 p=0.01	t=1.007 p=0.31
Competitive Prior Election	t=-2.474 p=0.01	t=-0.788 p=0.43
Years in Office	t=2.428 p=0.02	t=4.648 p=0.00
Chamber	t=0.817 p=0.41	t=-1.804 p=0.07
Professionalism	t=0.958 p=0.34	t=-1.058 p=0.29
Term Limits	t=-0.959 p=0.34	t=-1.712 p=0.09

Appendix C: Results of T-Tests for Dependent Variables	
Meeting with Citizens in the District	t=1.552 p=0.12
Meeting with Constituents at the Capital	t=1.436 p=0.15
Engaging in Fundraising	t=-1.124 p=0.26
Attending Committee Meetings, Markups, and Other Meetings	t=-3.598 p=0.00
Meeting in the State Capital on Legislative Issues	t=-2.522 p=0.01
Studying, Reading, or Discussing Pending Legislation	t=-4.039 p=0.00
Working with Informal Caucuses	t=-1.763 p=0.08
Attending Floor Debate	t=-1.133 p=0.00
Working with Party Leaders to Build Coalitions	t=-0.858 p=0.39
Overseeing how Agencies Carry Out Policies and Programs	t=0.577 p=0.32
Giving Speeches Outside the District about Legislation	t=2.400 p=0.02
Bare Factor One	t=1.429 p=0.15
Full Factor One	t=0.840 p=0.40
Factor Two	t=-3.665 p=0.00